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ABSTRACT 
This MPhil compares Turkish and Australian foreign policy relations with the 
United States (US) between c.1975 and 2018. This comparison will investigate 
whether these bilateral relations resemble the “wavy cross” explored in my 
doctoral thesis. From the mid-1940s to the mid-1970s Turkish-American 
relations followed a fluctuating downward curve, while Australian-American 
relations followed a fluctuating upward curve. Turkey moved away from the US, 
Australia moved closer, a pattern like a “wavy cross”.  
This thesis begins where my PhD concludes, c.1975. The thesis will test whether 
the divergence between global priorities of a great power and the local/national 
priorities of two middle powers, together with the imbalance in their bilateral 
relations, continued to affect the stability of the arms and the tendency of the 
“wavy cross”. Although the metaphor in my PhD is the “wavy cross”, wobbly 
seems more appropriate in illustrating the fluctuations of the arms. Each chapter 
examines reasons inducing the wobbles and sustaining the tendency of the 
Turkish and the Australian arms, to test the validity of the “wobbly cross”. 
The rationale behind comparing Turkey and Australia is threefold. First, both 
Turkey and Australia are well known examples of middle powers, but little 
research has been conducted on their comparison. Second, my ultimate aim is to 
combine the PhD and the MPhil theses and make them a book. Third, for 
International Relations and Political History literature middle powers’ foreign 
policy actions is still an unclear area. Hopefully, this work could cast light on 
commonalities and differences of two significant middle powers’ foreign policies.  
This is a Political History rather than an International Relations project, since it 
aims to compare foreign policies, primary records on policy makers’ statements, 
and actions which are a reliable basis for analysis. As I experienced during my 
PhD research, International Relations theories and patterns do not explain middle 
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Introduction: Testing the “Wobbly Cross” 
This thesis compares two significant middle powers’ relations with a great power 
since c.1975. Since the end of the Second World War, Turkey and Australia have 
been prominent allies of the US. Each alliance, Turkey-US and Australia-US, is 
conceived as the arm of a cross, because they followed opposing trends. Each 
arm had sporadic ups and downs in their US relations, here called wobbles. This 
“wobbly cross” was examined for 1945 to 1975 in my PhD thesis.1 The aim of this 
MPhil thesis is to test whether the tendencies exposed then continued later.  
In the “wobbly cross”, the Turkish arm follows a downward sloping trend which 
demonstrates Turkey’s trending away from the US, while the Australian arm 
follows an upward sloping trend illustrating Australia’s trending towards the US. 
The “wobbly cross” depicts these contrasting arms since the early 1940s. Neither 
arm of the cross is simply linear: each wobbles and even dips as its US relations 
oscillate. The wobbles illustrate changes in relations between a middle and a 
great power. Essentially, they reflect middle power national security concerns 
versus a desire for self-reliance and national autonomy. 
The “wobbly cross” suggests that, regardless of a middle power’s political, 
cultural, or institutional differences, inherent factors shape its relations with 
great powers. The thesis explores these factors with two concepts: imbalance in 
relations, and divergence of priorities. Imbalance is a result of a middle power’s 
political, diplomatic, economic or military need of a great power, set against a 
much lesser great power need for middle power support. Acknowledging this 
imbalance requires the middle power to be a loyal ally, thereby avoiding wobbles 
on its arm. National priorities are narrower and more context-oriented. Great and 
middle powers’ national interests might converge, yet their priorities might 
diverge. This thesis argues that these two concepts greatly determined the 
wobbly diagonal shape of Turkey and Australia’s relations with the US. Even if a 
middle power acknowledges an imbalance in its relations with a great power, if 
 
1 There called the “wavy cross”. Gürol Baba, The “Wavy Cross”: Australia, Turkey and the US 1945-
1975, Canberra: The Australian National University, 2010.  
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the priorities diverge, the two cannot develop full cooperation. Australia provides 
an example of convergence while Turkey exemplifies divergence.  
To make this argument, the thesis confines itself mainly to the political and 
diplomatic manifestations of the two concepts above, for want of time and space 
not seriously addressing other factors such as bilateral trade, the US global role, 
and in Australia’s case a common language and similar traditions. I am aware of 
these factors, but chose instead to investigate closely the diplomatic and political 
sources in the archives of all three countries. I believe these secure my 
argument, even though it might be extended to those other realms.  
My argument is necessarily based on the evidence available, for the case studies 
here are about recent events. The thesis examines many sources not previously 
accessed. There may well also be evidence not yet accessible which will amend 
this account; for example the Turkish view of bilateral relations is more detailed 
than is available from US sources. Nonetheless, since the thesis is outlining the 
broad scope of policy and practice, it argues that the evidence available and the 
events portrayed sustain the “wobbly cross”.  
I express my argument in five parts, each of which has two chapters, a case 
study on Turkey, and one on Australia, except for the first part which bridges the 
1970s, where my PhD finished for want of then available sources.   
The first part points to the difference in the level of trust between Turkey’s and 
Australia’s relations with the US. A clear imbalance in Turkish-American relations 
was magnified by Turkey’s deteriorating economy. Although the US lifted an 
arms embargo imposed after Turkey’s Cyprus intervention (1974) and re-
commenced US aid, the Turkish administration still blamed the US for 
aggravating its economic crisis. The arm trended away from the US. The major 
Australian imbalance was its need for US strategic support in the Indo-Pacific, to 
stabilize the region and ensure Australia’s national security. Following the Guam 
Doctrine’s emphasis on self-reliance,2 Prime Minister Gough Whitlam followed an 
active and partly autonomous foreign policy which to an extent ran counter to US 
 
2 See Chapter 1 
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priorities. This induced wobbles, but the following Malcolm Fraser government 
eased them due to the traditional strength of bilateral relations, and sustained 
the arms’ trend.  
The second part examines the 1980s, during which the influence of broken trust 
continued in Turkey-US relations. It became clear that Turkey’s national priorities 
were economic while the US’ were military. The more each party pushed its own 
priority, the more wobbles were induced. Moreover, the age-old problems of 
Cyprus, the Kurds, and Armenia re-surged in this era, so Turkey continued to 
trend away from the US. Australia’s relations with the US strengthened because 
of the attitudes of the conservatives, despite Prime Minister Bob Hawke’s careful 
push for a self-reliant foreign policy. Hawke acknowledged the imbalance in 
Australia-US relations due to the former’s continuing need for ANZUS’ day to day 
benefits in military and intelligence equipment, and its deterrent value.  
The third part looks at Turkey, Australia and the US during the Gulf War (1990-
1991). Both Prime Minister Turgut Özal and Hawke tried to support US policies in 
Kuwait, but only Hawke was able to align his country’s priorities with the US. 
Özal acknowledged the imbalance due to his need for US support to strengthen 
the Turkish economy and Turkey’s clout in the Middle East. Yet his insistent 
efforts to secure more commercial and economic support from the US by using 
the Gulf Crisis were rejected by the US administration. Anti-American Turkish 
parliamentary and bureaucratic opposition then gradually weakened Özal’s 
political influence. By the end of the Gulf War, Özal finally understood that 
Turkey’s significance for the US was merely security-oriented. The trend of the 
Turkish arm was maintained. Australia acknowledged the imbalance because of 
the value and the tradition of ANZUS. Hawke used ANZUS requirements, 
Australia’s custom of following US policies, and UN resolutions to convince 
parliament and public opinion to support his decision to commit the Australian 
Defence Force (ADF)to the Gulf War. 
The fourth part investigates relations during the preparatory stages of the Iraq 
War (2001-2003). As in the Gulf War, Australia was more successful in aligning 
its priorities with the US for two major reasons. First, the Gulf was far from 
Australia’s strategic priorities, so it did not create an overwhelming parliamentary 
4 
and public reaction against Prime Minister John Howard’s decision for military 
commitment. Second, Howard successfully used a rhetoric for Australia’s 
commitment by linking UN resolutions with the gravity of the terrorist threat to 
Australia. The Australian arm maintained its trend. Turkish Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan was in a more vulnerable situation. He acknowledged the 
imbalance due to his need for US support to strengthen his position domestically 
and internationally. Although he became popular both in Turkey and in 
Washington, he could not suppress anti-American opposition in Turkey. Like 
Özal, he therefore could not align Turkey’s priorities with the US. The Turkish 
parliament’s crucial rejection of the resolution authorizing the US to use Turkish 
soil and bases for its Iraqi operation induced one of the biggest wobbles on the 
Turkish arm. Erdoğan’s subsequent efforts could not change its trend. 
The last part examines the effect of the Syrian Crisis on Turkey, Australia and 
the US. On Syria, Turkish and American priorities continued to diverge. Although 
high-level communications constantly emphasized the importance of Turkish-
American cooperation in Syria, in practice Turkish and US policies diverged. The 
crisis posed a direct and acute threat to Turkey via trans-border terrorist 
insurgencies, a massive number of Syrian refugees, and ISIS. Turkey’s relations 
with the US were still imbalanced due to its need for US support to suppress 
these threats. Erdoğan tried to convince the US of the gravity of these threats, 
but failed. Turkey and the US only effectively cooperated on fighting ISIS, which 
was the foremost US priority. The US’ neglect of Turkey’s priorities continually 
induced wobbles and sustained the Turkish arm’s tendency. Australia followed US 
priorities in Syria both in the UN Security Council and in the field. Supporting the 
US was paying a security insurance premium for the Indo-Pacific region, which is 
becoming a theatre of US-China rivalry.  
Apart from my PhD no previous attempt has compared Turkish and Australian 
policies in relation to the US, even though great power-middle power relations 
are often examined in international relations. This thesis aims to add untold 
stories to the public record and to offer new insights via this comparison. It 
validates my PhD’s central argument that the relations between middle and great 
powers are essentially imbalanced and unequal, because the great power has 
priorities extending far beyond those of its middle power partners, whose own 
5 
priorities the great power is prone to misunderstand or see as unimportant, and 
to disregard or even sacrifice if they run counter to its own priorities. Middle 
powers therefore live permanently on the edge of uncertainty. 
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PART 1:  
Turkey-US & Australia-US in the 1970s: incurable and curable wobbles 
In the 1970s, Turkey had difficulty in aligning its priorities with the US. The two 
parties might have similar national interests, such as NATO’s general 
effectiveness, and stability in the Middle East, but divergent priorities made it 
difficult for both to utilize their similarities. The priorities conflicted predominantly 
due to the Cyprus embargo. They made the Turkish arm of the cross quite 
wobbly, and the wobbles incurable. In the second half of the 1970s, the Turkish 
arm continued its tendency to show Turkey moving away from the US. 
************************* 
In 1975 the US Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey in retaliation for 
Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus.1 Although the punitive measures taken against 
Turkey only amounted to US military material, bilateral relations quickly, and 
significantly, deteriorated.2 US officials described this situation: 
The venom injected into US-Turkish relations by the controversy over 
military aid is likely to poison other important bilateral dealings as well. 
It will be difficult … to conduct fruitful discussions on sensitive issues. 3 
The arms embargo worsened the relations so quickly because of Turkey’s heavy 
dependence on US military aid, without which Turkey could not sustain its 
defence budget.  Since 1950, the US Military Assistance Program provided over 
$3 billion worth of military equipment to Turkey. Up to 1975:  
The US has supplied the Turkish Army with over 95 percent of its 
medium tank inventory, all of its personnel carriers, and all of its post-
World War II field artillery. About 85 percent of Turkey’s aircraft have 
come from the US. Almost all major naval combatants are former US 
 
1 FRUS, 1969-76, Vol. 30, Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, 21 February 1975 
2 For details of the influence of the US arms embargo on Turkish-American relations see Richard C. 
Campany, Turkey and the United States: the Arms Embargo Period, New York: Praeger, 1986; see 
also FRUS, 1969-76, Vol. 30, Paper Prepared in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 
227, 20 August 1975; FRUS, 1969-76, Vol. 30, Memorandum of Conversation, 23 September 
1975; FRUS, 1969-76, Vol. 30, Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, 
5 November 1975. 
3 FRUS, 1969-76, Vol. 30, Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, 21 February 1975. 
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vessels supplied through the MAP or built in Turkey under a cost-sharing 
program. More than 18,500 Turkish military personnel have been 
trained over the past 25 years with US assistance, nearly all in the US.4  
 With the increased burden, the Turkish military was unable to properly maintain 
its defence equipment and modernization program.5 The burden on the budget 
also sparked domestic socio-political tensions.6 Turkey had to find alternatives.  
Turkish leaders looked for both domestic and foreign solutions to alleviate this 
pressure. They tried to diversify the components of Turkey’s military arsenal by 
focusing on domestic production, by buying arms from other NATO members 
such as West Germany and Italy, and by receiving ‘help from wealthy Middle 
Eastern countries, [e.g.] Libya and Iran’. Turkey also considered opening 
negotiations with the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries for military 
equipment.7 The problem, however, persisted as none of these measures could 
replace the loss of US material. The US, on the other hand, did not show any 
substantial interest in Turkey’s economic situation.8 Turkey’s quest for 
alternatives and the American administration’s indifference further undermined 
an already damaged trust.  
Turkey soon saw that these alternatives were not as useful/profitable/valuable as 
the US alliance. Turkish government needed to get US attention, to re-start the 
aid inflow. For this, the Turkish leaders used the strategic value of its military 
bases. Turkey’s ultimate priority was to convince the US to lift the arms 
embargo. 
On 17 June 1975, the Demirel Government revoked the 1969 Defence 
Cooperation Agreement, an umbrella agreement concerned with the overall 
defence of the western alliance, and several related arrangements, and 
downgraded US facilities in Turkey to “provisional status”.9 Demirel also 
 
4 FRUS, 1969-76, Vol. 30, Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, 21 February 1975. 
5 For details see FRUS, 1969-76, Vol. 30, Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, 21 February 
1975. 
6 Milliyet, 20 January 1975. 
7 FRUS, 1969-76, Vol. 30, Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, 21 February 1975. 
8 FRUS, 1969-76, Vol. 30, Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, 21 February 1975. 
9 US National Security Council Institutional Records, NSSM 227 US Security Policy Toward Turkey, 
08/1975, National Security Council Institutional Files, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. 
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suspended four US electronic intelligence facilities responsible for monitoring the 
Black Sea for the US Sixth Fleet’s operations, and for USSR naval endeavours. 
The bases were also providing US aircraft an ‘extensive use of Turkish air space 
to fly from Europe into the Mediterranean’.10 On 27 July, Demirel restricted US 
military operations in İncirlik, the ‘main US NATO operating base in Turkey and 
the sole US … airlift terminal for Turkey’, to purely those needed for NATO 
purposes.11  
Demirel’s moves were partly successful. In order to regain access to these 
intelligence facilities, the Ford administration concluded a new defence 
cooperation agreement with Turkey on 26 March 1976, which allowed their 
resumption and established ‘the level of US assistance to Turkey during a four-
year period at $250 million per year’.12  The aid inflow re-started but the amount 
was not enough for Turkey’s growing economic instability.   
During the 1970s, Turkey spent around 30% of its budget on defence.13 
Budgetary pressure further increased on the back of the OPEC oil embargo in 
1973. Since the Turkish economy depended on imported oil, the rise in oil prices 
from $2.3 to $11.60 per barrel caused alarm. As a last resort the Turkish Central 
Bank began to print money and borrow short-term. Due to the losses of state 
enterprises the public sector deficits only increased, raising inflation to around 
40% in the second half of 1977. Turkey’s economy was on the verge of 
bankruptcy.14  
 
10 “NSC Meeting, 9/17/1975”, the National Security Adviser’s NSC Meeting File, Gerald R. Ford 
Presidential Library; FRUS, 1969-76, Vol. 30, Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for 
National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford, 21 August 1974.  
11 US National Security Council Institutional Records, NSSM 227 US Security Policy Toward Turkey, 
08/1975, National Security Council Institutional Files, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library; Briefing 
Paper Case File, ca. 7/9/1975, Turkey - Military Aid (1)” of the Loen and Leppert Files, Gerald R. 
Ford Presidential Library. 
12 Statement by the Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State before the House 
International Relations Committee, 29 March 1976, “State Department – Kissinger Speeches and 
Statements (1)” Ron Nessen Papers, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library; FRUS, 1969-76, Vol. 30, 
Memorandum of Conversation, 25 September 1975. 
13 Ron Ayres, “Turkish Foreign Relations,” Journal of Revolutionary Socialists of the Middle-East, 17 
August 2013, https://libcom.org/library/turkish-foreign-relations, (Accessed 3.9.2018). 
14 OECD, “November 1978 OECD Economic Survey: Turkey,” 5, http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/economics/ oecd-economic-surveys-turkey-1978_eco_surveys-tur-1978-en, (Accessed 
3.9.2018). 
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A bankrupt Turkey would not serve US priorities in the region, which were 
twofold: to sustain the performance of NATO’s south-eastern wing, and to 
maintain US control over the bases in Turkey. Turkey should be helped and the 
embargo eventually lifted.15 US concerns overlapped with Turkey’s ultimate 
priority.  
In the second half of 1977, the Turkish and American administrations intensified 
their efforts to deal with the economic crisis. In mid-October, The Carter 
administration firstly renewed arms sales to Turkey.16 Then the Turkish Prime 
Minister, Bülent Ecevit, who came to power in 1978, initiated a series of 
economic stabilization programs focusing on foreign investment and price 
regulation, none of which were in consultation with the IMF or the World Bank. 
Under the programs, six international banks provided $500 million (in total) to 
the Turkish Central Bank. Due to the lack of IMF and OECD’s support and their 
insistence on austerity measures, Ecevit’s attempt failed, resulting in $2 billion 
worth of state-owned enterprise loss.17 
Ecevit’s failure caused another significant wobble on the arm, particularly when 
he accused the US of causing Turkey’s economic crisis. He stated that ‘the 
stagnation in relations between the two countries had done great damage to the 
Turkish economy’.18 The wobble increased American concerns. Especially, US 
Department of Defense officials were anxious about Ecevit’s failures and 
underlined the necessity to take extra measures. They told President Carter that 
the ‘military situation on the Southern Flank of NATO [was] one which [offered] 
 
15 FRUS, 1969-76, Vol. 30, National Security Study Memorandum 227, 16 July 1975; FRUS, 1969-
76, Vol. 30, Paper Prepared in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 227, 20 August 
1975; FRUS, 1969-76, Vol. 30, Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research No. 
281, 14 January 1976; FRUS, 1969-76, Vol. 30, Action Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary 
of State for European Affairs (Hartman) to Secretary of State Kissinger, 3 November 1976; FRUS, 
1969-76, Vol. 30, Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, 8 November 
1976. 
16 FRUS, 1977-80, Vol. 21, editorial note. 
17 For the details of Ecevit’s economic stabilization program see Faruk Ataay, Kriz Kıskacında CHP 
Hükümeti (1978-1979), PhD Thesis, Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2005, 
141-222; Mahmut Durmaz, The U.S. arms embargo of 1975--1978 and its effects on the 
development of the Turkish defense industry, MA Thesis, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2014, 47. 
18 FRUS, 1977-80, Vol. 21, Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, 23 
January 1978 
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little comfort’. Therefore, the finalization of a Defence Cooperation Agreement 
with Turkey was ‘becoming more and more important’.19   
By the end of 1978, Turkey’s economic problems and the longstanding NATO 
force commitments had become an acute burden on the Turkish-American 
alliance. The US lifted the arms embargo on 10 December 1978, but then failed 
to induce any improvement in the Turkish economy. According to US calculations 
the ‘the gap between requirements and available resources [of Turkey was] 1.8 
billion [dollars], which was estimated as the total gap with up to 500 million 
[dollars] required in new money to be provided by some form of consortium’. In 
analysing Turkey’s predicament, Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski stated:  
[I]t was important to recognize that the economic situation in Turkey 
was showing signs of developing into a political crisis. In spite of its 
inadequacies, […] the Ecevit Government was the best we could hope 
for in Turkey in the foreseeable future and its collapse could bring a 
period of political confusion which might culminate in military 
intervention.20 
The continually worsening economic situation in Turkey made the US to take 
further steps. The US agreed to conclude a Broad Multilateral Cooperation 
scheme for relieving Turkey’s economic distress. In a letter to President Carter, 
Ecevit offered his appreciation for this help.21 Yet the scheme was not a panacea. 
In 1979 the economic crisis kept escalating, which intensified socio-political 
strains in Turkey. The US took another step. At the beginning of 1979 the US, 
Germany, and twelve other countries announced an aid program to solve 
Turkey’s economic problems.22 Ecevit’s failure to effectively utilize the funds from 
this aid program brought Demirel back to power in late 1979. In an effort to 
bring about an economic recovery, Demirel recruited Turgut Özal, who was an 
 
19 FRUS, 1977-80, Vol. 21, Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter, 18 
January 1978. 
20 FRUS, 1977-80, Vol. 21, Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting, 28 
December 1978. 
21 FRUS, 1977-80, Vol. 21, Letter from Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit to President Carter, 19 
January 1979.  
22 Dankwart A. Rustow, “Turkey’s Travails”, Foreign Affairs, 58:1, 1979, 98.  
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expert at the World Bank. 23 None of the measures instigated by Demirel and 
Özal, however, helped alleviate Turkey’s situation. In 1980, Turkey headed 
towards its most serious economic impasse.24 
The convergence of Turkish priorities and US concerns temporarily eased some 
of the wobbles on the Turkish arm. The convergence occurred not because 
mutual trust was re-developed but because a need of each other became acute. 
The US needed Turkey as a staunch ally. Turkey needed the US as a protector, 
financial/military aid supplier, and regional/international intelligence source. 
Because of this imbalance, Turkey ignored the deeper issues with the US and 
accepted American aid bundles. Ironically, the Turks first appreciated the aid 
bundles, then misused them, and then accused the US of not providing enough 
aid. The convergence of priorities neither cured the wobbles nor moved Turkey 
closer to the US. 
 Australia’s relations with the US during the 1970s were quite different. Although 
there were wobbles on the Australian arm, none of them were incurable. From 
1972, Prime Minister Gough Whitlam’s policies attempted to give Australia some 
autonomy. Whitlam’s clash with President Richard Nixon induced wobbles on the 
Australian arm. Yet the strong background of the relations proved that a leader-
oriented tension could not push Australia away from the US. With Prime Minister 
Malcolm Fraser, the wobbles were cured and the Australian arm continued its 
tendency.  
************************* 
The Whitlam government’s (1972-75) foreign policy pointed to a more 
autonomous and more regionally aware Australia. That meant reducing US 
influence on Australian foreign policy. The détente period25 helped Whitlam. He 
 
23 FRUS, 1977-80, Vol. 21, Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, 12 October 
1979.  
24 Arif Özsağır, “Askeri Darbe ve Müdahalelerin Ekonomik Performans Üzerine Etkisi: Türkiye 
Örneği”, Gaziantep University Journal of Social Sciences, 12:4, 2013, 759-773. 
25 Détente was the period of the easing of Cold War tensions between the US and the Soviets from 
1967 to 1979. The era was a time of increased trade and cooperation with the Soviets and the 
signing of the SALT treaties. See: https://www.britannica.com/topic/détente, (Accessed 4.9.2018). 
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hoped that the détente would help Australia ride ‘on the wave of great events 
rather than swimming against the tide’.26  
Whitlam’s self-reliant foreign policy was encouraged by Nixon’s promulgation of 
the Guam Doctrine on 25 July 1969. Nixon implied that the US expected its allies 
to take care of their own defence, and stated that ‘we must avoid that kind of 
policy that will make countries in Asia so dependent upon us that we are dragged 
into conflicts such as the one that we have in Vietnam’.27 He added: 
I want to be sure that our policies in the future, all over the world, in 
Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the rest, reduce American involvement. 
One of assistance, yes, assistance in helping them solve their own 
problems, but not going in and just doing the job ourselves.28 
The Whitlam government’s ride started by overturning three significant legacies 
of conservative policy: recognizing the People’s Republic of China as the 
legitimate government and closing the Australian Embassy in Taipei; pulling out 
the last Australian military personnel serving in Vietnam, and abolishing 
conscription.29 The US either opposed these measures or found them 
embarrassing. Marshall Green, later the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia 
and Pacific Affairs but then the Ambassador to Canberra, called Whitlam a 
‘whirling dervish’ as he was ‘moving on matters of vital interest to the US without 
the prior consultation that [the US] have come to expect from Australia’.30 
Whitlam’s attitude was unusual, but none of the above-mentioned measures 
raised alarms in the Nixon administration as much as his condemnation of the US 
final bombing campaign in Vietnam (December 1972).31 Whitlam’s criticism of the 
 
26 J. D. B. Miller, “Australian Foreign Policy: Constraints and Opportunities-II”, International Affairs, 
50:3, July 1974, 425-426.  
27 Jeffrey Kimball, “The Nixon Doctrine: A Saga of Misunderstanding”, Presidential Studies 
Quarterly, 36:1, 62.  
28 Jeffrey Kimball, “The Nixon Doctrine: A Saga of Misunderstanding”, Presidential Studies 
Quarterly, 36:1, 64. 
29 For details see Whitlam Institute, The Whitlam Legacy, Gough Whitlam’s Mission to China, 1971, 
Vol.3, University of Western Sydney, July 2013; National Archives of Australia (NAA), M170, 71/46, 
Personal papers of Prime Minister E G Whitlam, Proposed visit to China, 11 May 1971, and 71/59, 
China report, Press Club, Canberra, 26 Jun 1971; Sydney Morning Herald, 21 October 2014.  
30 National Archives and Records Administration, Washington DC, (NARA), Memorandum, Green to 
Rogers, 30 December 1972, ‘Australia and New Zealand: Prospects’, SNF, 1970–73, Box 2106, RG 
59. 
31 Hansard, House of Representatives, 23 May 1972, 2877; Hansard, Senate, 18 October 1972, 
1682. 
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bombings induced one of the most visible wobbles on the Australian arm.32The 
US bombings -code name Operation Linebacker II- created massive collateral 
damage by killing 2000 civilians. The Washington Post named the operation ‘the 
most savage and senseless act of war ever’.33 Whitlam’s letter to Nixon ‘criticising 
the bombings—his first piece of substantial correspondence with the White House 
as prime minister —so enraged Nixon that it plunged the relationship into a 
virtual six-month freeze’.34  
In a later interview Green emphasized that there was a hostile atmosphere in 
Washington towards Australia, particularly during the first half of 1973.35 The 
growing ‘mistrust and misunderstanding’ pushed the alliance into a ‘new and 
deeply unstable phase’.36  
This did not stop Whitlam. Another wobble on the arm began to show up when 
he started to question the importance of ANZUS. On 27 January 1973, Whitlam 
stated that ‘[f]or all its enduring importance, adherence to ANZUS does not 
constitute a foreign policy’. It represented a ‘security guarantee in the ultimate 
peril, reliance upon it as the sole objective of our foreign policy would in fact 
place our foreign policy in suspension —until the peril emerged’. Whitlam was 
aiming to transform Australia’s US -oriented forward defence into a ‘regional 
community’- oriented approach. He believed that this approach could build up a 
zone of peace and neutrality in South-East Asia.37 The White House found this 
idea ‘half-formed’.38  
Whitlam tried to put his idea into practice by expressing his intention to remove 
Australian troops from Singapore by early 1975. Nixon named this as a serious 
dent in the Western presence in South-East Asia. He commented that Whitlam 
 
32 Andrew O’Neil, Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence, New York: Routledge, 2013, 103.  
33 Washington Post, 28 December 1972. 
34 James Curran, Unholy Fury: Whitlam and Nixon At War, Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 
2015, (Kindle Edition), 153; Telcon, Nixon and Kissinger, Camp David Study Table, 29 December 
1972, White House Tapes, Reference 158B, Conversation No. 158, 15, Richard Nixon Presidential 
Library.  
35 Sydney Morning Herald, 15 February 1988.  
36 James Curran, Unholy Fury: Whitlam and Nixon At War, Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 
2015, (Kindle Edition), 186. 
37 Gough Whitlam, “Address to the Opening of the Australian Institute of Political Science Summer 
School”, Canberra, 27 January 1973, Australian Foreign Affairs Record, 44:1, January 1973. 
38 FRUS, 1969-76, Vol. E-12, Memorandum, 1 February 1973. 
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was turning his back on Australian responsibilities in the region, which was 
turning Australia into a less dependable ally.39  
For the expectation of ameliorating relations, Nixon sent Green as the 
ambassador. Green’s appointment was unusual. In the previous 20 years, US 
ambassadors to Canberra were mostly presidential friends. Whitlam considered 
Green’s appointment as indicating success for his policies. He said that ‘the US 
has shown that at last it takes us seriously’.40  
As expected, Green managed to ameliorate relations. After his meetings with 
Whitlam, his correspondence with the White House convincingly emphasized that 
‘the president’s failure to invite’ Whitlam to the US would not only ‘insult’ 
Australia, ‘but put at risk the US defence facilities and $5 billion worth of 
American economic investment’.41 With the additional influence of the American 
press, Green managed to persuade Nixon to meet Whitlam on 30 July 1973.42  
At the end of the meeting, Whitlam accepted that ‘it is widely understood that 
Australia’s effectiveness in its relations with Asia depends upon a reputation for 
good relations with the US’.43 Yet in a talk at the National Press Club in 
Washington it seemed that Whitlam did not change his idea about ANZUS. He 
underlined that ANZUS should not the ‘be-all and end-all’ of bilateral relations. 
‘We are a friend and partner of the [US] particularly in the Pacific but with 
independent interests of our own’.44 For Whitlam the visit was ‘cordial, friendly 
and informative’. It was also ‘successful both in asserting and explaining the 
more independent and diversified Australian stance in international affairs’.45 
Nixon’s ultimate aim was to ‘keep Whitlam in line’,46 which was partially 
 
39 FRUS, 1969-76, Vol. E-12, Memorandum of Conversation, 2 May 1973. 
40 New York Times, 11 March 1973.  
41 NARA, Telegram 3304, Green to Secretary of State, 16 June 1973, SNF 1970–73, Box 2105, RG 
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42 James Curran, Unholy Fury: Whitlam and Nixon At War, Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 
2015, (Kindle Edition), 232. 
43 FRUS, 1969-76, Vol. E-12, Memorandum of Conversation, The President and Prime Minister 
Whitlam, 30 July 1973. 
44 Gough Whitlam, “Speech to National Press Club, Washington DC, 30 July 1973”, Australian 
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46 Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, 29 May 1973, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, VIP 
Visits, Box 910, Richard Nixon Presidential Library. 
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successful. Both leaders had different expectations and conclusions. Therefore, 
the visit’s honeymoon ended quickly. 
At the beginning of 1974, the Whitlam government increased its focus on 
American military activities at the North West Cape base, which were carried out 
without any reference to Australia. One example was passing instructions to the 
US Polaris missile-armed submarines in the Indian Ocean. Whitlam had similar 
suspicions on Pine Gap and Nurrungar, the other two intelligence installations.47 
Deputy Prime Minister Lance Barnard was sent to Washington to investigate how 
to increase Australia’s ability to examine communications going through the 
bases. In his private talks with the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Barnard proposed a 
joint statement which would curb the Australian government and public opinion’s 
criticisms of US installations.48 Yet the US did not make any substantial 
concessions on the North West Cape agreement except some sort of ‘joint 
operation and management’.49 At the end of the visit, Pine Gap and Nurrungar 
were converted into joint facilities while the number of Royal Australian Navy 
(RAN) and civilian personnel serving at the North West Cape was increased. The 
title of the senior RAN commander became Deputy Commander.50 Whitlam did 
not push any further. He had no desire to terminate any of the agreements on 
the North West Cape, Nurrungar or Pine Gap, even when they were reaching 
their expiry date.51 A significant wobble was eased.  
Another wobble appeared in February 1974 when Australia announced its 
intention to normalise relations with North Korea.52 The State Department was 
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harsher this time. It ‘interpreted Australian actions on North Korea’ as a threat 
‘to the American posture in Asia’.53  
In May 1974, another issue causing a strain in relations was Whitlam’s 
unhappiness with the ‘closeness of ASIO’s [Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation] ties with its US partners that he gave instructions’ to the Director 
General of Security, Peter Barbour to ‘sever them’.54  
The continuing strain in Australian-American relations was examined in US 
National Security Memorandum 204. The memorandum emphasized the ‘growing 
divergence between Australia and US policy in Asia and elsewhere’ regarding ‘US 
defense installations’ and the ‘risks involved in continuing sharing of intelligence 
with Australia’. The memorandum also asked how to minimize ‘the potential 
damage of such divergencies’.55 The memorandum ‘never made it to Nixon. By 
the time it was scheduled for discussion, the president had fallen victim … to the 
Watergate scandal and resigned from office’.56  
In November 1975, another intelligence community related issue strained the 
bilateral relations. Whitlam accused the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ‘of 
having made politically motivated financial contributions’.57 On 4 November, US 
Ambassador visited Whitlam and ‘categorically denied that the CIA had passed 
funds to any organisation or candidate for political office in Australia, nor, he 
claimed had any other US government agency done so’. The Director of the CIA, 
William Colby also publicly and strongly denied that the ‘CIA had taken any part 
in Australian politics’. Yet, ‘Whitlam repeated the allegation that he knew of two 
instances in which CIA money had been used to influence domestic Australian 
politics’.58 
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Whitlam aimed to amplify Australia’s voice in the Australia-US alliance but did 
not wish to reduce the alliance’s effectiveness or put an end to it. Some of his 
attempts created seriously visible wobbles on the arm but none of them were 
incurable.  
The Fraser Government (1976-83) eased these wobbles. Fraser’s fix was for two 
major reasons. Firstly, the strain in relations was not structural. It was a 
leadership issue. ‘Both leaders, though in their own way at the height of their 
political power, could not adequately understand the dilemmas the other faced. 
Instead, Nixon’s rage at Whitlam, and Whitlam’s frustration at the course of 
American foreign policy … only seemed to raise temperatures rather than 
advance understanding.’ Nixon was ‘desperate’ to get out of Vietnam; ‘Whitlam 
[was] eager to reset Australia’s international stance’.59 Secondly, since the 
bilateral relations had such a strong background resting on common values, two 
leaders’ battle did not much harm. 
Fraser began to announce official statements of assurance. First, via official 
reports and cabinet decisions, Fraser re-assured the US about the continuing 
significance of the alliance. After the election, he ‘removed the uncertainty 
hanging over the US intelligence community’s relationship with ASIO’.60 His 
Government’s Defence White Paper of November 1976 emphasized that alliance 
between the two powers provided ‘substantial grounds for confidence that in the 
event of a fundamental threat to Australia’s security, US military support would 
be forthcoming’. The paper added that ‘Australia’s security might be ultimately 
dependent upon US support’. Regarding bilateral defence relations, the paper 
underlined the ‘many important practical advantages’ that the US alliance had 
already provided, e.g. ‘intelligence, defence science and technology, military staff 
contacts regarding tactical doctrine and operational procedures, and military 
exercising with forces using high technology which [was] not otherwise 
available’.61 In March 1977, a cabinet minute confirmed that Australia would 
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‘seek assurance from’ the US that Australia would be ‘treated as a member of 
their inner group of allies’. The Minute emphasized significant US influence on 
Australian foreign policy in stating that ‘the conduct of Australian foreign policy 
requires that Australia develop insights into American foreign policy perceptions 
and play a part in shaping attitudes that particularly affect Australia’s vital 
interests, either directly or indirectly’.62  
The US authorities welcomed Australia’s efforts to retain close ties. Relevant 
Congressional committees noted that ‘Australia’ mattered particularly regarding 
its ‘important responsibilities in the South West Pacific’.63 
The US authorities utilized the developing closeness with Australia by enjoying 
greater jurisdiction on intelligence bases. In 1978 it was revealed that the US 
replaced an out-dated satellite dish at the North West Cape station without the 
necessary authorization from Australian authorities.64 Fraser’s Minister for 
Defence, Jim Killen, initially denied any such occurrence by stating that ‘no 
installation … at North West Cape [would] occur without the Australian 
Government having first been formally approached’.65 Two weeks later, Gordon 
Scholes, MP, disclosed a detailed summary of the event in parliament.66 The US 
upgraded the satellite terminal equipment and the Fraser Government did not 
appear overly concerned.  
Fraser also utilized the developing closeness. As a result of his visit to the US in 
December 1978-January 1979, aiming to ‘strengthen’ the ‘relations at the 
highest possible level’, 67 the two governments signed a memorandum of 
cooperative logistic support for covering Australia’s deficiency in national defence 
capabilities. The defence items listed in the memorandum included weapon 
systems and their spare parts, ammunition, explosives, modification kits, and 
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repair services.68 The US would provide this equipment in both peacetime and 
emergency, which alleviated ‘the need for large-scale stockpiling’ by the 
Australian Defence Force.69 The memorandum provided a guaranteed70 access to 
US war material.  
The Wobbly Cross: 
The 1970s supported the “wobbly cross” thesis. Turkey’s tendency to move away 
from the US continued even after its arms embargo was lifted. Neither side 
created an atmosphere to mend broken trust. The US lifted the embargo and 
increased the amount of aid and Turkey pretended that the relations were 
normal. Yet Turkish governments blamed the US for their own failures to 
stabilize the economy. Australia, despite Whitlam’s autonomy quest did not move 
away from the US. Not only did Australian administrations not challenge US 
priorities in the Asia-Pacific but also they did not ask for anything substantially 
additional. Unlike Turkey-US relations there was no significant dent in the mutual 
trust between Australia and the US. The quick change in government from 
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PART 2 
 Relations in the 1980s 
a. Turkey: dialogue of the deaf 
The Turkish arm continued its wobbly tendency throughout the 1980s due to 
ongoing divergencies in Turkish and American priorities. In addition to these 
inconsistencies, the 1980s highlighted another significant aspect of the wobbly 
cross: acknowledging imbalance. This era particularly underscored the imbalance 
in relations between a great and a middle power. Theoretically, if the middle 
power acknowledged an imbalance, the wobbles were eased and bilateral 
relations were strengthened. Yet Turkish-American relations did not conform to 
this. Turkey was both economically and militarily in need of US aid. To 
rejuvenate relations, Turkish leaders had to acknowledge this imbalance. Until 
1983, the Junta did that by accepting almost all US demands with tiny 
reservations. Junta leaders did not push too much for their own priorities, which 
was to maximise American diplomatic and economic support. After 1983, the 
Prime Minister Turgut Özal also acknowledged the imbalance but insisted on 
achieving his priority, which was changing the bilateral trade regime to increase 
Turkey’s share of the US market. The junta’s attempts worked better, since 
Turkey’s economic weakness prevented the recalibration of bilateral trade. The 
US welcomed Turkey’s renewed subservience and restarted the aid flow, but did 
not increase its significance. Thus, accepting the imbalance did not change the 
tendency of the arm. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, trust in 
bilateral relations was seriously damaged; secondly, none of the parties tried to 
fix the divergence in national priorities (Turkey wanted more American aid while 
the US wanted Turkey’s unconditional support for its/NATO’s policies in the 
eastern Mediterranean); thirdly, for the US, Turkey was important militarily but 
not economically, whereas for Özal the reverse was so; fourthly, some age-old 
issues in bilateral relations (Armenia, Cyprus, and the Kurds) resurged. Neither 
the Junta/Özal nor the US was unwilling to rejuvenate relations. Even if the 
Turkish leaders utterly acknowledged the imbalance, since their priorities were so 
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disoriented, the parties did not understand each other. The unchanged tendency 
of the arm continued to reflect Turkey’s trend away from the US.  
************************* 
In 1980, Turkish governments could not ease the intensifying economic crisis, 
already acute at the end of the 1970s. Moreover, the domestic situation in 
Turkey was aggravated by the violence amongst several ideological factions. The 
Süleyman Demirel government could not cope with that.1 To meet the economic 
emergency, Demirel was in need of ‘approximately $4.5 billion … over the next 
five to six years’. US unwillingness to cover this debt over so short time,2 ended 
with the coup on 12 September 1980.3  
Ideologically and practically, the junta leaders were very pro-American. Right 
after the coup the Junta made a very clear public announcement about its 
closeness to the US. In his speech on 12 September,4 the Chief of the Turkish 
General Staff and the head of Junta, General Kenan Evren, firstly stressed the 
‘danger of external involvement in the growing anarchy’ in Turkey. He implied 
that ‘the ideological factions’ behind this anarchy were ‘directed or inspired’ by 
the USSR and/or Islamic revivalists in Iran, which were US adversaries. 
Secondly, Evren ‘strongly reaffirmed Turkey’s active support for a settlement in 
Cyprus problem’, which the US had been trying to solve since 1974. Thirdly, 
Evren assured the world that ‘Turkey’s … ties with NATO, relations with the 
[European Economic Community] and [the] Council of Europe, and bilateral 
relations with Western democracies’ were solid. Evren further appreciated the 
‘special role in preserving world peace’ played by the US.  
 
1 FRUS, 1977-80, Vol. 21, Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, 9 
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4 FRUS, 1977-80, Vol. 21, Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, 19 
September 1980. 
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In their following conversations5 with US officials, the Junta leaders continued to 
emphasize their pro-western, particularly pro-American, stance. They underlined 
that they would ‘keep Turkey democratic, secular and pro-Western’ and ‘protect 
[the] Turkish parliamentary system’. They also promised to continue ‘the 
economic reform program’6 begun earlier. The acting head of the Turkish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MFA), İlter Türkmen, clarified Evren’s expectations from the 
US. In his conversation with the US Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, Türkmen 
declated Turkey’s ‘strong attachment to the [NATO] alliance and also to 
democracy’. He added that ‘Turkey [was] looking forward to continuing 
productive cooperation with the US and with the other NATO allies’. The Junta 
leaders expressed their readiness to sort out the issues of the 1970s and to 
accept US demands in order to rejuvenate US-Turkish relations. They were 
clearly open to accept the imbalance in relations. Muskie expressed the 
‘supportive attitude of the US toward the new Turkish government’.7  
As understood from Muskie’s words, the US was interested in supporting Turkey, 
which was highlighted in US official reports on Turkey. The reports underlined 
Turkey’s importance for defending NATO’s interests in the eastern 
Mediterranean. One significant report from the Foreign Affairs and National 
Defense Division of the Congressional Research Service to the US House of 
Representatives stressed that Western communication lines in the region passed 
through the Turkish straits, which were crucial in defending NATO’s southern 
flank. Military installations, particularly İncirlik Air Base, the storage depots near 
the Syrian border, and intelligence collection stations in Turkey, became even 
more important following the loss of similar elements in Iran after the 1979 
Revolution and increasing instability in the Middle East. A widely held view in the 
Pentagon also pointed out that after the loss of Iran and the USSR’s invasion of 
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Afghanistan, Turkey was the only real barrier against a potential Soviet invasion 
of the oil fields in the Persian Gulf.8 On 6 March 1980, the National Security 
Adviser to President Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, reported that ‘Turkey 
[was] a NATO ally whom we value highly and with whom we want to work closely 
to assure the security of the eastern Mediterranean region.’.9  
In US strategic calculations Turkey was important for five reasons: the Turkish 
straits, İncirlik Air Base, providing a large barrier to stop the Soviet penetration 
into the northern Iraqi oil fields, and co-operating with Greece for the stability of 
the eastern Mediterranean. These show that Turkey’s significance was only 
security-oriented and strictly related to its loyalty to NATO’s priorities.  
Turkey needed to be strong both economically and militarily to defend these 
priorities, so the US appealed to its allies to increase their economic and military 
assistance to Turkey.10 The US State Department’s spokesman, John Trattner 
stated:  
[f]or the last several years, Turkey has been beset by increasing 
politically motivated terrorism and severe economic difficulties. We have 
admired the Turkish people for their persistent efforts to deal with a 
deepening economic and political crisis … the [US], along with Turkey's 
other NATO allies and friends, has provided significant levels of 
assistance to help stabilize its economy and provide for the common 
defense. This assistance will continue.11 
The Junta’s readiness to be a loyal ally convinced the US to recognize and 
support it as the official governing authority of Turkey. 
The wobbles on the arm were temporarily eased and US-AID visits to Turkey 
were restarted. The first visit was in October 1980, which reviewed ‘a broad 
range of security assistance issues’ covering ‘price reductions on US military 
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and Prospects: Implications for US Interests, Washington DC: US Government Printing Service, 
1980. 
9 Office of Staff Secretary, Series: Presidential Files; Folder: 3/8/80; Container 153, Jimmy Carter 
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Presidential Library.    
11 US Department of State, “Coup d’état in Turkey 12 September 1980”, Department of State 
Bulletin, Vol.80, Number 2044, November 1980. 
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equipment, F-4 aircraft and [allowing] Turkey to liquidate its $50.7 million trust 
fund shortfall over a five year period’. During these talks, Turkish Deputy Prime 
Minister Turgut Özal requested $400 million in Foreign Military Sales credits for 
FY82.12 Unlike US-Turkish negotiations in the 1970s, the US did not refuse Özal’s 
demand.13 
These mutual efforts seemed promising, but did not change the tendency of arm, 
since the relative priorities were still not converging. The US’ top priority was to 
strengthen NATO’s south-eastern flank, which required strict American control 
over strategic installations in Turkey. Increasing Turkish defence capabilities was 
required only for the effectiveness of these installations. Another related priority 
was Greece’s re-integration to NATO, which Turkish governments had been 
vetoing since 1978.14 The Junta’s priorities were twofold: achieving American 
diplomatic support to consolidate its international recognition, and increasing 
American aid for dealing with the ongoing economic crisis.15 The Junta 
acknowledged the imbalance but its priorities were economic and national, the 
US was happy about this acknowledgement but its priorities were security-
oriented and regional.  
One major example of how indisputably the Junta acknowledged the imbalance 
was removing Turkey’s veto on Greece’s re-integration. Evren expressed his 
personal view that Turkey should actively support Greek re-integration in NATO 
in order to increase the organisation’s internal stability.16 
Regardless of the Junta’s readiness, US officials acted carefully. They took a pro-
Turkish attitude in order to eliminate any Greek-Turkish conflict in the future. 
The US National Security Council knew that the ‘Turkish military favour[ed] 
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Greek reintegration into NATO’. Yet in a conversation with President’s advisor 
Brzezinski, Council representative Paul Henzer emphasized that Turkey should 
not be bullied or made to feel that Greece’s re-joining into NATO was a top 
priority for the US. The first priority should be underlined as restoring ‘domestic 
tranquillity to Turkey, keeping [its] economy functioning well and setting a 
constitutional reform process in motion’. With this approach, Turkey could be 
‘secured as a valuable ally and effective member of NATO and rebuilt as a 
bastion of “strength in the Middle East” ’.17 The US Department of State 
additionally underscored the importance of aid for keeping the Turks in line. The 
Secretary of State proposed that the new military and economic aid bundle 
should be conditional on Turkey’s approval of Greece’s re-integration into 
NATO.18 This was a good example of the damaged trust in American 
considerations about Turkey.  
To finalize Greece’s re-integration, on 17 October 1980, NATO Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR), Bernard Rogers went to Ankara. Before Rogers’ 
arrival, President Carter sent a letter to Evren to make sure that the Turkish 
authorities would not change their mind. Carter stated that Greece’s re-
integration into NATO was ‘essential’ and had to be resolved swiftly. Indeed, ‘if a 
solution [was] longer delayed it [might] well become impossible’, which ‘would 
be a tragedy’.19 Under Rogers’ auspices ‘Greece and Turkey had agreed on a 
formula [what became known as the “Rogers Plan”] for the reintegration of 
Greece into the military structure of NATO’.20 The NATO Defence Planning 
Committee did not waste time and on 20 October reintegrated Greek forces into 
the military structure of the alliance.21  
 
17 FRUS, 1977-80, Vol. 21, Memorandum from Paul B. Henze of the National Security Council Staff 
to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), 12 September 1980; see also 
National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 75, Turkey: 9/80–1/81, Jimmy 
Carter Presidential Library. 
18 FRUS, 1977-80, Vol. 21, Telegram from the Secretary of State Muskie to the Department of 
State, 27 September 1980. 
19 FRUS, 1977-80, Vol. 21, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey, 3 
October 1980.  
20 FRUS, 1977-80, Vol. 21, Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, 18 
October 1980. 
21 NATO Update, https://www.nato.int/docu/update/80-89/1980e.htm, (Accessed 10.04.2018). For 
details of the Rogers Plan see İsmail Soysal, Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Siyasal Bağları, Vol. II, 1945-
1990, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1991, 467-468; NATO Defence Planning Committee Final 
Communiqué, 9-10 December 1980, https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c801209a.htm, 
(Accessed 10.04.2018).  
26 
The US used the Junta’s acknowledgement of the imbalance to increase its 
military control in Turkey. In 1982, it began to put pressure on the Junta to open 
a US Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) base in Turkey. At the end of 1979, the US 
had established the RDF due to concerns about a possible USSR intervention in 
Iran. The RDF was originally a force of 200,000 troops established in the US in 
1980. Reagan renamed it as the US Central Command (CENTCOM), increased its 
troop numbers to 300,000 then linked it to NATO SACEUR. For increasing the 
RDF’s operational management, the Reagan administration asked its Middle 
Eastern allies, e.g. Saudi Arabia, for pre-positioning facilities, which would be 
smaller than fully-fledged military bases but large enough to provide operational 
material to RDF personnel. 22  
The US used increasing Soviet activities in Afghanistan and the Gulf to convince 
the Junta to open an RDF base. In 1982 the head of the CIA with National 
Security Council member Paul Henze visited Turkey. Both emphasized the 
eruption of the Soviet threat after the Afghanistan invasion.23 The Junta was not 
convinced for several reasons. First, the anti-American leftist groups in Turkey 
were still influential on public opinion, and a new US military installation might 
have caused serious public reaction. Second, the Junta was suspected US plans 
to use the RDF to achieve political ends. Third, a new base might hinder Turkey’s 
recently developing relations with Iran, Iraq, and Libya. Fourth, almost all Gulf 
countries were opposed to the concept of an RDF force. Yet the Junta was still in 
need of US support for its survival. In a Memorandum of Understanding, it gave 
the US conditional approval for the RDF’s equipment and storage facilities in 
1982. The memorandum stated that the RDF would be utilized solely within a 
NATO framework, that RDF personnel would use the equipment in the bases only 
with Turkey’s approval, that all RDF operations would require both Turkey’s and 
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NATO’s approval, and that the bases’ costs would be covered by the US.24 Yet the 
imbalance prevented the Junta from saying no.  
In December 1983, the Junta left the government to Özal. He was a profit-driven 
pragmatic leader with relatively little interest in defence issues. In return for 
Greece’s reintegration to NATO and more American control over Turkish bases, 
he attempted to change the conditions of the Defence and Economic Cooperation 
Agreement (DECA).25 His aim differed from those of previous leaders: to increase 
Turkey’s profits from bilateral trade, so reducing the need for American aid. He 
believed that a new DECA, with reduced limitations on Turkey’s exports to the 
US, could eventually provide that.26 But neither the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee nor the Congress accepted such a change.27 Özal’s push for his own 
priority wobbled the arm. 
In 1985, Özal visited the US three times to negotiate DECA. Since his emphasis 
was on bilateral commerce, he tried to show the similarities between his and 
President Ronald Reagan’s economic ideals: free enterprise, free trade, and 
minimizing government interference. Reagan was ‘delighted’ by Özal,28 but Özal’s 
give-and-take strategy was not palatable.29 Özal repeatedly underlined the 
restrictions of the DECA agreement on bilateral trade and noted to US officials, 
‘[i]f I give the US bases, I expect it to increase trade in return …. Otherwise, 
[Turkey] will have to beg for aid all the time’.30 In another press release in New 
York he reiterated, ‘I am not going to ask for more aid. To live on help, aid, is no 
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longer important for Turkey. If you want a strong Turkey, if you want to help us, 
help us on trade’.31  
Turkey’s economy was too weak to increase bilateral trade to the extent that 
Özal desired, but this did not deter him. On 17 September 1985, three months 
before DECA’s first year ended, he called on the Americans for renewed 
negotiations. Congress once again blocked any radical changes to DECA. At the 
end of the negotiations, on 18 December, DECA was renewed for another five 
years without any essential changes or any new US commitments.32 What Özal 
achieved after almost one year of negotiations was a Bilateral Investment 
Agreement, which aimed to establish equality between Turkish and American 
companies in investment management, operation, and entrepreneurship.33 Özal 
had to accept the imbalance. Although the Agreement failed to address Özal’s 
demands, it was the first agreement of its kind signed by the US and Turkey.34 
Reagan’s delight in Özal’s liberalism did not transform into a trade agreement. 
For the US, developing bilateral trade with Turkey on Özal’s terms was not a 
priority.  
Divergent priorities also persisted on three old but major issues: Armenia, 
Cyprus and the Kurds. In all these, wobbles became more visible when Turkey 
showed its discontent openly.  
The Armenian issue re-erupted with a Congress debate over defining the events 
in 1915 in the Armenian provinces of the Ottoman Empire as “genocide”. Until 
the mid-1980s, the US administration supported Turkey’s case that the Ottoman 
Army was not responsible for the massacre of Armenians in the Armenian 
provinces. With decreasing US Presidential support for Turkey’s case, in 
September 1984 the Armenian lobby managed to pass through the House of 
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Representatives a decision for 24 April to be termed as “Man’s Inhumanity to 
Man Day”.35 The Senate Foreign Affairs Committee also passed a decision 
emphasizing that US foreign policy should prevent events like the “Armenian 
Genocide” in the future. The House of Representatives voted on the Armenian 
decision proposal on 4 June 1985, but did not pass.36 The Armenian lobby 
brought the proposal back to the House on 23 April 1987.37 The MFA, the Turkish 
Armed Forces (TAF), and the parliamentary opposition expressed their outrage.38 
The Özal government reacted by recalling its US ambassador.39  
With the election of George H. Bush, who had promised the Armenian lobby to 
look into the “genocide proposal”, the US Senate Justice Commission ratified the 
1985 proposal. The TAF and the MFA reacted in anger and outrage and took 
measures restricting American military activities, for example hindering the US 
fleet visiting Turkish naval bases, suspending Turkish-US Defence Council 
meetings, and even preventing flights from İncirlik base.40 The measures were 
eased after Democrat Senator Robert Byrd prevented the Armenian lobby from 
taking the proposal to the Senate via filibustering.41 This did not stop President 
Bush. He said ‘[o]n this 75th anniversary of the massacres, I wish to join with 
Armenians and all peoples in observing April 24, 1990, as a day of remembrance 
for the more than a million Armenian people who were victims. I call upon all 
peoples to work to prevent future acts of inhumanity against mankind, and my 
comments of June 1988 represent the depth of my feeling for the Armenian 
people and the sufferings they have endured’. 42 The filibustering could not ease 
the wobble.  
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Another wobble was induced by the Cyprus issue, which had been lingering 
between Turkey and Greece since the 1960s. By the 1980s both parties were in 
need of US interference to ameliorate the continuing strain. Greek-Turkish 
relations were so tense that any American decision favouring one party would 
upset the other.  
The US administration’s mediating efforts on Cyprus were additionally hindered 
by the diverging views of the Presidency and the Congress. For security and 
strategic reasons, the Presidency favoured Turkey. With the influence of the 
Greek lobby, the Congress was against Turkey. In particular, the Reagan 
administration favoured a more conciliatory and constructive approach towards 
Turkey rather than taking punitive measures.43 Yet supporting Turkey became 
difficult for Reagan when the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) 
proclaimed its independence in November 1983. The Greek lobby used the 
TRNC’s proclamation to urge the suspension of promised US aid to Turkey.44 The 
Lobby’s activities were partially successful. The Congress cut aid to Turkey by 
$200 million.45 Moreover, in November 1983, the US administration condemned 
the TRNC’s declaration of independence and put pressure on Pakistan and 
Bangladesh not to officially recognize the declaration.46  
Reagan tried to mediate. He did not push Turkey to reverse the claim of 
independence, nor did he completely cut off aid. He tried not to lose the Greeks 
either.47 One of his moves was the announcement of the Cyprus Peace and 
Reconstruction Fund of $250 million on 8 May 1984.48 Its aim was to converge 
Turkish and Greek interests by funding joint projects on the island. The project 
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was dead in the water. Greece rejected it by claiming that giving 19% of funding 
to the Turkish Cypriots was not fair due to their population ratio.49  
At the end of the decade, the US tried once more to reduce tension on the island. 
The US considered Greek Cypriot President Rauf Denktaş as a roadblock against 
any solution and proposed to replace him with Asil Nadir, perceived as a more 
conciliatory figure. Özal supported it but Nadir refused.50 Throughout the 1980s, 
US efforts prevented the Cyprus issue from becoming a new armed conflict but 
did not straighten the wobble on Turkey’s arm.  
The Kurdish question was also a result of divergent Turkish and American 
priorities on the Northern Iraqi and Turkish Kurds. The US had retained an 
interest in the Kurds since the 1950s. Ever since Turkey had resented the US-
originated Peace Corps activities among the Kurdish populations in the eastern 
and southeastern provinces. Turkish pressure served to reduce the Corps’ 
activities. In 1979, the CIA reported that Turkey failed to invest enough in the 
Kurdish provinces, and that the Kurds were undermined by internal strife and 
without strong leadership would be unable to develop autonomously.51 During the 
1980s, with the intensification of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) activities in 
Turkey’s southeast, US official reports increased their focus on human and socio-
political rights in Turkey’s Kurdish provinces. They predicted that unless the 
Turkish government expanded these rights, the PKK’s activities would intensify.52 
Although these reports outraged Turkish public opinion, the Turkish official 
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reaction was more measured. In February 1988, the Turkish MFA merely 
expressed its discomfort about the US reports.53  
The US had a far greater interest in the Northern Iraqi Kurds, as they were 
producing 65% of Iraq’s oil. In the 1970s, under Mulla Mustafa Barzani’s54 
leadership Kurdish-American relations were particularly close, so close that the 
Nixon administration supported the Kurdish uprising in 1972.55 In the 1980s, the 
Kurds exploited the power vacuum created by the Iran-Iraq War and rose up 
once again. At the end of the war, Kurdish leaders visited Washington expecting 
to forge a bilateral arrangement with the US.56 Their failure to conclude an 
agreement pushed them under the repressive measures of Saddam Hussein. 
50,000 Kurds became refugees on the Turkish border, leading to intense debates 
and disagreements between Turkey, Iraq, and the US. Turkey was particularly 
against US policies towards the Northern Iraqi Kurds, which were creating one of 
the biggest refugee crises in the region.57 The causes, activities and outcomes of 
this wobble on Turkish-American relations will be examined in the next chapter 
on the Gulf War.  
In this era, Kenan Evren and Turgut Özal acknowledged the imbalance between 
the US and Turkey. Both leaders had economic imperatives but only the latter 
openly pushed for them. This made the Turkish arm less wobbly until 1983, 
though the general tendency did not change. Acknowledgment of the imbalance 
did not align the national priorities of the US and Turkey, which were military-
regional and economic-national respectively. Turkey was significant and useful 
for the US as long as it acted within NATO’s aims or US priorities. The Turkish 
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administration, on the other hand, estimated its importance for US foreign policy 
aims as far greater than it actually was. In this era, bilateral relations were 
developed to an extent but proved to be strained by the ‘dialogue de sourds 
[dialogue of the deaf] in which minds [could not] meet, not necessarily because 
of ill-will, but because the attention of each side [was] fastened on matters and 
interests which [were] largely or entirely unrelated’.58 The wobbly cross was 
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b. Australia: alliance overshadows self-reliance 
While the 1970s, especially after Whitlam, showed how Australia aligned its 
national priorities to the US, the 1980s demonstrated a deepening of imbalance 
in relations between the two. There was an imbalance in the 1970s but it was 
curbed by Whitlam’s realist and nationalistic policies. Even if the imbalance in the 
1980s was not as great as between Turkey and the US, it was significant. More 
importantly, Australian governments’ acknowledgement of it protected the 
Australian arms tendency. Under the influence of the Soviet menace in 
Afghanistan, Australian conservatives emphasized that only the US could save 
the country from any Soviet nuclear attack. This made Prime Minister Malcolm 
Fraser intensify his efforts to develop the already-very-close relations with the 
US. His efforts gave the US more freedom to carry out military exercises within 
Australia’s jurisdiction. Again, with the effect of the Guam Doctrine, the Hawke 
government prioritized developing self-reliance in Australian defence capabilities. 
Although Hawke did not adjust this priority, he had to acknowledge the 
imbalance soon enough. After that, his government’s statements and little steps 
for self-reliance did not induce any wobbles or change the arms’ tendency. In 
short, during the 1980s, the US alliance overshadowed Hawke’s self-reliance.  
************************* 
In the 1980s, the first significant booster to Australia-US relations was the Soviet 
intervention into Afghanistan. The Soviet move increased Australian 
conservatives’ threat perceptions. Fraser delivered a speech in the parliament 
declaring that it could trigger a war between India and Pakistan, threaten ASEAN 
countries’ stability, and force China to respond which could lead the Soviet Union 
to ‘enhance its strategic posture in the West Pacific in areas which directly affect 
Australia’s security’.1 The remedy was simple: boost closeness with the US. In 
March 1980, the Minister for Defence, Jim Killen, stated: 
We must rely on our principal ally, the United States, to carry the main 
responsibility in [the security of the Asia-Pacific]. But we can, through 
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our policies, and by practical measures in support of the United States, 
show our concern at Soviet aggression and our resolve to defend our 
interests and independence, and to raise the cost [to] the Soviet Union 
of interference with them. 2 
At the beginning of the 1980s, Australia was already a close and a significant ally 
of the US. At the ANZUS Council meeting, in February 1980, Council members 
emphasized the prominence of Australia’s cooperation ‘with the South Pacific 
states’ for the security of the region.3 Moreover, the US was in need of ‘facilities 
in Australia as part of its strategic defence program’.4 Yet this closeness did not 
seem enough for the Fraser government.  
Heightened threat perceptions led the government to take extra measures. In 
March 1980, ADF’s air and naval forces frequency of deployment was increased 
in the Indian Ocean. Fraser also offered the US the use of facilities in Australia 
that might support US operations.5 In 1981, US B-52 bomber aircrafts began 
navigational training flights over northern Australia and transit through Darwin 
on surveillance flights over the Indian Ocean.6  
Australia probably gave the US more than was required. The priorities were 
really close and the Australian Opposition’s discomfort did not affect it. The 
opposition was concerned about the nuclear-armed status of the B-52s. The 
Deputy Opposition Leader, Lionel Bowen, argued that the US administration 
should ‘satisfy Australian public opinion’ over whether US military aircraft in 
Australia were armed with nuclear weapons.7 The US neither confirmed nor 
denied the B-52’s status.8  
The Australian conservatives’ silence on the B-52s nuclear status was because 
they believed that Australia should give the Americans every facility to support 
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their counter-measures against the Soviets. On 23 April 1981 the Foreign 
Minister, Tony Street stated that Australia believed that the Soviets constituted 
‘both an expansionist ideology and military power on an unprecedented scale’, 
which could be deterred by strengthening ‘America’s military capability’. This was 
a familiar argument but the Australian government believed that the US 
possessed the sole capability to counter any potential Soviet threat.9 In the same 
year, the Commonwealth Parliament’s Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
Defence report, “Threats to Australia’s Security: Their nature and probability” re-
iterated this claim. The report underlined that the Australian Government 
‘thoroughly’ supported the Committee’s view: ‘the ANZUS Alliance acts as a 
deterrent against those potentially hostile actions [of the USSR] against Australia 
which are of such magnitude that they are beyond Australia’s own capabilities’.10 
The government echoed that these actions could stem from the Soviet Union’s 
formidable nuclear potential, so Australia should support US ‘efforts to reinforce 
the credibility of its nuclear deterrent force through measures designed to enable 
an adequate response’.11  
During Vice-President George Bush’s visit, Fraser emphasized his government’s 
belief in the significance of US deterrence against the Soviet Union. Fraser 
underlined Australia’s anxieties due to the Soviet’s ‘provocation and aggression’ 
in Afghanistan, Poland, ‘its support for Vietnam’s continued occupation of 
Kampuchea’, and its direct and indirect operations in Central America, Africa and 
the Middle East. Against these moves, he added that Australia ‘has been greatly 
encouraged by the determination of President Reagan to effect the revival of 
Western power, a power even more vital to the defence of freedom more than 
any time since the end of Second World War’.12  
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The Liberals’ belief that US nuclear capabilities was enough to counter the 
Soviets, moved Australia closer to the US. The tendency of the arm was 
sustained.  
The Fraser government dismissed the Opposition’s criticisms of US actions. In 
May 1982, in his letter to Fraser, Victorian Premier John Cain stated that his 
government would not permit US nuclear-powered/armed warships to visit 
Victorian ports. In June, Fraser replied that denying US nuclear-powered 
warships from visiting Australian ports would contradict the terms of ANZUS, and 
added, to say that ‘no nuclear weapons are carried in a particular warship’ was 
‘simply not possible’ since such identification would turn US warships into 
targets.13 The Labor opposition leader, Bill Hayden, echoed Cain’s claim that the 
US should assure Australia that the warships were not nuclear armed.14 The 
Opposition could not present a strong reason to push US authorities to inform 
Canberra about status of the vessels. The US warships continued their visits. 
With the intensified closeness in bilateral relations the US had more freedom to 
act within Australia’s jurisdiction.  
In February 1983 Bob Hawke replaced Hayden as the Labor and Opposition 
Leader, then won the general election on 5 March. Although he knew the ANZUS 
alliance was indispensable, he tried to increase Australia’s self-reliance. During 
his visit to Washington in June 1983, Hawke stated that ‘Australia is not and 
cannot be a non-aligned nation, [w]e are neutral neither in thought nor in 
action’.15 A few days later in Canberra, Hawke reiterated that Australia’s relations 
with the US ‘with its many dimensions, are of fundamental importance’. Equally, 
Australia’s ‘foreign policies would inevitably have differences of emphasis … [o]n 
such issues as Indochina, China, Japan, and Central America’. Australia’s ‘first 
priority should be given to [its] relations with [its] neighbours of the Asian and 
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Pacific region’. Hawke further emphasized that US proposals regarding the Pacific 
should be ‘compatible with … mutual obligations under ANZUS’.16 	
Hawke continued to take little steps for self-reliance. In July 1983, the 
communiqué of the 32nd meeting of the ANZUS Council lightly supported Hawke’s 
steps: ‘[t]he Council acknowledged that the ANZUS Treaty does not absolve each 
Government from the primary responsibility to provide its own security to the 
extent which its resources allow’.17 In parliament the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Bill Hayden clarified the communiqué’s claim. He said that ANZUS did not offer 
any automatic security guarantee; its operation remained entirely at US 
discretion. He stressed the need to strip ‘away the misconceptions, and the 
unrealistic expectations which surrounded the Treaty’. The Treaty needed to be 
strengthened and brought back ‘to the terms of reality’.18 These words did not 
induce a wobble since they were not put into practice.  
Before long, Hawke’s attempts at self-reliance were undermined by the 
imbalance. The request of the British aircraft carrier, HMS Invincible, to dry dock 
in Sydney for repair showed how vulnerable the imbalance was. Australian 
Defence Minister Gordon Scholes asked whether the carrier had nuclear weapons 
on board. HMS Invincible’s captain response was to neither confirm nor deny, 
which resulted in Australia’s refusal to let the ship dry dock.19 US Assistant 
Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz stepped in. Wolfowitz questioned what the 
Australian government’s ‘attitude would be if an allied ship got into serious 
difficulty in Australian waters and had to steam to a local power for repairs’.20 In 
February 1984 Scholes had to revise his government’s decision. ‘Australia would 
not in any way endanger the safety of any allied of friendly ship or crew in need 
of access to Australian facilities’.21 In February 1985 Minister assisting the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Gareth Evans clarified Australia’s position: ‘it 
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is and has been the Government’s position that the question of port access is to 
be regarded as an inextricable part of an alliance relationship’.22 No wobbles were 
induced.  
The HMS Invincible incident altered the Hawke government’s stance. It began to 
focus more on ANZUS’ significance than its transformation. At Pennsylvania State 
University, Scholes emphasized US potential to ‘come to Australia’s support’, 
‘once a particular level of threat was reached’. Therefore ANZUS’s function 
should not be ‘over-simplified’. He also stressed that ‘agreements relating to the 
visits to Australian ports by [US] naval units … and access to Australian training 
facilities for [US] ground forces’ were significant components of ANZUS.23 The 
Minister for Aviation and Minister Assisting the Minister for Defence, Kim Beazley, 
clarified Australia’s continuous need to maintain its alliance with the US by 
quoting the Prime Minister’s words: ‘[a]lthough Australia might be remote for the 
areas of the world where any nuclear war may be fought, it would be unrealistic 
to suppose that Australia would not be profoundly affected by such a conflict’. 
Beazley repeated that ANZUS had ‘significant deterrent value’ and represented 
‘the formal basis of a wide range of practical defence co-operation’. Australia’s 
geostrategic location, and the uncertainties around it, needed to be ‘tied up into 
US nuclear war fighting strategies’. Australia should be ‘committed to support 
these measures’.24 With this acknowledgment of the two nations relative 
imbalance, the tendency of the arm was consolidated. 
At the end of 1984, closeness was increased by exchanges of visits between 
Australian and US defence industry representatives. ‘Some 70 US participants, 
representing 23 US logistic support agencies and 11 US prime contractors, 
visited’ Australia. With ‘460 separate’ Australia defence firms, they ‘attended the 
series of one-day fairs’.25  
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While Australian-American relations were strengthening, New Zealand’s new 
government shook the ANZUS alliance. In July 1984, David Lange’s Labour 
replaced the ruling National Party. Due to the inflexible anti-nuclear policy of 
Lange’s government,26 the US greatly reduced its level of intelligence sharing 
with New Zealand and refused to take part in ANZUS joint exercises with New 
Zealand elements. 27  
The New Zealand attitude demonstrated self-reliance, but it was too extreme for 
Hawke. On the contrary, in early 1985 his government secretly permitted the 
Americans to install devices into the Tasman Sea bed to measure the new US MX 
(Peacekeeper) Inter Continental Ballistic Missile’s performance. During the tests 
US officials used Australia as a shore support facility,28 which showed how the US 
continued to utilize the imbalance. When details about the agreement and its 
arrangements were leaked, parliamentary and public outcry forced the Hawke 
Government and the US to stop the tests.29  
The termination of the tests could have induced a wobble but Hawke did not let 
that happen. He diverted attention away from the Tasman Sea by focusing on 
the indispensability of ANZUS. In Los Angeles on 9 February 1985, Hawke stated 
that ‘notwithstanding the recent decision by the New Zealand Government 
regarding visits by nuclear warships, that the ANZUS Treaty remains, and that 
the alliance relationship between Australia and the [US] continues as strongly as 
ever’. The bilateral relationship under ANZUS, ‘and the rights and obligations 
assumed under the Treaty, were undiminished by recent events’.30 On 4 March 
1985 he reiterated, ‘the Australian-[US] alliance under ANZUS remains as strong 
as ever. In the case of New Zealand, we propose to pursue [its] important 
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defence relationship on a bilateral basis’.31 In May 1985, Hayden, reiterated, ‘in 
the absence of ANZUS, [Australia’s] access to advanced technology would be 
akin to that of some backwoods nation’. It would also lead to the increase of 
Australia’s defence budget by ‘more than $4000 million or some 70[%]’.32 
Acknowledging the imbalance did not mean that the Hawke government 
completely shelved the idea of a shift towards self-reliance, via a couple of small 
steps. In January 1985, Beazley underlined the absolute necessity of ANZUS, but 
also stressed that Australia needed to develop a ‘self-reliant defence posture 
based on the principle of developing independent national capabilities’ for its 
defence and ‘direct interests’.33 As the first step, Australia did not endorse the US 
Strategic Defence Initiative or so-called Star Wars program.34  
Another step was the examination of ‘the content, priorities and rationale of 
defence forward planning’.35 The former Deputy Director of the Joint Intelligence 
Organization, Paul Dibb conducted a review of Australia’s defence capabilities, 
threat perceptions and force structure priorities. Dibb reported in mid-1986, 
although his report took almost a year to finally be turned into a Defence White 
Paper in March 1987.36 Dibb listed Australia’s primary national security interests: 
avoiding global conflict; bolstering Australia’s strategic position in the South 
Pacific; promoting a sense of strategic community between Australia and 
countries in the proximity of direct military interest (Indonesia, Papua New 
Guinea, the neighbouring island states of the Southwest Pacific and New 
Zealand); defending Australian sovereign territory from military attack, and the 
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protection of Australia’s maritime interests in nearby waters and proximate sea 
lines of communications. For Dibb, Australian governments had the option to 
contribute forces to support ‘more distant diplomatic interests and the military 
efforts of others’ – one of which was the US - but argued that ‘this should be 
seen essentially as a gesture of support, not as a contribution that could 
materially affect the outcome’.37 Dibb believed the true value of ANZUS was not 
the provision of an unconditional security mechanism but ‘the access … to US 
intelligence, defence science and advanced weapon systems’, which were 
‘unique’38 and in many ways ‘irreplaceable’.39 The primary issue concerning 
ANZUS was the relative divergence of members’ strategic interests.40 
Although Dibb’s analysis did not advise Australia to move away from the US, his 
criticisms of the efficiency of ANZUS disturbed Australian Conservatives. That 
was his particular emphasis: ‘[t]here are no guarantees inherent in’ ANZUS; and 
‘[t]he parties will continue to approach each situation in accordance with their 
respective national interests’.41 The conservatives were quicker than US officials 
to express their reaction. Firstly, they stressed that the ANZUS alliance had 
greatly bolstered Australia’s forward defence.42 In parliament, they questioned 
whether Dibb’s review would turn Australia’s ‘friends into enemies’43 and sway 
the electorate into thinking that ANZUS was of little use and Australia’s alliance 
with the US was unnecessary.44 
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Dibb’s review induced a temporary wobble. In open official correspondence, the 
US administration did not put any direct pressure on Australian policy makers. At 
the Australia-United States Ministerial Talks in August 1986, US Defence and 
State Department officials accepted Dibb’s ‘main principles’ and ‘responded 
favourably’ to the report.45 Yet, at the extra session with Beazley, US Defence 
Secretary Caspar Weinberger ‘conveyed the formal US objections’ to the report. 
Weinberger stated that ‘the Dibb’s Report’s view of the Australian role in the 
ANZUS Alliance was unacceptable to the US’. The US ‘believed the report’s 
underlying threat assessment was wrong’ and that it ‘could jeopardise the future 
of the alliance’. Weinberger added that ‘the US could not accept the Dibb 
interpretation of the alliance under which Australia would make an adequate 
contribution by simply hosting US warship visits and the US intelligence and 
communications facilities’. The other US objection related to the Soviets. The US 
could not accept the view in the Dibb Report that deterrence of the Soviets was a 
matter for the US alone’. The US view was that the Soviet Union ‘can only be 
deterred by the joint contribution of all US allies, including Australia’.46 
‘Subsequent to the meeting, Beazley and other Australian officials stressed that 
the Dibb report essentially was only a force-structure document and not official 
Australian policy’.47 In a news release Hayden reassured the US again. He stated 
that there was ‘no uncertainty of continuance of alliance ties between Australia’ 
and the US.48  
US officials refrained from putting too much pressure on Australia since on 17 
September 1986, the American administration suspended its treaty obligations 
toward New Zealand. Putting extra pressure on Australia would jeopardize ANZUS 
en masse. 49 The temporary wobble disappeared.  
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Neither Dibb’s report nor the change in the very structure of ANZUS altered the 
Australian arm’s tendency. On 20 February 1987, in the parliament, Beazley 
implied that Australia’s possible future role might be to mediate American and 
New Zealander interests in the South Pacific. He said that ‘[o]ur activities in the 
South Pacific are being developed in close consultation with our allies the United 
States and New Zealand, both of which are also giving increased priority to their 
defence contacts with the South Pacific region’.50 In an evaluation of Dibb’s 
impact on Australian Defence Policy in 2016, Beazley underlined that ‘Dibb made 
clear that self-reliance with its foreign policy-liberating, security-guaranteeing, 
industry-enhancing value, would not be affordable without the American 
alliance’.51  
The 1987 Defence White paper52 referred to Dibb’s report carefully and 
successfully. Dibb and the White Paper emphasized the need to prioritize 
Australia’s area of direct military interest for defence.53 The White Paper made 
clear that such regional action would require the development of common 
concern with the countries of the South Pacific and Southeast Asia ‘to strengthen 
regional stability and to limit the potential for external powers to introduce 
tension or conflict’ into this region.54 Although the paper underlined a ‘range of 
other threats’ that Australia ‘should expect to handle independently’, it did not 
forget to emphasize the indispensability of the US alliance. The paper stressed 
that in peacetime ANZUS had ‘day-to-day benefits’ and a significant ‘deterrent 
value’. With ANZUS, Australia had access to ‘extensive US intelligence resources’, 
received a ‘preferred status in military equipment purchasing’, a ‘privileged 
access to the highest level of US defence technology’, and maintained 
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‘confidence that in the event of a fundamental threat to Australia’s security, US 
military support would be forthcoming’.55  
The continuing tendency of the Australian arm almost synchronised US and 
Australian foreign policies on three events. The first was East Timor on which 
neither the US nor Australia was ‘ever willing to say or do anything that would 
seriously have offended Jakarta for the sake of the apparently lost cause of East 
Timorese self-determination’. The second was uranium. Due to the ‘difficult 
financial circumstances of late 1986, [the Australian] Government resumed 
supply [of uranium] to France, despite France’s continued testing of nuclear 
bombs in the Pacific’. On both issues ‘Australian policy was entirely in line with 
US hopes’.56 The third issue was the Non-Proliferation Treaty, on which ‘both 
sides affirmed their commitment to the [treaty], noting with concern that some 
non-nuclear weapon States, not parties to the NPT, appear to be holding open 
the option of developing nuclear explosives, with consequent risks for regional 
and global peace and stability’.57 
In 1987, another significant example of closeness between Australia and the US 
was Australia’s decision to send clearance divers to the Gulf for the protection of 
shipping. The security of navigation in the Gulf was deteriorated after Iranian 
vessel’s, Iran Ajr, act of laying mines in September 1987,58 Iraqi aircraft’s attack 
to the Australian fishing vessel, Shenton Bluff, in October 1987, and in the same 
month Iran’s missile strike to US-registered Kuwaiti tanker, Sea Isle City.59 In 
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October, the US Assistant Secretary of Defense, Richard Armitage called Beazley 
and enquired about Australia’s possible participation for the protection of 
shipping in the Gulf,60 which was not a formal request. Australian Department of 
Defence’s ‘preferred option’ was sending a clearance diving team.61 Hayden and 
Beazley agreed on this option, by stating that Australia could not accept a ‘free 
ride’ on the efforts of friendly countries to maintain navigational security in the 
Gulf.62 On 10 December, Beazley announced government’s decision to send a 
clearance diving team of up to twenty personnel to the Gulf.63 Even though the 
divers ‘were never deployed’ the decision was important because since Vietnam, 
the Australian government ‘approved the deployment of military forces to’ a 
‘limited combat situation’ and although the US ‘had not formally requested 
Australian support, the government had clearly reacted to the American 
suggestion’.64 The arm’s stability was sustained. 
In 1988 Hawke took advantage of the stability of the arm with a few more extra 
steps for self-reliance. These focused on maintaining regional security in the 
South Pacific, including developing Australian naval capacity on ‘long range ships’ 
and submarines, [and] the latest combat aircraft’, improving ‘surveillance 
capabilities’, relocating ‘major facilities closer to [Australia’s] neighbours in the 
north and west’, developing ‘defence cooperation with neighbours to achieve 
shared strategic goals’, and ‘undertaking military deployments’.65 In February 
1988 Beazley informed parliament that Australia aimed to deploy its F/A-18 and 
F-111 aircraft to Malaysia and Singapore for at least 16 weeks of the year to 
show Australia’s ‘continuing willingness to commit a significant proportion of [its] 
Air Force to the support of regional security’. 66  
In 1988, relations were so close that none of these individual steps induced any 
wobble. At bilateral ministerial talks on 29 June 1988, US representatives 
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‘reaffirmed [their] understanding’ of Australia’s ‘emphasis on defence self-
reliance and modernisation … based on broad concepts of strategic responsibility 
and regional cooperation’.67 The next day Beazley re-emphasized the significance 
of Australia’s alliance with the US. He stated that the alliance gave ‘Australia the 
technological edge … to enable less than 1% of the Earth’s population to guard 
12% of its surface. Without that help, Australia cannot sustain a self-reliant 
defence posture’.68  
An important reason for the stability of the Australian arm even if Hawke’s efforts 
for reliance was the impact of the Guam Doctrine. According to it, Australia was 
to be expect to be self-reliant, so Hawke’s efforts were not totally at the expense 
of the Australia-US alliance. 
In this era, there were two additional reasons why Australia wanted to maintain 
the tendency of the arm. The first was available money to spend on Australia’s 
defence. In this decade the defence budget sat at around 3%. Even if the Hawke 
government wanted to increase defence spending, it was not politically or fiscally 
feasible. Moreover, the debate over who or what constituted a recognizable 
threat to Australian national security proved to be a point that successive 
governments failed to agree upon. The second was Australian defence policy 
makers’ and practitioners’ habits. Australian defence forces were ‘accustomed to 
close cooperation’ with the US. ‘Personnel exchanges, training schemes and 
courses, joint exercises of all kinds’, ‘compatibility in weapons systems and 
procurement’69 consolidated this habit. Gareth Evans summarized it in his lecture 
at the University of Texas on 9 October 1990. He argued that the US-Australia 
alliance has been serving firstly as ‘transition mechanisms’ for ‘keeping the 
process of confidence building and common security moving forward’, secondly 
as ‘fail-safe mechanisms’ against future conflicts. More importantly, Evans 
emphasized that the US presence in Asia-Pacific has been a reassurance for 
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Australia and a solid requirement for the new security architecture of the 
region.70 
In the 1980s the Australian arm of the cross did not change its tendency or 
experience any permanent wobble. The priorities of Fraser’s Liberals overlapped 
with the US’ in relation to the potential Soviet nuclear threat. Fraser’s 
enthusiasm to deepen relations for confronting this threat increased US military 
jurisdiction in Australian facilities. Although Hawke’s ultimate aim was self-
reliance, he had to acknowledge the imbalance. Fraser and Hawke’s posture 
consolidated the tendency of the arm throughout the 1980s. Neither Dibb’s 
report nor Hawke government’s small steps and statements for self-reliance 
induced any serious wobbles. Both the US protective umbrella and its political 
influence continued on Australia.  
The wobbly cross: 
Comparing Australia and Turkey vis-à-vis the US he wobbly cross was validated 
in this era as well. Even if both countries tried to deepen their relations with the 
US, for several reasons the results were contradictory. First, the mutual trust 
between Turkey and the US had been damaged since the mid-1960s, and none 
of the parties took the initiative to mend it. For, Australia the relations had not 
only been reinforced after Whitlam but were also operating on common values 
and old alliance habits, which were strongly embraced by Australian Liberals. 
Second, there was a clear divergence in the priorities of Turkey and the US, 
which caused significant disorientation. Turkey’s expectations from the US were 
economic, the US’ were military. The more each side pushed their own priority, 
the more wobbles were induced and the distance between them grew. On the 
other hand, while during Hawke’s term there was some divergence in priorities 
due to his search for self-reliance, imbalance prevented Hawke from pushing his 
own priorities too hard. His acknowledgement of imbalance prevented wobbles 
and maintained the tendency of the arm. Third, there were age-old issues 
between Turkey and the US, for example the Kurds, Cyprus and Armenia, which 
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resurged in this era. This definitely was not the case for Australia and the US. 
Fourth, Turkey was economically and militarily in a much more fragile position 
than Australia, which weakened it in taking steps for its national priorities 
without inducing wobbles. For both countries, however, the US used the 
imbalance to increase its military jurisdiction. This put Turkey in a much more 







Relations during the Gulf War (1990-1991) 
a. Turkey: mismatching priorities 
During the Gulf crisis1, the imbalance in relations between Turkey and the US led 
Özal2 to work on their divergent priorities. Although he did not shelve his 
economic and commercial aims, Özal strived to adjust Turkey’s priorities to the 
US’, at least in military terms. Özal’s problem was that the imbalance had 
already intensified the bureaucratic and parliamentary opposition’s antipathy 
towards US policies, ignoring Turkey’s priorities. With his parliamentary majority 
he orchestrated Turkey’s Gulf crisis diplomacy singlehandedly3, aggravating the 
opposition’s antipathy. Yet, he had the parliamentary majority, with which he 
acted more freely. He believed that adjusting priorities would not only increase 
US aid flow but also expand Turkish-US bilateral trade and political cooperation 
in the Middle East. Once again, he missed the point. The US was not interested 
in deepening politico-economic relations. Its was still focused on defence and 
security. Özal’s attempts to adjust Turkey’s priorities alienated the Turkish 
bureaucracy to such an extent that he was not able to implement his policies. 
Because of Özal’s acknowledgement of the imbalance and his efforts to adjust 
national priorities this arm was less wobbly but its tendency did not change.  
************************* 
Özal’s foreign policy principles4 determined his actions throughout the Gulf crisis. 
As an opponent of the status quo and a pro-American liberal, his policies 
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seemingly aimed to converge Turkish and American national priorities. For this 
aim, his clearest example was Turkey’s deployment to the Korean War. For Özal, 
Turkish-American military cooperation in Korea was the reason for US sympathy 
with Turkey. He thought that Turkey should take calculated risks, as in Korea, if 
it wanted to deepen its relations with the US.5 The Gulf War could be the second 
Korean War. 
His second principle was neo-Ottomanism,6 merged with economic opportunism. 
Özal aimed to use this paradigm to expand Turkey’s foreign policy scope to the 
fullest extent of the Ottoman Empire for carving out economic and commercial 
advantages.7 According to him, Turkey should take an active part in the Gulf 
Crisis, not only because the Gulf used to be an Ottoman territory but also 
because the crisis could make Turkey a key player in the economic negotiations 
on northern Iraq after Saddam Hussein’s defeat.8 Via strengthening bilateral ties 
with the US, those negotiations could open this market to Turkey’s developing 
construction sector.9  
Apart from these principles, Özal felt obliged to deepen Turkey’s relations with 
the US due to the unclear security challenges of the early post-Cold War. With 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a serious power vacuum emerged in the 
Middle East, which was open to all sorts of state and non-state rivalry. The Gulf 
Crisis was one of the consequences of this vacuum, which might have generated 
a wide variety of threats in Turkey’s very neighbourhood.10 One of these threats 
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was the resurgence of the PKK, which had bases in Syria, Iraq and Iran.11 After 
the 1979 revolution, relations with Iran were also tense due to its on-and-off 
manipulation of radical Islamic groups and the Kurds in Turkey’s southeast and 
northern Iraq.12 Turkey’s relations with its eastern and south-eastern neighbours 
were strained as well. Syria was supporting PKK militia.13 With Iraq, there were 
serious issues due to Turkey’s water policy on the Euphrates River. Since mid-
1980s the Iraqi administration had claimed that Turkey was restricting the 
amount of water flowing to Iraq.14 Armenia’s territorial claims against Turkey 
were also worrying.15 These regional complications troubled the Akbulut 
government. Throughout the Cold War, Turkey’s sense of security came from the 
US alliance, operating within NATO. NATO’s role began to decrease with the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union.16 For Turkey’s immediate security only the US 
was left. The imbalance was clear. Turkey was in need of US support to counter 
these non-traditional and ambiguous threats. Özal had to acknowledge it and 
work for closer relations with the US.  
During his attempts to use the Gulf crisis for tailoring Turkey’s priorities, Özal 
wanted to restrict the Turkish bureaucracy and the opposition’s interference. 
From the beginning of the crisis, Özal conducted foreign policy mostly via 
telephone conversations with US officials, including the President George H.W. 
Bush.17  
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In these conversations he made very clear that the Akbulut government, which 
was under Özal’s heavy influence, was ready to take part in any type of US 
defence scheme. Yet in his hidden agenda he wanted to deepen politico-
economic relations. Özal’s hidden agenda was unworkable. The US was not 
interested in a Özal style politico-economic collaboration. Özal misread this from 
the very beginning. As in 1970s and 80s, the US wanted to keep its relations 
with Turkey within the military and security realms.  
US demands on Turkey regarding the Gulf crisis were all defence-oriented and to 
facilitate the operation against Saddam Hussein. The US was not planning to 
boost Turkey’s role in the Middle East, as Özal calculated. US general demands 
were threefold: sending a Turkish battalion to Saudi Arabia, keeping a certain 
number of Turkish troops along the Turkey-Iraqi border as a precaution for 
suppressing the Iraqi forces, and using Turkish air bases for US air assaults in 
Northern Iraq.18 The specific demands, on the other hand, targeted the Iraqi 
economy. President Bush aimed to convince Özal to close the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık 
oil pipeline from Iraq, which would have been a massive blow to the Turkish 
revenues from Iraqi oil transfer. On 3 August 1990, Bush telephoned Özal and 
said that ‘as an important member of NATO’, ‘I wanted to know the conditions 
under which’ Turkey ‘might close’ the pipelines. Özal did not reply.19 Next day, 
Bush called him again and reiterated the same demand. This time Bush 
emphasized that Turkey and the US should ‘stand together on the economic 
front’, which required both Turkey and Saudi Arabia to close the pipelines in 
order to ‘crumble’ Saddam ‘faster’. Bush stressed that he disagreed with the 
Turkish Foreign Affairs’ view to ‘remain neutral’, he said that there could ‘be no 
neutrality in these circumstances’. Again he asked for Özal’s view. Özal avoided 
the question and said that Turkey needed solid UN sanctions on oil in order to ‘do 
something’.20 Yet, Özal shut down the pipeline on 7 August, a day after the UN 
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Security Council’s decision 661,21 which embargoed ‘the import into their 
territories of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait’.22 Özal 
took this decision ‘without prior consultation’ with the government or 
parliament.23 Turkey’s prospective economic losses were apparently not on 
Bush’s priority list. 
Özal’s misinterpretation of US priorities was clear in his statements about the 
above-stated US demands. In an interview with the US News Journal, he stated 
that the US demands underlined that Turkey was a ‘bridge between two different 
worlds’ and that if this ‘bridge’ was ‘cut, these two worlds could topple into 
conflict’.24 In another interview with NBC television, Özal interpreted US demands 
as its re-assessing ‘Turkey’s importance’.25 In fact, the US did not re-assess 
Turkey’s importance, it was still the same, restricted to the strategic assault 
bases on Turkish soil. Özal was overestimating Turkey’s role, which took him a 
few months to realize.  
The US, on the other hand, read Özal’s priorities accurately. He was not entirely 
different from previous Turkish leaders. After all, he was in need of more US aid. 
The imbalance was clear and the US responded it. On 17 August 1990, the US 
Ambassador to Ankara, Morton Abramowitz, spoke with Turkish Foreign Affairs 
and Treasury officials. Abramowitz conveyed the US administration’s consent to 
cover Turkey’s prospective losses from its efforts in the Gulf War.26  
While Özal was tailoring Turkey’s priorities, the opposition in the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly (TGNA), and the security bureaucracy, particularly the Turkish 
Armed Forces (TAF) were opposing him. 
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On 12 August, when TGNA discussions began on Özal’s proposal to cooperate 
with the US in Iraq, the fury of the opposition was unleashed. The TGNA rejected 
Özal’s proposal.27 The fury spread to the TAF, which thought Özal’s actions would 
topple Turkey into war. In a circular telegram, the Turkish General Staff notified 
all ministries and public offices to be on levy en masse due to any unpredictable 
developments in the Gulf.28  
The opposition attacked Özal from various sides, particularly over his alleged 
adventurism. The head of the Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti (Social Democrat 
Populist Party), Erdal İnönü, criticized Özal for ‘acting by himself’ and insisted 
that the TGNA should take necessary measures to stop Turkey toppling into 
war.29 In another statement, he accused Özal of provoking a war in the Middle 
East.30 At a press conference, he stated that Özal wanted to give himself powers 
not allowed by the constitution, and intended to act on behalf of the whole 
parliament.31 The leader of the centre-right Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party), 
Süleyman Demirel, stated that Turkey would be labelled a ‘second Israel’ due to 
the prospective loss of millions of civilians, if Turkish military elements joined the 
American effort in the Gulf.32 In another statement he said that, unlike Özal’s 
analogy of being a bridge in the Middle East, Turkey would become a stepping-
stone for the US.33 Demirel also accused Özal of trying to bypass the TGNA in 
deploying troops overseas.34 The head of the Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic 
Left Party), Bülent Ecevit, stated that deploying troops to the region would 
endanger Turkey’s security.35 Yeşiller Partisi (The Greens Party) representatives 
emphasized that Özal and the Akbulut government should ‘refrain from getting 
into an adventure in the Gulf’.36  
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To alleviate these opponents, Özal gave statements to international media. To 
the Spanish El Pais newspaper, he said that Turkey would not consider deploying 
Turkish troops to Iraq.37 In an interview to the BBC, he emphasized that without 
the TGNA’s approval, Turkey could not join any international coalition even if it 
were organized under the auspices of the UN.38  
These statements did not mean a change in his aim of following US priorities. Yet 
for this aim he still needed the TGNA’s support. He tried again. On 3 September, 
the Akbulut government, under Özal’s influence, turned the Turkey-US 
cooperation proposal into a resolution and submitted it to the TGNA. The 
resolution covered the overseas deployment of Turkish troops and foreign troops’ 
deployment on Turkish soil according to the 92nd article of the Constitution.39 
Both İnönü and Demirel stated that giving such an authorization to Özal would 
be ‘equal to the declaration of war’ on Iraq.40 Ecevit emphasized that Özal could 
not justify sending Turkish troops into such an adventure.41 On 5 September, 
with the support of Özal’s Anavatan Partisi (the Motherland Party’s) 
backbenchers, the bill was passed with 136 negative and 246 affirmative votes.42  
At once Prime Minister Yıldırım Akbulut stated that this authorization did not 
mean permission to wage war, and that it would be used in the interests of the 
Turkish state. Akbulut’s words did not appease the opposition. İnönü claimed 
that with this authorization Özal and the Akbulut government would potentially 
open a second front on Turkey’s southern borders, so his Party would take this 
decision to the Constitutional Court. Demirel was equally critical. He firstly 
criticized that the decision was made in a closed session, and secondly 
condemned Özal’s personal attitude in acting on behalf of the whole government 
and the parliament.43 
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One day after his success in the TGNA, Özal uncloaked his hidden agenda in a 
speech broadcast on US television channels. He emphasized that the economic 
losses Turkey would face due to the coming war could reach up to $3.5 to $5 
billion. To cover these loses, Turkey would not only need more aid, but must also 
develop bilateral commercial relations.44 On 7 September, Özal reiterated his 
words about developing Turkish-American trade on American Public Television.45  
Özal wanted to ensure US gratitude for his efforts. On 25 September he visited 
Bush. During the talks Bush specifically appreciated Özal’s leadership and 
promised Özal to ‘expand the ties’ on political, military, economic, and cultural 
matters. Bush added that the US would continue to support Turkey’s European 
Community (EC) membership. Özal stressed that Turkey wanted ‘more trade 
than aid’, for example starting negotiations for a new agreement on textiles.46  
NATO also appreciated Özal’s success. The General Secretary, Manfred Wörner, 
told the Turkish Anatolian News Agency, that Turkey would be the keystone of a 
new security structure in the Middle East after the Gulf Crisis.47 In his statements 
to Turkish newspapers Cumhuriyet and Hürriyet, the Under-Secretary of the US 
Department of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, repeated Wörner’s words and added that 
the US was confident in asking Turkey for help when it was required.48 
At the end of Özal’s visit, the US announced that Kuwait would give $75 million, 
the World Bank would give $300 million and Japan would give $300 million to 
Turkey to cover its losses.49 Özal’s response was what the US wanted to hear. He 
told Newsweek that Turkey would join a US-led coalition under the UN’s 
auspices.50 Özal received some appreciation, although in the form of aid. No 
agreement was concluded to develop bilateral trade. There were no wobbles on 
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the arm but its tendency did not change. Özal’s, not Turkey’s, relations became 
closer to the US.  
During the visit, Özal acted as the sole representative of the Turkish Republic. He 
did not even invite the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Bozer, to join the talks with 
President Bush. Özal’s rugged individualism heightened the frustration in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of National Defence (MND). As 
a result, on 11 October 1990 the Minister of Foreign Affairs Bozer and on 18 
October the Minister of National Defence Safa Giray resigned.51 In addition to the 
MPs, the Turkish bureaucracy too was reluctant to help Özal.  
Özal saw this danger and used the Secretary of State James Baker’s visit on 7 
November to relieve the distress in the bureaucracy. During the visit, Özal 
implied that ‘Turkey would not join a ground offensive’ due to its bureaucracy’s 
growing worries.52 Baker saw the pressure Özal had been dealing with. At the 
end of the visit, a joint communiqué emphasized that military operations could 
not be a solution to the crisis. The spokesman for the MFA, Murat Sungar, 
reiterated that Turkey and the US shared the decision to solve the crisis by 
peaceful means.53  
The real situation was not stated in the communiqué. Baker came to Turkey to 
convince Özal to deploy Turkish troops to the Iraqi border. He used the aid card 
to secure Özal’s support for this. He promised Turkey $1.1 billion worth of Saudi 
Arabian aid.54 Özal’s political and economic distress was increasing. The 
imbalance put pressure on Özal again. He could not say no, either to the oil or to 
the deployment. In a Memorandum of Understanding on 20 November, Özal 
agreed to deploy Turkish troops to the Iraqi border.55 Özal’s efforts were not 
bringing Turkey closer to the US but merely reflecting the imbalance. 
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After the memorandum, the Turkish bureaucracy and opposition took another 
step to stop Özal. On 3 December 1990, the Head of Turkish General Staff, Necip 
Torumtay, resigned.56 After the resignation, in parliament, İnönü warned that 
there was a possibility of a new coup. He added that Özal should share crisis 
management authority with the parliament.57  
These responses did not deter Özal. At the end of 1990, Turkey deployed 
approximately ‘120.000 men, with air support, armour and transport’ on its ‘150-
mile border with Iraq’. Although these elements never moved into Iraqi soil, they 
‘pinned down about eight Iraqi divisions in the north of the country which could 
otherwise have been used against the coalition forces in the south, and were 
thus of some value to the coalition cause’.58  
At the same time, Özal increased the level of pro-Americanism in his statements. 
In December, he stated that ‘Turkey should send a symbolic military force to 
Saudi Arabia, and if war breaks out, allow the [US] to use an important NATO air 
base in southern Turkey’.59 Seemingly Özal had not yet realised that his pro-
American comments were not meeting US priorities or pushing the US closer to 
Turkey.  
The opposition reacted strongly again. The Deputy Head of the True Path Party, 
Hüsamettin Cindoruk, said that if Turkey entered the war, not only Özal and his 
party group but the whole parliament would be responsible. Ecevit emphasized 
that Özal would be fully responsible if Turkey toppled into war.60 This time 
Akbulut tried to de-escalate. After the Cabinet meeting on 8 January 1991, he 
said that if there were no Iraqi assault on Turkish soil, Turkey would not attack.61 
Özal, tried again. In his speech to CNN, he emphasized that Turkey would not be 
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the second front of the Gulf War.62 Özal was squeezed between the opposition 
and his ambitions. 
While Özal was trying to alleviate this domestic pressure, the US Congress 
approved President Bush using military power against Saddam’s regime.63 Özal 
had no choice but to support this. In an interview with American ABC Television, 
he stated that the US Congress’ decision would bring peace to the region.64 
Akbulut’s words were more reassuring. He said that Turkey could give necessary 
logistic support to the US, including using the İncirlik base.65  
Opening İncilik to the US outraged the opposition. At a press conference Demirel 
expressed his concerns at the American use of Turkish bases. He said that these 
bases would become targets for Iraqi missiles. Similarly, Ecevit stated that 
starting a war before the UN Security Council’s resolution of 2 August became 
effective would be a crime against humanity.66  
On 16 January 1991, Operation Desert Storm started with a US air assault. After 
Baker’s visit on 12-13 January 1991, which was about allowing American F-111s 
to strike Iraqi targets,67 Özal asked for extra authorization for US use of Turkish 
bases and airspace from the TGNA. One day before voting in the TGNA, Bush 
sent a memorandum to the Secretary of State authorizing the provision of up to 
$32 million in defense articles from the stocks of the Department of Defense to 
Turkey plus military education and training.68 Once again the US successfully 
used the imbalance via aid card. The voting was on 17 January, and the bill 
passed with 250 votes.69 The Motherland Party’s majority helped Özal again. On 
the same day Özal talked to CNN. He was fishing for appreciation. He 
underscored the Akbulut government’s success in securing the authorization to 
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enable Allied forces to use Turkish bases and airspace.70 The US was so sure of 
Özal’s success that before the voting ended American jets had already taken off 
from İncirlik.71 Once again it was Özal’s orchestration was supported by his 
majority in parliament.  
The opposition was outraged, but Özal largely ignored it. While opposition parties 
were stating that the 17 January authorization would topple Turkey into war,72 
Özal gave one of his most ambitious statements. He claimed that there would be 
a need for specific powers to keep the region under control after the crisis and 
only Turkey had these powers.73  
Opposition in parliament spread to other segments of the Turkish state and 
society. The TAF was against opening a second front74, and particularly wanted to 
have the final decision on sending Turkish jets to assault Iraq.75 The Turkish 
public was also outraged. Turkish media drew parallels between Germany 
dragging Turkey into the First World War and the possibility of being dragged 
into the Gulf War by the American use of Turkish bases.76 The Turkish 
construction and petroleum businesses were also unhappy. Closing the Kirkuk 
pipeline cut off 1,5 million-barrels of oil a day.77 Turkish construction companies 
operating in Iraq and Kuwait had to evacuate, which not only damaged the 
commercial relations developing since 1973, but also their socio-cultural bonds. 
78  
Özal and the Akbulut government were not successful at calming public 
reaction.79 Ten Turkish NGOs organized a group called Savaşa Hayır (No to War), 
which presented several petitions to public authorities to stop the Özal and the 
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Akbulut government’s decision to deploy troops to the region.80 The Turkish 
Human Rights Association also condemned Özal and the government for 
transferring the Turkish bases’ command to the US.81  
Özal’s hand was weakening. Opponents raised more than he could suppress. 
They showed how much Turkey was moving away from the US during the crisis, 
mostly because of Özal’s individualism. 
What Özal achieved at the end of the crisis from the US is still not clear due to 
the inaccessibility of Turkish Presidential Records and Özal’s private conversation 
minutes with Baker and Bush. Yet it is obvious that Özal did not achieve anything 
substantial. He managed to sustain the inflow of American aid under the existing 
conditions. DECA was extended for another year in return for the American use 
the bases, without any extra negotiations with the Turkish administration.82 The 
US administration promised to keep the annual aid level not below $545 million 
together with giving $1.4 million in American Eximbank credit.83 In November 
1990, the US administration announced an increase in Turkish textiles quotas, 
and gave Turkey 40 used F-4 Phantom fighters.84 To cover Turkey’s losses in 
closing Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline and joining the embargo against Iraq, the US 
increased assistance to Turkey by $82 million for 1991.85 With this increase, the 
total amount of US aid reached the amount of the mid-1980s - which was over 
$500 million.86  
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Özal did not receive a real diplomatic support from the US to thaw the Turkey-EC 
relations.87 In November 1990, Özal stated that ‘by being the first country to 
comply with the UN Security Council resolutions at the onset of the Gulf Crisis, 
[Turkey’s] chances of [EC] membership had increased’.88 Bush’s 25 September 
promise to provide diplomatic support for Turkey’s EC membership proved to be 
illusionary. The transformation of Turkish-EU relations ‘never materialized’.89 
Particularly on the EC side, ‘there was no discernible movement … toward 
accommodating Ankara on the issue of closer EC-Turkish economic and political 
ties’.90 
Regardless of Özal or the Turkish opposition President Bush was not interested to 
deepen relations with Turkey. Abramowitz commented that not only Özal could 
not deliver a clear message about his priorities, but Bush was not much 
interested anyway.91  
Özal’s misreading of US priorities clearly surfaced during Bush’s visit to Turkey 
on 20-22 July 1991. Bush was the first US president to visit Turkey since Dwight 
Eisenhower in 1959. He arrived ‘with promises of new military assistance’. Even 
though both leaders spelled out the term ‘strategic cooperation’, Bush’s main aim 
was to smooth over the Cyprus issue between Turkey and Greece. Bush stated, 
‘[a]s I’ve just come from Greece, let’s talk about ways of building a path to 
peace on Cyprus and making possible … reconciliation between Turkey and 
Greece’. Cyprus was not on Özal’s priority list. For him the US should ‘support … 
Ankara’s position that Turkish Cypriots should be equal negotiating partners with 
the majority Greek Cypriots’. Özal’s priority list included ‘more military aid, [and] 
an order to build another 160 sophisticated F-16 jet fighters under a joint 
arrangement’. US aid to cover Turkey’s losses did not coincide with Özal’s wish. 
Özal declared that the $3 billion Turkey received from the US and other nations 
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was not sufficient to meet Turkey’s war-related expenses.92 Once again, Özal had 
economic and nationalist priorities while the US had defence-related and regional 
priorities.  
Turkish-American relations during the Gulf crisis was mostly about the juggling 
between Özal’s and US administration’s priorities. Since 1983 Özal had been 
trying to increase Turkey’s significance via developing bilateral trade, in which 
the US was never interested. Özal tried to use the Gulf crisis to show Turkey’s 
acknowledgement of the imbalance and its readiness to comply with US 
priorities. Yet this acknowledgement and readiness were not Turkey’s - they were 
his. Özal’s other misinterpretation was about Turkey’s significance in US strategic 
plans for the Middle East. The US did not consider cooperating with Turkey in 
post-crisis Iraq, either politically or economically as Özal hoped. His personal 
push for expanding Turkey’s support for American priorities did not change US 
attitudes. The Guardian labelled Özal’s calculation ‘cynically simple’. ‘Either 
Turkey, by having a stake in the war, can deter others from dividing up Iraq 
after it is over or it can join in dismemberment’ of post-war Iraq.93 His hidden 
agenda was unworkable since the priorities mismatched. The tendency of the 
arm did not change, Turkey continued its distancing trend from the US.  
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b. Australia: too eager to cling 
US-Australia relations during the Gulf crisis show how Prime Minister Hawke 
effectively adapted Australia’s priorities to the US. From the very beginning of 
the crisis the US considered Australia a natural ally. Although Hawke government 
statements constantly emphasized that Australia contributed to the US-led 
Coalition’s efforts to restore international peace and security under UN auspices, 
Australia’s obvious motive was supporting US priorities. Australian media and 
several public figures highlighted this reason throughout the crisis. The UN 
resolutions helped the Hawke government to convince the House, Senate, and 
Australian public that Australia was supporting the UN, but from the beginning of 
the crisis Hawke was very eager to adhere almost all US demands, which 
maintained Australian arm’s tendency and prevented wobbles.  
************************* 
Australia-US cooperation started at the beginning of the crisis. On 2 August 
1990, UN Resolution 660 condemned Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait as a breach of 
international peace and security.1 On the same day President Bush ‘signed an 
executive order … freezing Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the US and in US overseas 
branches and called on other governments to take similar action’. On 3 August, 
the Deputy Director of the State Department’s Office of Northern Gulf Affairs, 
Joseph McGhee, told the Australian Embassy in Washington that ‘Australia was 
one of the first to be approached’ to follow the executive order.2 For the US, 
Australia was a natural ally.  
In 1990, the Australian arm was so stable and relations were so close that 
Australia would support almost any US-initiated decision. First, the Acting 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Michael Duffy, and the Minister for Foreign 
Affair, Gareth Evans, condemned the invasion ‘unreservedly’.3 Second, Australia 
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recognized UN Resolution 661 affirming economic sanctions on Iraq,4 while 
implying that the sanctions ‘would mean a loss of $350-450 million net annual 
export revenue’ which with the ‘outstanding debts to Australia’ would bring the 
loss ‘$750 million’.5 Yet supporting the US was more important. On 6 August, in 
Cabinet, Evans stated that considerations of trade had to be put aside when 
‘dealing with fundamental questions of war and peace and human rights’.6 The 
Hawke Cabinet unanimously recognized the sanctions. The decision ‘was reached 
in less than one hour’,7 regardless of its ‘serious implications’ in the cessation of 
wheat exports.8  
The US was appreciative. The US National Security staff viewed Australia’s action 
of ‘immediately announcing comprehensive sanctions despite the very real 
financial cost’ very ‘favourably’. The White House ‘equally’ welcomed Australia’s 
‘contribution’, as a ‘country so far removed geographically from the Gulf’.9 
The US was quick to get Australia officially on board. On 8 August the ‘US Navy 
made an informal approach to … feel out the possibility of Australia contributing 
to a US sponsored MNF [Multinational Naval Force]’. For the White House ‘an 
early agreement to contribute would mean a lot more … than … coming in late at 
the tail of a large field’.10  
Even an informal US approach put Australia to work. On 9 August, Minister For 
Defence, Robert Ray, stated that there had been ‘no formal request’ from the US 
but the government was ‘actively considering what’ it ‘might be able to do’.11 On 
the same day, ‘an ad-hoc interdepartmental committee chaired by the Secretary 
of the Department of Defence’ asked about the possibility of a RAN [Royal 
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Australian Navy] contribution to US efforts in the Gulf.12 Hawke put it in a more 
international framework, by stating that Australian participation’s ‘primary 
purpose was to enforce the blockade on Iraq and Kuwait and to protect the 
movement of … other oil producers in the area’.13 Hawke repeated this argument 
in various wordings throughout the crisis.  
Hawke was very ready to follow the US. On 9 August, in consultation with only 
five ministers (Deputy Prime Minister Paul Keating, acting Foreign Minister and 
Attorney General Michael Duffy, Minister for Defence Senator Robert Ray, 
Government Senate Leader Senator John Button, and Foreign Minister Senator 
Gareth Evans) he decided to commit Australian ships to support the MNF 
blockade of Iraq and Kuwait. All ministers agreed about ‘the appropriateness’ of 
the decision.14 The RAN also considered it appropriate since Australian ships were 
‘American-made and contain the same communication and fighting equipment as 
the same ships in the US Navy’.15  
The decision was not kept secret for long. The next day Australian media began 
to talk about Australia’s possible involvement to Gulf. The Age reported that ‘the 
RAN was debating whether to send FFGs [Guided Missile Frigates] or DDGs 
[Guided Missile Destroyer]’.16 The Australian reported that ‘Australia was likely to 
send two frigates, an oil tanker and a supply ship’.17  
Hawke officially announced the decision on 10 August, after Bush’s phone call.18 
‘Two frigates, HMAS Adelaide and HMAS Darwin, would depart for the Gulf on 
Monday 13 August and would be accompanied by the supply ship, HMAS 
Success’.19 Hawke did not ignore the Bush effect: there ‘had been earlier 
discussions at official levels initiated in the first place with the US’ but after the 
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‘lengthy conversation’ with Bush, together with Keating, Evans, Ray, Duffy and 
Button it was ‘agreed that Australia would contribute to a multinational task 
force’.20 The US influence was more than a telephone call. Hawke was already 
willing to follow Bush. Bush’s comment in his book proves it: on the telephone, 
Hawke ‘without equivocation said he was solidly behind’ the US.21 The decision’s 
speed and Bush’s words show that the call was only a catalyst for Hawke to 
announce the decision.  
Media reports stressed the same point. The Sydney Morning Herald argued that 
‘President Bush’s call had no influence on the decision. US officials [described] it 
as “thank you call” ’.22 The Sun Herald similarly reported that a ‘spokesman’ of 
Hawke ‘confirmed’ that ‘Hawke had made an in-principle decision to commit the 
vessels the day before’ Bush ‘telephoned him’. The spokesman added that 
‘through the discussions [with the US] initiated by the Australian Government it 
would have become clear to the Americans that we had very much in mind an 
Australian involvement’. Similarly, the Sydney Morning Herald reported, ‘Hawke 
took the President’s call during … breakfast at the Lodge. They spoke for half an 
hour. … When the call ended, Australia was a part of the blockade. It was as 
simple as that’.23 The Age claimed that it was ‘a measure of strength of the 
Australian-American alliance under Bob Hawke that Australia was the first non-
European country to promise to help’.24  
The government tried to dilute this impression. Evans stated that the reason was 
not the government’s enthusiasm for following the US. In an interview on 12 
August on Channel 9, the reporter asked Evans, ‘why did we jump so quickly? 
How much of it was … national self interest, and how much of it was … the 
Americans are calling, and we’ve got to answer the call?’. Evans replied that it 
was ‘overwhelmingly self-interest, and the question of acting, out of loyalty or at 
the US behest are simply … didn’t arise’.25 
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Developments before Bush’s call proved the opposite. The real reason was 
Hawke’s enthusiasm to follow Washington, which made him ready to support the 
US even before being requested. Bush’s call was organized by the Australian 
Ambassador in Washington, Michael Cook. On 6 August the possibility of an 
Australian contribution ‘to the idea of a multinational naval force to implement 
sanctions and deter further Iraqi aggression’ was discussed between US 
government officials and Australian Embassy personnel in Washington. 26 The 
Hawke government wanted to understand American intentions. On 7 August 
Hawke’s advisor Hugh White spoke to Michael Cook to assure him ‘the 
government would be ready to respond if the Americans made a formal 
request’.27 Cook was cabled on 9 August, right after Hawke and the five 
ministers’ decision, and the Ambassador was requested to organize the call.28  
The decision was taken to assist US priorities. The Hawke government’s wish to 
satisfy the US was clearly expressed in Ray’s statement: ‘the US is our ally: if it 
were a United Nations force I couldn’t imagine Cabinet saying no, but I’ll leave 
that to them’.29 The Hawke government’s affirmative response to American 
requests had ‘an almost automatic quality’.30 
Cabinet still argued the opposite: Australian vessels would be supporting Security 
Council sanctions against Iraq. The vessels ‘would remain under Australian 
national command, with the question of operational control to be determined 
later’.31 
Although the Hawke government decided to support the MNF one day before 
Bush’s call, ‘in the eyes of’ some members of the opposition it was a ‘proof of 
Australia’s readiness to anticipate America’s needs’.32  The Leader of the 
Australian Democrats, Janet Powell, asserted that the deployment was 
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‘inappropriate’ and that Australia ‘should have responded only to a UN call for 
military assistance’. Powell added that the UN ‘believes that there is no need for 
any kind of policing. If there was a need for a policing force then the UN should 
call for it, not the US’.33 Similarly, ALP member Allan Morris said that the 
government ‘should have waited until a [UN] process eventuated’.34  
On 13 August the Emir of Kuwait’s letter requesting Australia to take necessary 
steps to enforce the UN sanctions arrived in Canberra.35 On 14 August Cabinet 
accepted the letter as a ‘legally sufficient basis for enforcement of sanctions’.36 
Hawke used the letter to state his claim that Australia’s commitment was under 
the auspices the UN. On 16 August, on the radio, he stated that the Emir of 
Kuwait personally requested assistance and that Australia ‘had given immediate 
support to the decision of the UN Security Council to impose comprehensive 
sanctions’.37  
The ALP’s Left faction stated that Australian vessels should be under UN 
command not the US’, that their role should avoid ‘physical interaction’, and that 
the government should ‘resist all approaches other than the UN to escalate’ 
Australia’s involvement.38 Evans and Ray briefed the Left faction leaders and 
separately Caucus foreign affairs and defence committee members to assure 
them that the Prime Minister would not escalate Australia’s commitment or take 
any further decisions affecting this commitment before extensive consultation.39  
After the brief Hawke sought parliamentary approval. On 21 August, he asked 
the House to ‘support [his] Government’s prompt action to implement UN 
sanctions’ and its decision ‘to send ships … to the Middle East to assist … in 
enforcing UN sanctions against Iraq under Article 51 of the UN Charter’.40 Even if 
at the time of discussion at the Australian parliament, the UN ‘had gone no 
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further than to mandate sanctions and call for member states to observe them’41, 
he ‘effectively quelled disquiet within the [ALP] and achieved the belated 
endorsement of Caucus and Parliament’.42  
By and large the Conservative opposition was not against the decision itself, but 
objected to the way it was taken and the confusion over Australian ships’ role. 
For example, the leader of the Opposition, John Hewson supported Hawke’s 
decision although he was concerned about ‘the operational and legal complexities 
of the situation’.43 Yet the opposition’s concerns did not ‘overshadow [their] 
whole-hearted support for the deployment’.44 Unlike Turkey, there was no heavy 
anti-Americanism within the opposition.  
On the ABC on 22 August, Hawke attempted to convince the public that Bush’s 
call was not the real reason for his decision. ‘My consideration of [Australia’s 
commitment to the Gulf] started well before the conversation with President 
Bush. There had been discussions at the diplomatic … and at the armed forces 
level. The discussions with George Bush was not the initiation, it was the end of 
a process’.45 To strengthen this understanding, the Hawke ‘government had 
throughout the planning and the initial execution of Operation Damask [striven] 
to be seen to be operating independently of the US in terms of national decision 
making, ie. not to be seen to be acceding to every request that emanated from 
the Pentagon or US State Department’.46  
The speed of Hawke’s decision showed the stability of the arm’s tendency. In 
‘five days after the UN Security Council had imposed sanctions on Iraq the 
government had decided to commit forces’.47 Eight days after the Iraqi invasion 
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of Kuwait, Australia dispatched two frigates and one supply ship, which were 
integrated into the ‘carrier battle group centered on the USS Midway operating 
primarily in the Gulf of Oman’.48  
The Australian bureaucracy was excluded from the decision making. ‘There was 
no discussion with senior defence or foreign affairs bureaucrats, while the foreign 
and defence ministers were only consulted via telephone’.49  
Hawke did not need to adjust Australian national priorities to any great extent, 
since the commitment was not contrary to Australia’s defence psyche. First, 
ANZUS included an ‘implicit understanding that Australian troops would be sent 
to the Middle East in any future global war’.50 Second, the forward defence policy 
aimed to carry out joint actions with great power allies, accumulating political 
credits to be used in times of national emergency. Third, Hawke’s previous self-
reliance efforts stated the importance of US-Australia cooperation on joint 
training and supply/support arrangements.51 Fourth, as a member of UKUSA 
Signals and Security Agreement,52 Australia, should ‘be seen to be playing its 
part’.53 Moreover, even before the crisis, Australia was unhappy about Saddam’s 
threats to use chemical weapons.54 Evans called Saddam’s statements on using 
these weapons as ‘lunatic’.55 In its news release DFAT also named Saddam’s 
attitude towards Kuwait ‘irresponsible and counterproductive to regional 
security’.56  
The Australian public did not seriously protest at the government’s decision. In 
general, it ‘stood firmly behind the American alliance; popular support has rarely 
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fallen much below 70’%.57 The Australian’s survey covering 24-26 August showed 
that 60% of Australians ‘favoured sending ships to the Gulf, with 40% being 
strongly in favour’. More than half the opponents of sending ships favoured the 
use of military force to impose the sanctions, and just under half opposed 
sending more military elements to the Gulf.58 
At the end of August, the US and Australia began to talk about the possibility of 
using force against Iraq. On 28 August Evans discussed US’ considerations on 
military action with the US Secretary of State James Baker. Baker asked Evans 
whether he could provide ‘specific details of Australia’s position on enforcement’. 
Evans replied that ‘Australia had stopped short of complete operational 
commitment to the use of force in part because of domestic political concern’. 
Evans carefully mentioned that Australia wanted to support the US but with a UN 
decision it would be easier.59 Evans’ statement to the public at the press 
conference highlighted the UN. ‘Australia was not [in the Gulf] supporting’ the 
US, it was ‘supporting the international community. Australia is supporting the 
UN. … We are supporting the US because what the US is doing here is absolutely 
right’.60 
Baker’s enquiry about Australia’s commitment had a direct influence on Hawke’s 
cabinet. On 30 August the Cabinet ‘agreed … that if it became apparent during 
the international discussions that the effective operation of the MNF would 
require it to have permission to use force in support of UNSCR [the UN Security 
Council Resolution] 661’ the Prime Minister and Defence and Foreign Ministers 
‘were authorised to expand the operational role of the Australian TG [Task 
Group] to permit action to halt all designated vessels in order to inspect and 
verify their cargoes and ensure strict implementation of the UNSCR 661; this 
would include the use of minimum force, including direct fire if necessary’.61  
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In early October, the shadow Foreign Minister, Senator Robert Hill, called on the 
US Undersecretary of State for Political Military Affairs, Richard Clarke, to ask 
whether the US would be demanding more contribution from Australia. Clarke 
responded that an additional Australian contribution would be valuable because 
of its ‘political message it could send to Saddam. The greater the array of 
countries contributing on the ground, the more powerful the message’. Baker 
added that ‘it would send a much stronger political message if they were to 
commit ground forces, whether troops or aircraft’.62 The US was confident that 
Australia would comply and it was not wrong.  
In October, while US officials were considering increasing the commitment in the 
Gulf, 63 Ray and Evans visited Washington. For the expansion of US 
commitments, Australian frigates could provide a useful contribution as air 
defence escorts to protect the US Navy’s high value ships.64 On 8 October Evans 
and Ray met the Secretary of Defence, Dick Cheney, and Baker.65 The US made 
no direct request of Australia but ‘the issue of whether Australia should increase 
its presence in the Middle East surfaced’.66 In the UN General Assembly Evans 
declared Australia’s determination to support the Iraqi sanctions and 
‘acknowledged that military action could not be ruled out should all other means 
of resolving the crisis fail’. He added that Australia strongly preferred that such 
military action ‘should be conducted with the explicit authority’ of the UN.67 Evans 
words clearly illustrated how closely Australia was following the US. The 
tendency of the arm was very stable. 
On 28 October, the Americans clarified their request for Australia’s extra 
contribution at the Multinational Naval Force Conference in Dubai. They wanted 
frigates with high anti-air warfare capability.68 
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The Hawke government was ready to comply. On 6 November Evans told 
Parliament that Australia could join an attack on Iraq.69 Evans’ statement was 
ahead of a US official draft resolution to the Security Council, on 8 November, to 
authorize the use of force.70 The next day, Bush began to reinforce ‘the forces 
that had been deployed for Operation Desert Shield’.71 Bush’s move showed that 
‘operations in the Gulf of Oman were declining in importance, and if Australia 
was to continue to play a useful role its ships to be permitted to move into the 
Arabian Gulf’.72 The Hawke government saw this strategic necessity but politically 
they ‘needed to hang’ it ‘on an appropriate’ UN resolution. In the Senate on 15 
November, Evans stated that if ‘the sanctions strategy and associated diplomacy 
do not achieve the objectives to which the international community is committed, 
we have to be prepared to contemplate military action, if that is the only course 
left which will ensure Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait’.73 
The required UN resolution, No.678, was passed on 29 November. It authorised 
the use of force against Iraq unless it withdrew from Kuwait and implemented 
the other relevant resolutions before 15 January. Six members of the Security 
Council (the US, the UK, the Soviet Union, France, Canada and Romania) 
sponsored it.74 
The Hawke government was again very quick to adhere. On 30 November, 
Hawke stated that increasing Australia’s forces in the Middle East would not be 
ruled out.75 Hawke was ‘mindful of his previous commitment to consult widely 
within the parliamentary party if there was to be any change to Australia’s 
military commitment’. On 3 December, before a Cabinet meeting, Hawke, Ray 
and Evans talked to the leaders of Labor’s three factions.76 To meet Centre-Left 
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and Left demands the Cabinet stated, ‘it was not anticipated that Australia would 
make any other contribution of naval, air or ground forces to operations’.77  
Hawke’s control over his party was clear. The Labor Party walked ‘remarkably in 
step behind’ him. ‘There have been some squawks on the Left and some agony 
in the Centre Left. But given the gravity of the decision and the history’ of Labor 
Party’s ‘sentiment about foreign war, they have been extremely mild’.78 Even if 
‘at the early stage of Australia’s commitment there had been complaints by the 
leader of the Opposition, John Hewson, over the lack of consultation and 
quibbling about lack of detail over the precise function of the frigates in the Gulf, 
the Opposition did not criticize the Government for its commitment’.79  
On 3 December Cabinet agreed that the naval task group would join operations 
in the Gulf under allied command, supported by an additional two medical 
teams.80 On 4 December Hawke announced that ‘the Government will now 
authorise the … (ADF) to deploy ships of our task force from the Gulf of Oman 
into the Persian Gulf to exercise and operate with allied naval forces in 
preparation for that role. The ADF will also now participate in allied military 
planning’.81 At this time the original task group returned to Australia and was 
relieved by a second task group. 
Although Hawke pledged to the factions on not expanding Australia’s second 
contribution, he left the door half-open for any future US requests. On 6 
December, Hawke said that although any request for an increase in Australian 
contribution was not expected, ‘in the unlikely event that one came we would 
consider it’. 82 
There were some critics, but the Australian media generally supported the 
decision. Some critics noted that the decision showed Australia’s clear desire to 
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please the US.83 Others argued that sending military elements to the Gulf would 
detach Australia from its self-reliance quest since the Gulf was beyond Australia’s 
direct military interest.84 Proponents, for example the Herald Sun, commented 
that the government’s action was proper. The Age called the expansion of the 
Australian commitment ‘logical’. The Australian stated that Hawke’s case was 
‘clear and convincing’.85 The Australian public also supported Hawke. The Age’s 
poll of thousand voters on 5-6 December showed that 80% supported his 
decision to use Australian ships in action.86 
Evans responded to the critics that ‘what we have to realise now is that in 1990 
we are genuinely confronted with a 1930s-type situation [Hitler’s threat] which 
needs [a] collective security response, which it didn’t get in the 1930s, but for 
which the UN was established in 1945’.87 The UN was again the government’s 
official reference point.  
On 24 December, the US Navy ‘formally asked Australia to send two more 
[medical] teams’.88 Australia agreed. ‘Unlike the earlier teams which were 
primarily Navy, these latter two teams comprised seven Navy, six Army and 
seven Air Force personnel, and they included Permanent, Reserve, male and 
female members’.89 
The situation in the Gulf escalated with Saddam’s declaration on 30 December 
that Iraq’s preparations for war were over and he would not leave Kuwait.90 On 5 
January 1991, Saddam announced that Iraq was ready for battle. On 9 January, 
Baker’s meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz in Geneva did not defuse 
the crisis.91  
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It was clear that Australia would go into battle. The main tactical issue was to 
receive an advance warning about a coalition offensive in order to have enough 
time to formally approve Australian ships participation. On 14 January Evans met 
Baker in Ottawa to make sure that the US would give Australia an early 
warning.92 Baker said the US could give ‘one or two hours notice –through a 
political rather than a military channel’. Evans was satisfied.93 He reported to 
Hawke that Australia ‘had been consulted at the time, thus enabling it to make a 
final judgement on the political context of the decision’.94  
In early January, the Australian bureaucracy was finalizing tactical requirements. 
On 14 January the Australian Defence Force Command Centre ‘went on full-time 
war basis’, and linked to the Pentagon and Whitehall via secure lines.95 The 
Australian Defence Force would be at war for the first time, since Vietnam, once 
again in line with the US. In a brief to Cabinet, DFAT clearly underlined that 
Australia for ‘good reasons’ for its ‘national interest’ to be ‘solidly behind’ the 
US.96 
Before Bush’s deadline to Saddam expired on 16 January, Hawke told Cabinet, 
‘we must expect to be involved in war within 24 hours’. The ministers ‘were 
supportive but many were understandably anxious’.97  
Baker promised Evans that Bush would give early enough warning of the 
impending attack. On 17 January morning at 9.48 (Canberra time) Bush 
telephoned Hawke and told him that ‘the first actions would start within an 
hour’.98 On the night of 16-17 January (Kuwait time) Desert Storm’s offensive 
action began. The Prime Minister ‘signed a pre-prepared letter to the [Chief of 
Defence Force] authorising the Australian Task Group to participate in operation 
Desert Storm’.99 On the same day he announced that as a ‘consequence’ of UN 
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Security Council Resolution 678 ‘the Australian Task Force in the Gulf [was] now 
with the other members of the [UN] co-operating in armed action to fulfil the 
[UN] resolutions to enforce the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait’.100  
There were public reactions to the operation. 500 protestors in Sydney, almost 
2,000 in Melbourne101 and 300 in Canberra staged demonstrations. On 18 
January in Melbourne 20,000 people, on 19 January in Sydney 10,000 people, in 
Canberra 700, in Adelaide 10,000, in Brisbane 5,000, in Perth 5,000, and in 
Hobart 3,000 people marched. 102 Despite these reactions the Australian’s poll 
taken on 18-20 January showed that 60% favoured Australia’s naval presence, 
and 75% favoured military action. 103 
On 21 January Hawke asked the House to ‘affirm its support for Australia’s 
positive response’ to the implementation of the Resolution 678. He listed a few 
reasons for this response, none of which mentioned the US influence. They were: 
establishing peace and stability in the Middle East, preventing the ‘disruption of 
[the] international economy’, and fulfilling UN Charter’s goals ‘to achieve the 
promise of a more free, more peaceful and more prosperous world order’.104 
Hewson105 and the Opposition Leader in the Senate, Robert Hill106, supported 
Hawke, which helped his motion to pass in both houses with insignificant 
opposition.107 
Australia was forewarned, although not very early. Two hours before the land 
offensive Bush again called Hawke, and advised that he had ordered General 
Schwarzkopf to start full-scale military operations.108 On the same day, Hawke 
‘reaffirmed his support for the coalition’s operations’. He also stated, ‘Australia’s 
Task Group is not currently taking any direct part in supporting the ground 
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operations, but as those operations develop [the] task force may deploy further 
north in the Gulf where it could face higher risks from mines and other Iraqi 
action’.109 On 27 February, Hawke announced that Australian ships would leave 
the Gulf ‘when the war ends’.110 Thanks to Hawke’s stance, there were no 
wobbles on the arm and its tendency did not change.  
On 24 February the ground offensive to liberate Kuwait began.111 Apart from a 
few individuals, for example Captain John Walters, ‘second-in-command of a 
170-strong company of the Grenadier Guards, and Major John Cantwell, serving 
as a ‘liaison officer to the US 1st Infantry Division’, Australian units ‘were not 
involved in the land campaign’.112 ‘Forty Australians in the Task Group Medical 
Support Element’ had moved into ‘the northern Arabian Gulf to support the 
amphibious task force’.113 
On 28 February, Hawke announced that the Gulf War was over.114 The next day 
he called Bush and congratulated him on ‘the magnificent victory’.115 On 1 March, 
Hawke stated that the US ‘played a special part’ by employing ‘its authority and 
its power to serve interests which were not America’s alone, but were the 
interests of the world community as a whole’.116 His statements clearly exhibited 
his pro-Americanism.  
Australia’s military contribution to the Gulf War was small. Its deployment cost 
over $100 million. There was an additional approximately $300 million to 
compensate Australian wheat producers’ exports to Iraq, and in writing off 
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Egypt’s wheat debt.117 Australia also delivered $16.2 million of humanitarian 
aid.118  
The Australian Defence Force’s commitment in the Gulf War ‘was mainly driven 
by political considerations’ rather than strategic and military. The Australian 
government considered that contributing to US Gulf operations was for 
‘Australia’s wider security interests’.119 A major criticism of Hawke’s decisions was 
that Australia followed the US unthinkably and uncritically.120 Richard Leaver 
commented that the victory in the Gulf showed that there was already a ‘strong 
majority sentiment within Australia behind the American alliance’ which was ‘re-
awakened and spectacularly confirmed the pro-alliance sentiments of the silent 
majority’.121 Hawke’s policies throughout the crisis kept Australia’s national 
priorities in step with the US. 
Hawke was a key factor in continuing the trending of the Australian arm of the 
wobbly cross. During the crisis he bolstered Australia-US link. He ‘prided himself 
on his close relationship with President Bush, and … with the previous Secretary 
of State, George Shultz’.122 Hawke later explained, ‘From the very beginning of 
the crisis in the Gulf I believed that Australia had vital interests at stake’.123 
Those vital interests were, almost as an imperative, ‘to support’ the US and 
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The Wobbly Cross: 
The main similarity between Turkish-American and Australia-American relations 
during the Gulf crisis was their leaders’ enthusiasm to support the US. Yet their 
attitudes, the domestic political scenery and the orientation of national priorities 
were quite different, moving the arms of the cross following opposite directions. 
Özal isolated himself from the parliament and even from his own cabinet to 
singlehandedly coordinate Turkey’s relations with the US, which backfired. Not 
only the parliamentary opposition, and the defence and foreign affairs 
bureaucracy but also some of his own cabinet heavily reacted against him. Unlike 
Hawke, he could not manage these reactions via UN resolutions. He was caught 
between his ambition to develop Turkish-American commerce and US defence-
oriented priorities and expectations. Özal understood the divergent priorities only 
at the end of the Gulf crisis, which increased his distrust in bilateral relations 
again. Özal’s attempts made him, not Turkey, closer to the US.  
Hawke was luckier. Australia’s relations with the US were much closer than 
Turkey’s. There was also a well-established habit in the Australian parliament 
and bureaucracy to follow US priorities. Although many members of his cabinet, 
the parliament, the media and Australian public knew that Australia’s 
contribution was to support the US, Hawke managed to display it as part of a UN 
effort. Unlike Turkey, the Gulf crisis did not pose an imminent threat to Australia, 
which made it easier for Hawke to manage the opposition. Since there was a 
very traditional cooperation culture between Australia and the US, it was not too 
difficult for Hawke to adapt Australia’s national priorities to the US during the 







Relations during preparations for the Iraq War (2001-2003) 
a. Turkey: all down the drain 
During the preparatory phase of the Iraq War, Turkish-American relations 
resemble their relations during the Gulf War. The leader of the AK Parti (the 
Justice and Development Party - JDP), Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, played a role 
similar to Özal. Until JDP’s election victory in November 2002, Bülent Ecevit did 
not have enough political clout to suppress the continuing anti-Americanism in 
the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), which was a must for adapting 
Turkey’s priorities to the US. Therefore he could not promise to support US 
priorities in Iraq.  
Erdoğan was a new hope for changing the Turkish arm’s tendency and pushing 
Turkey closer to the US. Before the elections in November 2002, he managed to 
create a good impression in Washington and among conservative Turkish voters. 
He had a full agenda: he wanted to start his own reforms to increase democracy 
in Turkey via reducing the influence of the Kemalists to consolidate JDP’s 
national and international legitimacy; and to finalize Turkey’s EU membership 
process. Very similar to Özal, for each of these aims he was seriously in need of 
US diplomatic and economic support. He was ready to acknowledge the 
imbalance, and supporting US priorities in Iraq could have been a very good 
instrument to show this.  
Even before he became the Prime Minister, Erdoğan showed his personal 
enthusiasm for supporting US policies in the Middle East. For this he tried to 
move Turkey’s priorities more towards the US. Yet he met Özal’s fate. Erdoğan’s 
efforts could not suppress the anti-Americanism of the seculars in the TGNA. He 
was also restrained by the politico-strategic concerns of the Turkish military and 
bureaucracy regarding the PKK and the possibility of a Kurdish state in northern 
Iraq. On 1 March 2003, the TGNA did not approve a resolution which would have 
allowed US troop deployment to open a second front in northern Iraq, and to 
send Turkish soldiers into Iraq. This was one of the biggest wobbles in bilateral 
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relations, which surprised and infuriated the Bush administration. Erdoğan 
managed to have the resolution passed on 20 March but this was too late to 
mend relations and ease the resultant wobbles on the arm. Erdoğan could not 
change the Turkish arm’s tendency. Turkey kept trending away from the US. 
************************* 
Turkey-US relations during the first phase1 of the Iraq War were under the 
influence of goodwill following the September 11 attacks.2 Turkey was the first 
Muslim nation to express its unconditional support for America’s response to the 
attacks. To support Operation Enduring Freedom against al-Qa’ida, Turkey 
opened its airspace and İncirlik Base for the US Air Force. Turkey sent 90 Special 
Forces personnel to Afghanistan and assigned anti-terror personnel to Florida to 
support the US efforts.3 ‘Before NATO undertook command’ of the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation, ‘Turkey led ISAF-II from June 2002 
to February 2003 with 1400 troops’.4  
At the beginning of 2002, the Ecevit government’s expectations from the US 
were similar to Özal’s: more commercial flexibility. Yet the Bush administration’s 
‘inflexibility on [US] market access … fuelled [Turkey’s] criticism that the 
partnership lacked an economic dimension responsive to Turkey’s needs’.5 
Ecevit’s US visit in January temporarily alleviated this frustration. Ecevit told US 
officials that Turkish-American counter-terrorism cooperation should be 
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supported with an ‘economic partnership’. The US administration accepted this.6 
For finding ‘compatible areas – e.g. textiles - for trade development’ the 
Economic Partnership Commission was established.7 During Ecevit’s visit, Bush 
tried to get his support for a US operation against Saddam. Because of his 
domestic unpopularity, Ecevit could not give the promise.8 He was prevented 
from adjusting Turkey’s priorities with the US. 
As in previous high-level good-will visits, the Ecevit-Bush talks brought additional 
American aid to Turkey but did not develop bilateral trade. ‘$2,500,000 for … 
2002 and $2,920,000 for … 2003 [of US financial assistance was] authorized to 
be available for Turkey’.9 After Ecevit’s visit, with the influence of the Bush 
administration, the IMF decided to lend $16 billion over the next three years to 
cover Turkey’s losses for supporting the US in Afghanistan.10  
The US administration wanted to use the increased imbalance in bilateral 
relations for its plans to assault Iraq.11 The Bush administration firstly tried to 
clarify whether Ecevit had changed his mind on supporting the US in Iraq. On 16 
July 2002, Ecevit told US Deputy Defense Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, that he 
could not support the US operation, since his domestic political situation was not 
improved. He avoided Wolfowitz’s inquiry, saying that it was ‘possible to 
ameliorate the situation [in Iraq] without military action’. He did not want to put 
extra pressure on his government by breaking off relations with Iraq. He added 
that ‘we want to have good relations with all our neighbours – among them Iraq 
of course’. Wolfowitz was clearer. He said that the Iraqi regime was ‘hostile’ to 
the US ‘and supporting terrorism, is a danger that [the US] cannot afford to live 
with indefinitely’. He added that he ‘had not asked Turkey for any decisions but 
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had come to seek Ankara’s perspective’. Turkey as ‘a key NATO ally’ with the 
İncirlik Base, the ‘only established US Air Force forward-operating base in the 
region’, would be ‘crucial to any major operation’.12 Pentagon’s plans reiterated 
Wolfowitz’s statement that Turkey was on a very valuable logistics line for 
assaulting Iraq from the north.13  
On 15 October, a Wolfowitz headed US delegation visited the Turkish General 
Staff and clarified US demands, which were a pre-deployment of US military 
personnel for site surveys, stationing 80,000 US troops and 250 US jets in 
Turkey, authorizing the use of Turkish soil for logistics and unrestricted 
overflights, and using Turkey’s six main and eight supplementary airfields. To 
alleviate Turkey’s concerns about the security situation in northern Iraq, the US 
delegation stated that Iraq’s unification would be protected, no Kurdish state 
would be established, and northern Iraq’s oil resources would be under the 
control of a central government representing all ethnic groups of Iraq.14 
Bush was clear about his priorities but Ecevit was not. In addition to his political 
weakness, Ecevit’s health was deteriorating. By July, sixty deputies of his party 
resigned, including the deputy prime minister and the foreign minister.15 His 
government did not have the necessary discretion to accept US requests and 
even if it had, he had lost his parliamentary majority to pass an act authorizing 
American troop deployment. The domestic situation was aggravated by a 
deepening economic crisis. Ecevit’s need for more American aid was increasing.16  
Yet the priorities still were not converging. Although Ecevit did not promise, his 
increasing need for American aid led him to authorize Turkish officials to 
cooperate with their US counterparts ‘closely and frequently’. The undersecretary 
of the Foreign Ministry, Uğur Ziyal, visited the US in August 2002. The Vice-
President, Dick Cheney, ‘assured’ him of US ‘opposition to Kurdish control of 
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Mosul and Kirkuk and stated that the oil resources would be controlled by the 
future central Iraqi government’.17 The US prioritized using military installations 
in Turkey, while Turkey was trying to prevent any economic loss and if possible 
to increase American aid via using the crisis. Once again, US priorities were 
security, and Turkish priorities were economy-oriented. 
The military bureaucracy of two countries began to work closely. The 
Commander of US Central Command, General Tommy Franks, and the NATO 
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and Commander of the US European 
Command, General Joseph Ralston, met the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, 
General Hilmi Özkök and relevant Turkish officers in Ankara on 21 October 2002. 
The talks were similar to previous discussions: the Iraqi Kurds, Kurdish militia 
issues, no-fly zone, and the territorial integrity of Iraq.18 Özkök visited the US on 
4-10 November. During the visit he stated that ‘the US should avoid a war in 
Iraq but that Turkey’s differences with Washington over the [forthcoming US 
operation] could be ironed out’.19  
This military compromise did not alter Ecevit’s and the Turkish MFA’s decision, 
which was to permit the US to use Turkish air space and to send a limited 
number of Turkish special forces to support American troops.20 Ecevit and the 
MFA did not want to open Turkish soil for a land operation and desired to protect 
Turkey’s military influence in northern Iraq. This was not enough for the US. The 
Bush administration wanted a solid promise for passage rights for both land and 
air forces in order to open a northern front, access which would eventually 
undermine Turkey’s influence in northern Iraq.21 Turkish and American priorities 
did not converge on operation-specific issues. 
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By November 2002, the Ecevit government could no longer resist heightened 
economic and political turmoil, triggering one of the biggest changes in Turkish 
political history. On 3 November 2002, the JDP won the general elections.22 
Erdoğan was JDP’s leader but was banned from national politics because of an 
Islamist speech at the time of elections, so he could not be Prime Minister. His 
deputy Abdullah Gül formed the government.23 With the JDP, the religious-
conservatives came to power, starting the political shift from secular nationalism 
to religious conservatism in Turkey. This shift affected Turkish-American relations 
in an unexpected way. 
Until then, the US had been working with a secular, Westernist, civilian-military 
Turkish bureaucracy, mostly known as the Kemalists.24 Under the Kemalists the 
Turkish arm of the cross had been quite wobbly. The JDP’s, and particularly 
Erdoğan’s, political transformation aimed to reduce the influence of the Kemalists 
on Turkish politics. Erdoğan’s objective was to give the Turkish socio-political 
fabric a more Islamist outlook. From the start this aim deepened the divide 
between the Kemalists and the religious-conservatives. Erdoğan’s developing 
dominance in Turkish foreign policy, let JDP members began to replace the 
Kemalists.  
The US did not object to this. Due to Turkey’s wobbly distancing from the US 
from the mid-1960s, the US administration had been discussing a change in 
Turkey’s political fabric. They thought it should be less Kemalist, more 
democratic, more human rights-oriented and more inclusive of ethnic (non-
Turkic) identities in Turkey.25 Erdoğan, as a pragmatic leader, proposed an even 
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deeper change. In his speeches he underlined his “new Turkey” model26, in which 
he used the term conservative democracy, rather than a direct reference to 
Islam. Erdoğan constantly underlined political liberalization and legal reforms to 
comply with the EU membership guidelines.  
Erdoğan’s conservative, Islamist, and reformist party fitted quite well into Bush’s 
Greater Middle East Initiative. The Bush administration put forward the Initiative 
after 9/11 as a more active and pre-emptive policy defending the US against 
Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups, such as al-Qa’ida. This policy brought 
the Middle East into the centre of US foreign policy. It rested on a ‘two-pronged 
approach’: ‘an aggressive pursuit of identified terrorists and the regimes that 
support them through the so-called war on terror’, and the ‘transformation of 
governments in the region, thereby making them less likely to harbor terrorists 
or tolerate activities that promote terrorism’. 27 The Bush administration 
embraced Erdoğan’s government as a model of ‘balancing democracy and 
religion’. Supporting the JDP government aimed to prove that Bush’s policy was 
not ‘specifically un-Islamic’. Bush also considered Erdoğan’s attempts to carry 
out reforms for fulfilling EU membership criteria a ‘crucial element’ for 
encouraging other Middle Eastern countries ‘to implement reform[s]’.28 Bush’s 
appreciation of the JDP had the potential to bring Turkey and the US closer.  
Erdoğan tried to boost this potential. Even before the elections, he attended the 
Davos meeting in January-February 2002 to show his personal support for Bush’s 
global war on terrorism.29 After the elections, as the JDP leader (not the Prime 
Minister), Erdoğan visited Bush on 11 December 2002. Bush stated: 
We’re impressed by the leadership - your leadership and your party’s 
strong victory. We thank you very much for your commitment to 
democracy and freedom. We join you, side by side, in your desire to 
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become a member of the European Union. We appreciate your 
friendship in NATO. You’re a strategic ally and friend of the United 
States, and we look forward to working with you to keep the peace. 30 
Erdoğan named this meeting a ‘turning point’ in Turkey’s history. He added that 
Turkey’s ‘bid [for the] European Union is the most important modernization 
project … since the establishment of the republic’. It ‘will serve as a great jump-
start for democracy’. Bush replied that his administration was going to work 
‘hard on Turkey’s behalf’ for the EU membership.31 
Erdoğan’s conversation with Bush resembled Özal’s with Reagan. Both were 
welcomed in Washington. Washington became ‘eager to shore up ties with’ 
Erdoğan, ‘and, in the event of war with Iraq, secure his support for [the] 
Pentagon’s plan for ousting Saddam Hussein’. The Pentagon still sought the 
northern front ‘that could complement the main attack from Kuwait and therefore 
enable’ the US ‘and its allies to quickly overwhelm Iraq’s overstretched forces’.32  
Erdoğan’s policies began to adapt Turkey’s priorities to the Bush administration’s. 
The JDP leadership began to prepare their constituencies. While Erdoğan was in 
Washington, JDP’s top-level MPs like the Minister of Justice Cemil Çiçek and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Yaşar Yakış stated publicly that the JDP government 
could work effectively with the US.33 US officials saw these statements as ‘the 
green light’ they had been ‘waiting for’. Wolfowitz ‘confidently’ predicted that 
Turkey would help the US in Iraq.34 Under Erdoğan’s de facto leadership Turkey 
began to move closer to the US. 
The Bush administration did not miss this opportunity. In January the US asked 
to use ‘Turkish airbases near Istanbul and [the] Black Sea, permission to deploy 
80,000 to 90,000 American troops on Turkish territory en route to Iraq, 
permission to station 250 planes at Turkish airports, and the use of 14 airports 
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and five sea ports’. 35 On 20 January the Chairman of US Joint Chiefs of General 
Staff, General Richard Myers, came to Turkey in order to ‘finalize an agreement 
on America’s military plans’.36  
The JDP was not ready to adapt Turkey’s priorities to that extent. JDP leaders 
tried to reduce this American pressure by pressing for diplomatic solutions over 
Iraq. Prime Minister Gül organized a “Meeting of the Neighbours of Iraq” on 23 
January. He aimed to convince Iraq, his constituencies and Turkey’s neighbours 
that the JDP was making every possible diplomatic move to prevent the 
American occupation of an Islamic country. During the meeting, Turkey informed 
the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yassin Ramadan of American plans.37 On 1 
February, the Gül government sent a delegation, including Turkish Ambassador 
to Washington Deniz Bölükbaşı, to the US to express Turkey’s increasing 
concerns, particularly about the PKK.38  
Yet, at the end of the meetings, the Turkish delegation accepted the American 
use of Turkish soil for opening a front in northern Iraq. The US accepted that 
31,000 Turkish troops would go into Iraq with heavy armour, including tanks, 
and link up with 1,500 Turkish special forces personnel already in northern Iraq. 
The US was planning to send 30,000 men into Iraq so there would be a 
numerical balance.39 To alleviate Turkish concerns about the PKK militia, the US 
promised that PKK ‘bases in northern Iraq would be eliminated’. ‘Turkey would 
also receive $6 billion in grants or $[26] billion in long term loans.’ Until these 
funds were available, Turkey ‘was provided a bridge loan of $8.5 billion’.40 
The TGNA showed only limited support for the JDP delegation’s agreement. On 6 
February 2003, the TGNA merely permitted US modernization of Turkish airports 
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and sea ports. It declared that upgrading Turkish ports should not be taken as a 
final decision to support a US assault.41  
On 8 February 2003, Turkey and the US signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
to carry out necessary infrastructural investment for US troop deployment.42 The 
US misinterpreted the Memorandum. The Bush administration thought that the 
Memorandum also covered the opening of Turkish soil for American deployment. 
Therefore, the Pentagon sent the 4th Division to Mersin and İskenderun offshore 
waters, with 7,200 vehicles and 80% of its equipment.43  
Like the Özal government during the Gulf War, the JDP government tried to use 
the situation to bolster the economy. On 13-14 February, Yakış and State 
Minister Ali Babacan met Secretary of State Colin Powell and Bush and asked for 
$92 billion. The Turkish delegation stressed Turkey’s losses during the Gulf War 
as a reason for such an extravagant amount.44 Bush rejected it and said that $6 
billion in grants would be enough for Turkey’s losses.45 In Ankara, Erdoğan was 
attempting to put pressure on Bush to increase this aid amount by delaying 
TGNA’s approval of the resolution.46 The persisting inconsistencies between 
Turkey’s economy-oriented and US security-oriented priorities were making it 
difficult to change the Turkish arm’s tendency.  
On 21 February, Turkish and US officials agreed on a package of $15 billion in 
‘immediate economic and military aid’ in exchange for allowing the authorization 
of 15,000 American troops to use Turkish territory. At the meeting in February, 
the amount was $26 billion but ‘much of that money was to be given over a 
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number of years’.47 The amount did not satisfy Erdoğan. Turkey was going to 
‘join a US-led “coalition of the willing”, albeit unwillingly’.48  
There were several other reasons for the JDP’s reluctance. Firstly, a big majority 
of the Turkish public, the parliament and bureaucracy were against the war. 
Turkish public opinion saw the US operation as ‘unlawful, immoral and 
unprincipled’, and was particularly discontented with a large number of US troops 
on Turkish soil. The Turkish Armed Forces and Foreign Affairs were particularly 
annoyed. They wanted neither to worsen relations with the US, nor to be part of 
an attempt to remove Iraq’s regime by force. Secondly, the JDP was 
inexperienced in foreign policy. Erdoğan was trying to push Turkey closer to the 
US but did not know how to suppress domestic anti-American opposition. Thirdly, 
even if the JDP’s statements were pro-Western, its constituency and 
establishment were Islamic. Therefore it was difficult for its members and voters 
to accept a military occupation of a Muslim country.49 Fourthly, Turkish public 
opinion’s memories were still fresh about the refugee crisis and losses in oil and 
tourism revenues during the Gulf War. The new war might raise oil prices, 
decrease foreign investment and significantly affect tourism sector. Moreover, 
closing the Iraqi-Turkish pipeline would drastically reduce energy transfer 
revenue.50  
The US operation’s international legitimacy was also weak due to the lack of a 
Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force. Moreover, France and 
Germany declared their opposition to the US operation. Supporting the US would 
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oppose the two major members of the EU, which could obstruct Erdoğan’s efforts 
for Turkey’s membership.51 
The JDP, parliamentary opposition, Turkish General Staff and MFA were all also 
concerned about Iraq’s territorial integrity. Firstly, the disintegration of Iraq 
could create a power vacuum, which the PKK could use to increase its insurgency 
into Turkey. Secondly, Turkey and the Northern Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic 
Party’s relations were strained due to the latter’s draft constitution for a ‘federal 
Iraq in which the Kurds would have greater autonomy and control of oil-rich 
Kirkuk’.52 Thirdly, Turkey aimed to protect Iraqi Turkoman rights in northern 
Iraq, in order to counterbalance the Kurds.53  
These reservations raised American concerns about the TGNA’s decision on the 
resolution. Before Gül sent the resolution to the TGNA, US diplomats invited 
some Turkish MPs to the Embassy to persuade them.54 Gül also waited for the 
Turkish National Security Council (TNC) meeting on 28 February, but since the 
TNC did not want to take any responsibility, no clear decision came out of the 
meeting about the US operation.55  
Gül ran out of time. On 1 March the TGNA discussed the resolution. 264 MPs 
voted for the motion, 250 against, and 19 abstained. According to the TGNA’s 
internal regulation, any type of approval requires a majority, which was 267 
affirmative votes in 2003. The resolution was rejected by three votes.56  
The result was not only because of the disagreement between the JDP and the 
opposition. Even the top three members of the JDP, Gül, Erdoğan, and Bülent 
Arınç were not on the same page.57 Of these three, Erdoğan was the most 
enthusiastic to support the US but he was not the prime minister, and did not 
 
51 Milliyet, 24 January 2003.  
52 “Iraq: Turkey, the Deployment of U.S. Forces, and Related Issues”, US Congressional Research 
Service, 2 May 2003, CRS-6-7; Hürriyet, 23 August 2002; Anatolia News Agency, 6 September 
2002.   
53 Colbert C. Held, Middle East Patterns: Places, Peoples, and Politics, Colorado: Westview Press, 
2000, 104; Sabah, 23 July 2002.  
54 Akşam, 27 March 2006.  
55 New York Times, 8 May 2003.  
56 For the details of the discussions see TGNAR, Term 22, Vol. 6, 1 March 2003. 
57 Wall Street Journal, 3 March 2003; Financial Times, 3 March 2003.  
96 
have enough influence on the parliament and the public opinion.58 The decision 
induced one of the biggest wobbles on the arm.  
Although the TGNA’s decision was a shock to the Bush administration, in January 
2003 there were discussions in the US Senate about the possibility of such a 
result. Congress Member Joseph R. Biden said:  
over 85[%] of the Turkish people [were] unalterably opposed to Turkey 
cooperation with [the US] in being able to successfully prosecute that 
[Gulf] war. So what happens if we go to war and we launch from Turkey 
with the support of the new Islamic leadership without having changed 
the minds of the people in Turkey and/or the world, to suggest that this 
[was] not merely us, but that it [was] sanctioned by the world that we 
do this? Well, the roughly 35 to 40[%] of this Islamic Party that is 
radical Islamic will play to its populist instincts and cause incredible 
trouble for the existing administration in Turkey.59 
The Senate’s preparedness for the TGNA’s decision did not reduce the size of the 
wobble. The arm swiftly and drastically trended down, which dented relations 
from several points. First the US media reported the Bush administration’s 
resentment, and anger and its alienation from Turkey.60 This annoyed JDP 
leaders, who thought that the US did not understand the restrictions they faced 
in and outside parliament.61 Second, Turkey’s rejection delayed decision making 
in the UN Security Council, both by encouraging Council members to lobby 
against the US decision and by making it more difficult for the US to win over 
undecided members. ‘This reinforced perceptions in America that Turkey had left 
its strategic partner in the lurch’.62 Third, the Pentagon had to revise its plans 
since there would be no northern front. Moreover, previous agreements and 
operational arrangements between Turkish and American officials became 
invalid, which automatically reduced Turkish military influence in northern Iraq.63 
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Fourth, the economic agreements became invalid as well. Turkey would no 
longer receive $15 billion. Fifth, America’s image in Turkey, not positive before 
the decision, worsened.64  
Within this turbulence, Turkey faced another unusual change. During his Prime 
Ministerial term, Gül carried out necessary constitutional changes to nullify 
Erdoğan’s political ban. Due to local electoral authorities’ reports on irregularities 
in Siirt, the Supreme Electoral Council of Turkey had declared the general 
election in Siirt null and void and ordered a by-election in March.65 This was held 
on 9 March 2003 and the JDP won 84% of the votes.66 Two days later Gül 
resigned, and Erdoğan formed a new government on 14 March.  
Unsurprisingly, Erdoğan’s first move was to begin discussions in the TGNA to 
open Turkish air space to the US Air Force, and to deploy Turkish troops to Iraq. 
On 20 March the resolution came to the TGNA once again. This time it passed 
easily, with 332 affirmatives, 202 negatives and 1 abstention.67 Erdoğan’s 
political clout in parliament was an obvious reason for this change. 
Erdoğan’s acknowledgement of the imbalance in bilateral relations did not reduce 
wobbles. After the first voting in the TGNA, the Pentagon and CENTCOM, which 
commanded the US operations in Iraq, began a harsher policy against Turkey. 
US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld refused to talk to Turkish officials on 
Turkish deployment in northern Iraq. Wolfowitz accused the Turkish General 
Staff of not influencing parliament, and said that Turkey should accept that the 
TGNA’s decision was a mistake.68 After the second vote, on 23 March, Bush 
stated, ‘we have got more troops up north, and we’re making it very clear to the 
Turks that we expect [the Turks] not to come into Northern Iraq’.69 Because of 
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Turkey’s lack of support, the US began to work more closely with the Kurds,70 
gradually excluding Turkey from operations in northern Iraq. 
Losing the US’ strategic focus and financial aid is always the worst nightmare of 
any pro-American Turkish administration. Therefore both the Erdoğan 
government and the Turkish General Staff strove to mend relations. After the 
second vote in the TGNA, Yakış said that the Turkish government miscalculated 
the importance of Turkey for US war plans, especially regarding setting up a 
northern front. He admitted that the TGNA made a ‘very serious strategic 
mistake’.71 Erdoğan was profoundly eager to mend the relations. On 31 March 
2003 he published an article titled “My Country is your Faithful Ally and Friend” in 
the Wall Street Journal, which underlined Turkish-American long-standing 
friendship and strategic partnership. The article said that ‘Turkey did not ignore’ 
the US and the only reason for Turkey’s desire to have a military presence in 
northern Iraq was to ‘take precautionary measures for possible intrusions by 
PKK/KADEK terrorists’. Turkey’s presence ‘is envisaged with full cooperation and 
coordination with the US, as well as the Kurdish groups in the region’.72 On 26 
March, Özkök stated that ‘Turkey was actively preparing to send more troops 
into northern Iraq, but that it would do so only if the threat against Turkey 
escalates - and in coordination with’ the US.73 On 1 May, in his message to 
Myers, Özkök said that NATO should take part in Iraq and Turkey could provide a 
serious contribution within NATO.74 On 23 June, the JDP passed a secret 
enactment which opened Turkish bases, including İncirlik, to coalition forces 
under the auspices of the UN Security Council.75  
On 7 October, the TGNA passed a resolution to send the Turkish troops to join 
the coalition in Iraq. CENTCOM did not refuse this but wanted to use Turkish 
forces in the most dangerous region, Fallujah. Turkish General Staff 
backpedalled, and did not send Turkish troops.76  
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The rejection of the first resolution pushed Turkey from the US war plans, 
especially in northern Iraq. Turkey’s restrained military influence in the region 
led Kurdish tribal leaders to claim control of Kirkuk. At the same time, the PKK’s 
insurgence activities increased along the Iraq border.77 The expansion of Kurdish 
influence in northern Iraq was Turkey’s biggest concern, and it was happening.  
Another big wobble was induced by the arrest of Turkish special forces, along 
with at least 11 civilians, on 4 July 2003, in Sulaymaniyah, northern Iraq. That 
is, after the successful invasion. The Turkish soldiers were arrested for the 
alleged reason that they were trying to assassinate the ethnic Kurdish governor 
of Kirkuk. They were captured, led away with hoods over their heads, and 
interrogated by American soldiers.78 The incident ignited anti-American headlines 
in Turkey.79 Turkish leaders ‘vehemently denounced the detention of their 
troops’. Although the soldiers were released in Baghdad after a couple of days, 
Turkish officials stated that ‘the American raid, and the heavy-handed way … had 
caused lasting damage to the American-Turkish relationship’.80 Özkök stated that 
the detentions ‘created the biggest crisis of confidence’ ever between the two 
armed forces.81 A senior member of the Turkish General Staff, Hurşit Tolon, 
stated that ‘it is a disgusting incident’. He added that ‘a NATO member arresting 
soldiers from a fellow NATO country, staging a raid without even providing an 
explanation or informing us in advance is unprecedented’.82 Erdoğan also called 
the arrests an ‘ugly incident’. Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül said that ‘none of it is 
believable’, ‘Turkey is working for Iraq’s stability, not to destabilize Iraq’.83 In 
retaliation, Turkey prevented humanitarian and logistical aid to northern Iraq and 
withdrew ‘two liaison officers from U.S. Central Command headquarters in 
Tampa, Fla’.84 Whether or not the assassination claim was true, the detention of 
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Turkish soldiers ‘developed hard feelings’85 which bolstered the tendency of the 
arm.  
Regardless of Erdoğan’s developing popularity in Washington and attempts to 
mend relations, Turkey and the US lost a lot of common ground during the 
preparatory stages of the Iraq War. Both Erdoğan’s conservative constituencies 
and the Kemalists did not believe that the US operation in Iraq would bring any 
profit. Most Turkish public opinion also found the operation’s international 
legitimacy questionable. Erdoğan hoped that the US operation in Iraq would 
increase his popularity, augmenting his international and domestic legitimacy. 
Although he won a significant level of support from Turkish voters, he had a lot 
to deal with in order to consolidate his power both nationally and internationally. 
Strong relations with the US would obviously have helped him. One major power 
bloc opposing Erdoğan was the Kemalists in the Turkish bureaucracy, which 
were also the US’ most formidable allies. Erdoğan needed to develop deeper and 
stronger relations with the US than the Kemalists. Moreover, he was in serious 
need of US diplomatic support for Turkey’s EU membership, which was the 
central plank of the JDP’s election victory. Supporting the US in Iraq could have 
been a catalyst for all these aims.  
Erdoğan resembled Özal regarding using the US Iraqi operation and its 
outcomes. Although Özal’s attitude was more profit-oriented, both tried to show 
their profound personal support to the US, but both could not overcome the anti-
Americanism in parliament and the public. Nor could they find a common 
language to share Turkey’s concerns either. Therefore both failed to adapt 
Turkey’s priorities to the US and to change the arm’s tendency. Erdoğan’s efforts 
to mend relations after the 1 March all failed, especially with the arrest of Turkish 
special forces. Turkey continued to trend away from the US. 
In the coming decades, Erdoğan would develop a more comprehensive control 
over parliament and the public in order to suppress opposing views. Yet in time 
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he also developed his own anti-Americanism, clearly seen in Turkish-US relations 





b. Australia: all the way one more time 
Prime Minister John Howard’s actions throughout the preparatory phase of the 
Iraq War bolstered the Australian arm’s tendency. Under Howard’s leadership 
‘Australia lined up with’ the US ‘in a way which went far beyond its formal 
obligations to its treaty partner’.1 Howard accepted the imbalance in relations 
before the Iraq War and managed to adapt Australia’s defence priorities to the 
US. During the preparations, his claims were almost identical to President George 
W. Bush’s. Both stressed Saddam’s alleged support of international terrorism, 
which was augmented by his alleged possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMDs). Howard also cited the 2002 Bali bombings to magnify the graveness of 
the terrorism threat to Australia. Although in Howard’s speeches eliminating 
international terrorism was presented as the main motive, reinforcing the US 
alliance was the most important, possibly the only, reason for Australia’s 
contribution to the Iraq War.  
************************* 
The American operation against Iraq, particularly for removing the Saddam 
regime, was handled by the US Congress in 1998 under the Iraqi Liberation Act. 
President Bill Clinton signed it into law. 2 Right after September 11, the Bush 
administration began to develop strategies to attack Afghanistan and Iraq.3 The 
Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, initiated discussions on Vigilant 
Guardian, code name for the operation against Iraq. In a couple of days, the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, brought a detailed plan for the 
invasion of Iraq.4 The plan relied on two justifications: Saddam regime’s 
possessed WMDs, and it supported international terrorism.5 Bush labelled Iraq 
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Presidential Documents, Vol.34, No.45, 9 November 1998, 2210-2211.   
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part of an “axis of evil”, which became a symbol signal for the coming US 
operation.6 In September 2002 the US National Security Strategy underscored 
this by stating US plans for pre-emptive strikes against rogue states or terrorist 
organizations. Iraq was one of them.7 
Bush needed international legitimacy for his pre-emptive strikes on Iraq. He 
spoke of the terrorism threat that Iraqi WMDs were posing. Saddam had worked 
on a WMD programme,8 and had used chemical and biological agents against 
military and civilian targets on numerous occasions.9 On 3 April 1991, under the 
Resolution 687, the UN imposed a WMD inspection and disarmament program on 
Iraq, called the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM).10 For years 
Saddam denied that he had WMDs, yet the UNSCOM inspectors claimed in 1995 
that they ‘uncovered key elements of the proscribed programmes, including that 
of undeclared biological warfare agents production and weaponization’.11 In the 
next three years, the UN inspectors faced Iraqi deception and non-compliance, 
which led the UN to withdraw its personnel in 1998.12 In December 1999, Iraq 
admitted a new round of inspections under a new UN body, the Monitoring 
Verification and Inspection Commission. This time Iraq cooperated with the UN 
much more effectively, but the UN Commission did not find WMD depots in 
Iraq.13  
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On 11 September 2001, Howard was in Washington meeting President Bush.14 
His purpose was to negotiate a free trade agreement, but the September 11 
attacks gave him an opportunity to bolster US-Australia relations. ‘During the 
return flight to Australia, Howard contemplated the invocation of’15 Article 4 of 
the ANZUS treaty, which stated ‘each Party recognises that an armed attack in 
the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and 
safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance 
with its constitutional processes’.16 The attack did not occur in the Pacific, and 
ANZUS was not designed to provide security assurance to the US, but Howard 
stated that the attacks underlined ‘the gravity of the situation’ and required 
Australia’s ‘steadfast commitment to work with’ the US in ‘combatting 
international terrorism’.17 It was the first time Australia invoked ANZUS. With this 
‘symbolic’ gesture,18 Howard wanted to emphasize the strength of the bond 
between two countries.  
Regardless of how much he acknowledged the imbalance in Australia-US 
relations, Howard was a true believer in US priorities and ‘for both material and 
cultural reasons’ his government ‘had chosen to prioritise the US as the 
centrepiece of its bilateral strategy’.19 As a result, the Howard government 
explicitly accepted the US claim that Saddam’s WMDs were posing an 
international terrorist threat, and so a grave danger to Australia. For Howard, 
Australia should share the costs and risks of eradicating international terrorism, 
so it needed to be ‘in close consultation with the [US Administration] in the 
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period ahead to consider what actions [it] might take in support of the US 
response to these attacks.’20  
Howard reiterated this claim in parliament and asked for support for the coming 
US actions. On 17 September he asked the House to ‘fully [endorse] the 
commitment of the Australian Government to support within Australia’s 
capabilities United States-led action against those responsible for these tragic 
attacks’. Howard emphasized the tragedy of 11 September rather than 
international terrorism. He said ‘[a]s a proud, patriotic Australian, I was literally 
moved to tears by what occurred in the United States. I was filled with 
admiration for the spirit of the American people’. Howard’s close connection to 
US priorities was clear. He added that in Washington he ‘had the opportunity to 
express immediately to the US administration the willingness of the Australian 
government to work with the Americans in responding’.21 
The Opposition agreed with Howard. On the same day at his speech, the leader 
of the Opposition, Kim Beazley emphasized the tragedy, but with a heavier focus 
on international terrorism. Beazley said that Australia should ‘support’ the US ‘in 
this fight because the fight against international terrorism is our fight’.22 He 
added: 
Australia will need to commit itself to an international intelligence, police 
and military effort against those who planned the atrocities in New York 
and Washington and against those who supported and harboured the 
perpetrators. We must do this in this country in a bipartisan fashion and 
see this effort through, no matter what the result of the election later 
this year.23 
Howard was quick to support US counter-terror efforts in Afghanistan as a 
response to September 11. 24 As well, he used Australia’s fight against 
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international terrorism in his election campaign. There, he presented ‘his new 
nationalism’ which emphasized ‘unity’ and ‘reinforcing the idea that Australia’s 
security relies on its traditional allies’. He also re-defined ‘patriotism’, which 
partly relied on supporting the US alliance. These emphases helped him to win 
the elections on 10 November 2001. 25 Howard’s election victory showed that 
international uncertainty increased the Australian public’s insecurity and 
reluctance to change the government.26 Involvement in the Afghanistan conflict 
was not ‘a direct strategic priority’ for Australia but a ‘by-product of larger 
interests’, one of which was obviously ‘maintaining strategic alliance with’ the 
US.27   
Howard had two main considerations regarding the American alliance. Firstly, 
‘earning credit from the Americans for a relatively small but effective military 
commitment to a cause which’ he ‘believed to be just’; and secondly, ‘reassuring 
the Americans that they did not have to undertake every difficult task alone, thus 
encouraging them to continue to shoulder the burden of security’.28 He wanted to 
show how valuable Australia was as an ally, with its great determination to 
support US priorities.  
As the Iraq crisis escalated, the Howard government echoed Bush’s main claims, 
though with a little twist. Government statements focused more on the global 
consequences of Iraq’s WMDs than on solely removing Saddam, which was 
Bush’s main concern. In June 2002, the Minister for Defence, Robert Hill, said 
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that Iraq was far from Australia but the proliferation of Saddam’s WMDs via 
international terrorist groups still posed a threat to Australia’s national security.29  
The Bush administration appreciated Howard’s support. On 13 June 2002, Bush 
stated his personal friendship with Howard and thanked him for ‘his steadfast 
support’ in ‘fighting terror’. He also said that ‘before’ taking any ‘military action’ 
on Iraq, he ‘would closely consult’ Howard.30  
Bush’s words were soon put into practice. In June 2002, US officials commenced 
sharing CENTCOM plans with Australia.31  
Although international terrorism, which was Bush and Howard’s common focus, 
was a relatively new concept, Australia faced it in Bali on 12 October 2002. Over 
200 people died, 88 of whom were Australians, and a further 209 injured.32 The 
attack strengthened Howard’s hand to justify the legitimacy of his decisions to 
support US counter-terror efforts. The next day he said that ‘[t]errorism is a 
worldwide menace and that’s been brought home to us’.33  
After the attack, the Howard government’s claims grew much closer to Bush’s. It 
began to stress the Bush-induced “link” between international terrorism and 
Saddam Hussein’s regime, and the military measures to end it. In November, Hill 
claimed that Australia should not rule out sending ‘land ground troops’ to support 
pre-emptive strikes to disarm Saddam.34 In December, Howard confirmed Hill’s 
words, especially by underlining the importance of pre-emptive strikes for 
combatting international terrorism.35  
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The government was tailoring Australia’s priorities, but not yet to the extent of 
sending troops. In January 2003, the possibility of American military action grew 
stronger. Although Howard was rhetorically echoing Bush, he was still avoiding 
making any commitment to support the US militarily. In January ‘only’ 6% of 
‘Australians’ were ‘prepared to send Australian troops to war against Iraq 
without’ UN ‘backing’. According to an AC Nielsen AgePoll ‘one in three believed 
[that] war against Iraq was not acceptable under any circumstances’.36  
In January, Howard still wanted to increase diplomatic pressure on Saddam to 
make him comply with UN resolutions, not to remove him by force.37 To back up 
diplomatic pressure, on 23 January 2003 the Howard government deployed 
HMAS Kanimbla and additional military elements, including the Perth-based 
Special Air Service regiment, to the Gulf.38 Hill stated that ‘the forward 
deployment of KANIMBLA and other ADF elements’ would hopefully ‘help to keep 
up international pressure on’ Saddam ‘to cooperate with’ UN ‘weapons inspectors 
and disarm’.39 On 28 January, Howard kept repeating that his government’s 
policy was ‘to have this matter handled through the [UN] process to the 
maximum degree possible’ and his government has ‘not made a final decision 
about military involvement’. He added:  
No final decision has been taken in any event by the United States. We 
have pre-positioned Australian forces because we believe that 
contributes, albeit in a much smaller way obviously than the pre-
positioning of other forces, to reinforcing the diplomatic efforts. We also 
think it’s fairer on our forces if we ultimately do decide to commit them, 
to commit them when they’ve had an opportunity of being pre-
positioned. But our position hasn’t changed. 40  
The lack of parliamentary approval for sending HMAS Kanimbla and other 
military elements triggered an Opposition reaction against Howard’s enthusiasm 
for following Bush. On 27 January Labor leader Simon Crean said, ‘Howard, in his 
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undue haste to deploy the troops, has gatecrashed the war’. For Crean ‘it’s not 
patriotism, it’s bad judgement because it’s in Australia’s interests that the United 
Nations determine the next step, not Australia simply following George Bush’. He 
added that ‘when the telephone call comes from President Bush, John Howard 
will say “yes” to the deployment of these troops in battlefield conditions in Iraq’. 
41 In Canberra on that day, ‘activists were mocking Howard’s staunch support of 
Washington’s hardline stance against Iraq’.42 
None of this deterred Howard. He ‘favoured giving Iraq a little more time but not 
too much’, and he was ‘certainly not talking about months’.43 
In February, Howard began to increase pressure to get parliamentary support for 
joining the ‘coalition of the willing’.44 In parliament he said that his government 
was predominantly after a peaceful diplomatic solution and would ‘not make a 
final decision to commit to military conflict unless and until it is satisfied that all 
achievable options for a peaceful resolution have been explored’. He added that 
the events in ‘Bali and those of 11 September’ showed that ‘we are living in a 
world where unexpected and devastating terrorist attacks on free and open 
societies can occur in ways that we never before imagined possible’. Howard also 
tried to convince the Opposition that Australia was not merely following the US. 
He said that ‘[o]ur close relationship with and our ready access to the US 
administration have meant that our views are heard and respected’. Yet he also 
emphasized the importance of the US alliance. He said that ‘[n]o nation is more 
important to our long-term security’ than the US, and concluded:  
Clearly the pre-positioning of Australian forces and the contingency 
planning with the United States military — to which ministers and I have 
referred frequently over recent months — have put Australia in a 
position where it can effectively, and in circumstances providing the 
best assurances of safety for our forces, contribute to a military 
operation against Iraq, should a final decision be taken for this to occur. 
45 
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The Opposition reacted strongly. Crean accused Howard of committing Australian 
troops ‘solely on the say-so of George W. Bush’ to a ‘command structure that 
you cannot withdraw from if George Bush decides to go it alone’. He added: 
What we have just heard from the Prime Minister is a justification for 
war, not a plan for peace. We have heard the Prime Minister unctuously 
in this House talk of his abhorrence of war and say that he wants peace, 
yet he has already committed our troops to war without a mandate from 
the Australian people, without a mandate from the parliament and 
without a mandate from the United Nations.46 
Crean clarified Labor’s position:  
I do not support and Labor does not support that decision—and I have 
made that clear. We do not support the deployment of Australian troops 
in advance of any United Nations authority. I took my case directly to 
the troops themselves on the HMAS Kanimbla. 47 
The Shadow Foreign Minister, Kevin Rudd, noted the potential humanitarian costs 
of war in Iraq, about which the government did not outline any plans. He also 
stated that ‘based on the evidence to date Iraq does not represent a basis for the 
formal invocation of the ANZUS alliance’.48 Thus the Opposition did not 
completely rule out the possibility of Australia’s military engagement in Iraq. 
What it asked for was to exhaust all UN channels first. The Opposition’s limited 
support made it easier for Howard to push on.  
Another important example of Howard’s effort to follow US priorities was his 
statement supporting US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s speech at the UN 
Security Council on 5 February. Powell put pressure on the Security Council by 
emphasizing Iraq’s breach of its disarmament obligations under the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1441.49 He said: 
Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction 
for a few more months or years is not an option, not in a post-
September 11th world. … Today, Iraq still poses a threat and Iraq still 
remains in material breach. Indeed, by its failure to seize on its one last 
opportunity to come clean and disarm. … We have an obligation to this 
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body to see that our resolutions are complied with. We wrote 1441 to 
give Iraq one last chance. … We must not shrink from whatever is ahead 
of us. We must not fail in our duty and our responsibility to the citizens 
of the countries that are represented by this body. 50 
The next day Howard reasserted Powell’s claims in the parliament. He underlined 
that as ‘a very compelling and credible Secretary of State’ Powell put forward a 
‘very compelling case’. He added that Powell’s presentation ‘revealed … a 
deliberate, systematic campaign of deceit, distortion and deception on the part of 
Iraq’. He echoed Powell by stating that ‘self-evidently what the Secretary of 
State said … is a damning indictment against Iraq and the strongest possible 
evidence that what the United States has been saying, what we have been 
saying, … [and] many others have been saying is absolutely correct. Nobody can 
doubt Colin Powell’s credibility; nobody can doubt the credibility of this 
presentation’. Then he asked the parliament, ‘[i]n the face of evidence like this, 
how can members in this parliament pretend that there is not a very compelling 
case against Iraq?’ 51 
Opposition did not directly challenge Powell’s claims. It criticized Howard for not 
securing full parliamentary support before the ‘refit of the HMAS Kanimbla in 
preparation for its forward deployment to a possible war in Iraq’, and holding 
‘discussions with the US about the role of Australia in the event of a US led 
military strike against Iraq’ without the ‘backing of’ the UN.52 The opposition was 
not against the idea of supporting the US but against the way it was done.  
Howard was also in need of public support. For this, he used his international 
terrorism rhetoric to bolster his claims. In February he sent every household a 
package with a personal letter and a colour booklet titled “Let’s look out for 
Australia: Protecting our way of life from a possible terrorist threat”. Media 
reports underlined the fact that the booklet was not ‘much help on how the 
average Australian can do their bit to combat terrorism’.53 Moreover, the amount 
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of money spent ($15 million) on the kit caused resentment. One third of the kits 
were returned.54 
The lack of public support did not change Howard’s views. On 9 February, before 
his overseas visit to the US, the UN headquarters and the UK, he stated that if 
the decision to send troops to Iraq ‘involves a short or even long-term popularity 
cost - so be it. I’m not going to tailor my view on this’.55 
On 10 February, Howard’s meeting with Bush illustrated the imbalance in 
Australia-US relations. After the meeting, in response to a question on ‘whether 
you count Australia as part of the coalition of the willing?’, Bush said that ‘Yes, I 
do. You know, what that means is up to John to decide. But I certainly count him 
as somebody who understands that the world changed on’ 11 September. 
Howard was clearer. He said: 
Australia’s position concerning Iraq is very clear. We believe a world in 
which weapons of mass destruction are in the hands of rogue states, 
with the potential threat of them falling into the hands of terrorists, is 
not a world that Australia, if we can possibly avoid it, wants to be part 
of. And that is the fundamental reason why Australia has taken the 
position she has. … The one real chance of a peaceful solution is the 
whole world saying the same thing to Iraq. And that’s why we believe 
the closest possible cooperation and unity of objective and unity of 
advocacy is very important. 56 
In Canberra, DFAT supported Howard by underlining the importance of the US 
alliance for Australia’s security. In February 2003, the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Alexander Downer released “Advancing the National Interest: Foreign 
Policy White Paper”.57 The paper echoed the Bush administration’s claims. It also 
stated that ‘the very close bilateral relationship is an important asset in the 
Government’s advocacy of Australian interests’ and that the ANZUS alliance was 
‘fundamental’ to Australia’s national security.  
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None of this much diminished public reaction in Australia against the Iraq War. 
‘Tens of thousands of peace protesters packed Melbourne … streets’ on 14 
February ‘in a show of strength against a US-led war in Iraq’. According to media 
reports, it was ‘the biggest protest in Australia since the anti- Vietnam War 
marches’. There were also anti-war demonstrations in Perth, Hobart, Canberra, 
Brisbane, Darwin, Adelaide, and Sydney.58  
The Opposition also intensified its opposition to Howard’s enthusiasm for 
following the US. Crean stated that the UN inspectors’ report on Iraq’s WMDs 
‘provided no basis for a military attack’ and that Howard ‘must rule out 
Australian support for the US-led cooperation’.59  
Neither the parliamentary nor the public reaction changed Howard’s mind. He 
said that ‘Australia's security alliance with the United States was strategically 
more important than that with the United Nations in shaping security and foreign 
policy’.60 Of the protests he commented, ‘[I] don't know that you can measure 
public opinion just by the number of people who turn up at demonstrations. I 
also suspect that there are a lot of Australians who do [not turn up], and they 
are perhaps not as noisy about it. And there are a lot of people in between’. He 
added, ‘[w]e should remember that in the end there is only one country that can 
help, with us, to guarantee our security and that’s the [US]’.61  
For Howard, if Australia did not help the US in Iraq to remove the Saddam 
regime, it would be a target of international terrorism in near future. Only the US 
alliance could protect Australia. On 13 March at the National Press Club, Howard 
asserted: 
Of course our alliance with the United States is also a factor, 
unapologetically so. … Alliances are two-way processes and our alliance 
with the United States is no exception and Australians should always 
remember that no nation is more important to our long-term security 
than that of the United States. … Australia is a western nation. Nothing 
 
58 Courier - Mail, 15 February 2003; Weekend Australian, 15 February 2003; Sunday Mail, 16 
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can, will or should alter that fact. As such, in this new world, we are a 
terrorist target. 62 
Regardless of Opposition or public protests, Howard’s policies protected the 
tendency and stability of the Australian arm. 
The leader of the Australian Democrats, Andrew Bartlett, criticized Howard’s 
speech and his zeal for following Bush: ‘PM’s war speech [was] about [the] 
defence of US militarism not Australian security … [He has] simpering praise for 
American militarism’. He added that Howard continued ‘to attempt to link 
unrelated issues such as Bali and September 11 to a war on Iraq, with no 
evidence any such link exists’. He concluded:  
The PM said Australian foreign policy should reflect Australian values but 
Australia’s defence and foreign policy is now effectively determined by 
the United States. US President George Bush will decide when Australia 
goes to war. 63 
Political and public unrest continued in Australia.64 On 14 March, Crean also 
criticized Howard’s 13 March speech: ‘[t]his isn’t just a sad day for the country, 
it’s a day of disgrace in which our Prime Minister has been involved’. The Greens’ 
leader Bob Brown said that it showed how ‘very out of touch’ Howard was ‘with 
community sentiment’.65 Neither this nor public opinion provided ‘significant 
enough opposition to prevent’ Howard’s coming decision for Australia’s 
participation. 66 
On 18 March, Bush delivered an ultimatum to the Iraqi leadership: Saddam 
Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours or face military conflict. 
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speech about defence of US militarism not Australian security”, Media Alert 03/ 144, 13 March 
2003, https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au, (Accessed 18.2.2019).  
64 Age, 14-18 March 2003; Australian, 14-18 March 2003; Courier – Mail, 14-16 March 2003; Daily 
Telegraph, 14-18 March 2003.  
65 Australian, 14 March 2003.  
66 Brendon O’Connor & Srdjan Vucetic, “Another Mars–Venus divide? Why Australia said ‘yes’ and 
Canada said ‘non’ to involvement in the 2003 Iraq War”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 
64:5, 2010, 533. For details of opinion polling around the war see Murray Goot, “Introduction: 
World Opinion Surveys and the War in Iraq”, International Journal of Public Opinion, 16, 2004, 
239–68; Murray Goot, “Questions of Deception: Contested Understandings of the Polls on WMD, 
Political Leaders and Governments in Australia, Britain and the United States’, Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, 61, 2007, 41–64. 
115 
That same day, Bush called Howard with a formal request regarding ‘Australia’s 
support and participation in a coalition of nations who are prepared to enforce 
the Security Council’s resolutions by all necessary means. This request was 
subsequently considered and agreed to by [the] cabinet’. Howard informed 
parliament of his cabinet’s decision. Although he said several times that the UN 
Security Council was ‘the most important framework’ to bring peace and security 
in Iraq,67 cabinet had already decided to commit Australian forces to the US 
operation, despite the UN, and before any comprehensive parliamentary 
consensus. Howard stated:  
There is no more serious decision for any government than to commit 
its forces to military conflict abroad. Under our system, this decision lies 
with the executive of government: the cabinet. Nevertheless, it is 
appropriate that the parliament, at the first opportunity, have the 
chance to debate this motion. It is essential that the reason for that 
decision be made plain to the representatives of the people and that 
they have a full opportunity to debate them and to have their views 
recorded. 68 
Although Opposition members called Howard’s decision of committing Australia 
into the Iraq War ‘reckless and unnecessary’,69 they could do nothing.  
On 20 March Howard announced Australia’s commitment to the Iraq War. He 
summarized what he had been saying since the Bali bombings, that the 
‘Government has decided to commit Australian forces to action to disarm Iraq 
because we believe it is right, it is lawful and it’s in Australia’s national interest.’ 
He added: 
International terrorism knows no borders. We have learnt that to our 
cost. Australia and Australians anywhere in the world are as much 
targets as any other Western country and its people. … Another reason 
[for the decision] is our close security alliance with the United States. 
The Americans have helped us in the past and the US is very important 
to our long-term security. 70 
 
67 Hansard, House of Representatives, 18 March 2003, 12506; Sydney Morning Herald, 18 March 
2003. 
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Crean pointed out that Australia had entered the war ‘because the US asked us 
to’,71 and the Labor Party ‘accused the Government of acting illegally by sending 
troops to war without any additional resolution by the UN authorising the use of 
force’.72  
On 24 March parliament discussed the petition of 7000 Australians. The 
petitioners requested that ‘the House shall refuse to commit Australia to join the 
[US] in this impending war, and further, that Australia uses what influence it has 
over the [US] to convince it to use non-violent strategies such as seeking a Zone 
Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction over the entire Middle East’. The petitioners 
also claimed that the US operation in Iraq was a ‘unilateral military action’ and 
the Australian troops were deployed ‘in support of this action’. They requested 
the House to: ‘use its influence to dissuade the US Government from the threat 
of precipitate military action in Iraq; refrain from all support of such threats; 
continue with diplomatic efforts to reach a resolution of the problems of the 
region; and work through the United Nations, as the duly constituted 
international body, for building a secure basis for world peace’. 73 None of this 
changed the Howard government’s decision. Four days later, Australian fighter 
jets attacked Iraqi military elements in Baghdad.74  
For Howard’s commitment there was no comprehensive parliamentary debate, 
‘no budget was revealed, no time-frame was set, and no clear objective was 
announced’. Forty-three of Australia’s ‘leading jurists’ could not find ‘authority for 
the unilateral invasion of Iraq in resolution 1441’. Although the resolution had 
‘strong language’ about ‘Iraq’s obligations to cooperate and disarm, and about 
the serious consequences that would follow if it did not, the resolution provided 
only that, in the event of a material breach by Iraq, the Security Council should 
convene to consider the situation’.75 Regarding Australia’s commitment, the UN 
resolution was not the motivation or the justification, rather it was Howard’s 
passion to follow Bush’s priorities. 
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Howard tacitly confirmed this by emphasizing the priorities the two nations 
shared. On 14 May he said: 
My talks last week with President Bush underlined the deepening and 
strengthening relationship between our two nations. The relationship 
between Australia and the United States has never been stronger. This 
relationship is not forced or contrived. We are allies because we are 
friends — very close friends. And that friendship is based above 
everything else on a commonality of views. We share a view of the 
world that values freedom and individual liberty. 76 
During Howard’s visit in May, Bush also confirmed the closeness in bilateral 
relations. He stated that ‘Australia and America began writing a new chapter in 
the history of our alliance. Our relationship has never been stronger’.77 Even a 
year later, Bush was lauding the strength of the bond with similar words. He said 
that ‘Australia and the United States have never been closer. Our closeness is 
based on a shared belief in the power of freedom and democracy to change 
lives’.78 
Howard expected not only to reinforce the closeness in bilateral relations. Greg 
Sheridan listed Howard’s expectations, some of which seemed unrealistic. 
‘Howard wanted: an enhanced intelligence relationship; enhanced defence 
cooperation; greater Australian influence in Washington’s decision making; a free 
trade agreement; increased US involvement in the region, especially in 
Indonesia; the greater prestige in Asia that comes from being close to and able 
to influence Washington; and the enhanced prestige for his government with 
Australian voters that comes from the same source.’79 As the leader of a middle 
power, Howard tried to punch above his weight.80  
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During the preparatory phase of the Iraq War, the Australian arm of the cross did 
not change its tendency and did not wobble. From the earliest planning stages of 
the US operation, Howard almost singlehandedly maintained this. Although there 
were other significant actors, such as Downer, Australia’s Ambassador to the US 
Michael Thawley, and its Ambassador to the United Kingdom Michael L’Estrange, 
it was ‘essentially’ Howard’s war.81 As the leader of a smaller ally, Howard with 
his ‘assiduous rhetorical support for the US following’ September 11 ‘had limited 
the options under which’ Australia ‘could manoeuvre’.82  
Howard sent Australian troops to fight alongside the US to converge Australian 
and American priorities. From the beginning this was his main motivation. A year 
after Howard’s decision, Downer claimed that Australia supported the US in Iraq 
to prevent the alliance being weakened ‘very substantially’.83  
The wobbly cross: 
At the beginning of the 2000s Turkey was both economically and politically in a 
weaker position than Australia. The Ecevit government was politically unpopular 
and economically inefficient. Although Ecevit acknowledged the imbalance in 
Turkish-American relations due to his grave need for US aid, he never had the 
discretion to give any solid promise to support the US in Iraq. Erdoğan was much 
more popular both in Turkey and Washington and eager to support the US. He 
also acknowledged the imbalance in bilateral relations, considering his urgency 
for US support to consolidate his power and to further Turkey’s EU membership. 
Yet he was not very experienced in foreign policy and had not yet obtained 
dominance over the anti-American opinion in parliament and among the public 
opinion. He tried to adapt Turkey’s priorities to the US but the rejection of the 
proposal on 1 March induced one of the biggest wobbles on the arm, which was 
aggravated with the arrest of the Turkish special forces in Sulaymaniyah.  
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Legally, institutionally, and politically, Howard was in a more comfortable 
position. Firstly, he did not need a parliamentary resolution to send troops. 
Secondly, he did not have to deal with an opposition as hostile as the Kemalists 
to Erdoğan. Thirdly, he did not need to consolidate his popularity in Washington 
or in Canberra. Fourthly, as in the Gulf War, the Iraq War posed a more 
imminent threat to Turkey than Australia, and the losses Turkey might have 
faced in the Gulf War were much serious than Australia’s. These two additional 
reasons made the Turkish parliament and public unwilling to support Erdoğan’s 
enthusiasm. Fifthly, Australia’s strategic habit supporting the US aided Howard. 
Howard successfully highlighted the severity of the threat posed by international 
terrorism and the requirements of the UN Security Council decisions. He 
constantly disguised his personal passion to follow Bush’s policies. At the end 
Howard followed the Australian arm’s trend. Erdoğan was more straightforward. 
He mainly focused on the importance of US alliance for Turkey and his party, 
rather than emphasizing international terrorism and the UN resolutions. He tried, 







Relations during the Syrian crisis (2011-2018) 
a. Turkey: an inexorable trend 
The Turkish-American interactions over the Syrian crisis demonstrate the 
inevitability of intractable wobbles, even with strong high-level political 
understanding and good-will. Throughout the crisis several other issues1 induced 
wobbles on the Turkish arm which sustained its trend. This chapter focuses only 
on Turkish-American relations in Syria between 2011 and 2018. Both parties, 
especially in high-level exchanges, did their best to ease wobbles and change the 
Turkish arm’s tendency. On many issues the Erdoğan government acknowledged 
the imbalance in bilateral relations but Turkey’s priorities in practice were so 
disoriented that wobbles were not eased. To eliminate this, Turkey tried to 
change US priorities rather than adapting its priorities to the US. Yet, as a middle 
power, Turkey was not capable of doing this. The US did not change its priorities 
but tried to ease Turkey’s frustrations. None of these efforts eased the wobbles. 
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At the end of 2018, the Turkish arm of the wobbly cross had seemingly inevitable 
downward trend, pushing Turkey away from the US.  
************************* 
The Syrian crisis2 between Bashar al-Assad’s government forces and various 
opposition groups began in 2011. Although the crisis started as a domestic affair, 
very quickly became part of the post-Cold War great and middle power struggle 
in the Middle East. 
As in previous cases, Turkish and American priorities regarding Syria were 
different: the US’ were more regional, Turkey’s were more national. The US 
prioritized containing Iran’s influence in the region; reducing the dominance of 
political Islam; eradicating the extremists with a particular focus on the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant - 
ISIL); and preventing the use and proliferation of chemical weapons. Turkey’s 
priorities were to restrain Kurdish military and political influence in the region; 
maintain security alongside its Syrian border; control the inflow of refugees; and 
remove the Assad regime.3 The difference in priorities and the tactics to achieve 
them created incurable wobbles on the arm, and sustained its tendency. 
At the beginning of the crisis, Turkey tried to mediate between Assad and the 
Syrian opposition. On 6 April, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet 
Davutoğlu, met Assad to convince him to carry out reforms the opposition was 
demanding.4 A few days later the Assad regime killed some 80 people, which 
brought Turkey and the US together for the first serious consultations on Syria. 
Both Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and President Barack Obama stated 
that they were keen on the Assad regime’s survival. Obama urged Erdoğan ‘to do 
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his best in order to convince his neighbour’ Assad ‘to reform his regime instead 
of toppling it’.5 Turkey and the US agreed on Assad’s survival but their priorities 
were quite different. 
The Obama administration viewed the Assad regime as a ‘bastion of stability in 
the Middle East, and thus a key factor in continued US security’.6 For Turkey, the 
Syrian crisis began to generate two serious problems: the resurgence of the PKK 
and the refugee influx.7 The crisis was creating a power vacuum in which the PKK 
could increase its influence on Syria’s Kurdish-majority areas of Kobane, Jazira, 
and Afrin.8 Moreover, from its very beginning, the crisis ignited the refugee 
problem both for Turkey and other neighbouring countries.9 The survival of Assad 
was crucial to subdue these issues.  
Erdoğan tried to convince his neighbour. On 27 April, the Director of Turkish 
National Intelligence Organisation, Hakan Fidan, conveyed Erdoğan’s message 
for reforms to the Syrian Prime Minister, Adel Safar.10 On 15 June, Erdoğan 
reiterated his message to Assad’s special envoy Hasan Turkmani. By that time, 
‘about 8,500 Syrian nationals crossed into Turkey to shelter in tent-camps in 
southern Turkey’.11 On 9 July, Davutoğlu re-visited Damascus to convey 
President Abdullah Gül’s letter to Assad, calling for reforms.12  
The US was appreciative. In the Senate, Senator Joe Lieberman stated that ‘no 
one has worked harder than Prime Minister Erdogan to encourage Bashar al-Asad 
to reform’.13 On 16 July during her meeting with Davutoğlu, US Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton highlighted the importance of bilateral cooperation on the 
Syria crisis.14 This was repeated in almost every Turkish-American high-level talk 
throughout the crisis. 
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Erdoğan’s diplomacy did not work. Assad ignored his calls. Turkey understood 
this especially after Assad’s attack on Hama on 31 July. On 15 August, Davutoğlu 
stated that ‘[t]his is our final word to the Syrian authorities: Our first expectation 
is that these operations stop immediately and unconditionally. If the operations 
do not end, there would be nothing more to discuss about steps that would be 
taken’.15 On 14 September Erdoğan re-affirmed that ‘[n]ow the Syrian people do 
not believe Al Assad. I don’t either. A leader that murders his people loses his 
legitimacy’.16  
The US agreed. On 18 August, Obama stated that ‘[t]he future of Syria must be 
determined by its people, but President Bashar al-Assad is standing in their 
way’.17 Obama’s next move was to issue the Executive Order 13582, which 
blocked ‘the property of the Syrian government’ in the US from being 
‘transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in’; banned ‘US 
persons from new investments in or exporting services to Syria’; and banned ‘US 
imports of, and other transactions or dealings in, Syrian-origin petroleum or 
petroleum products’.18 
On 20 September Erdoğan met Obama in New York. Their remarks once more 
highlighted the importance Turkish-American cooperation.19 After the meeting, 
Turkey began to follow US measures. On 30 November, the Erdoğan government 
started sanctions against Syria via suspending the Turkish-Syrian High Level 
Strategic Cooperation Council, introducing travel bans on several officials from 
the Assad government, and freezing these officials’ assets in Turkey.20  
At the end of 2011, although their priorities in Syria did not overlap at all, both 
the US and Turkey were sharing the idea of removing Assad. Both leaders 
 
15 International Herald Tribune, 17 August 2011.  
16 Wall Street Journal, 14 September 2011.  
17 “A Statement by President Obama”, 18 August 2011, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/,(Accessed 20.2.2019). 
18 “Executive Order 13582-Blocking Property of the Government of Syria and Prohibiting Certain 
Transactions with Respect to Syria”, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 18 August 
2011.  
19 “Remarks Prior to a Meeting with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey and an 
Exchange with Reporters in New York City”, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: 
Barack Obama, 2011, Book II, 20 September 2011, 1091-1092. 
20 BBC Monitoring European, 2 December 2011.  
124 
repeatedly underlined the strategic importance of Turkish-American cooperation 
but they had not yet started to talk about policy or tactics.  
In 2012, with differences in tactics, wobbles became visible again. The 
differences were on two issues: the Syrian opposition, and military intervention. 
In 2012, Turkey was supporting the Syrian National Council (SNC) and the Free 
Syrian Army (FSA) as the main opposition front, and wanted the US to intervene 
militarily to replace Assad with the SNC. Erdoğan acknowledged the imbalance in 
bilateral relations by believing that only an American intervention in Syria could 
resolve the crisis and end Assad’s regime. But Obama was against a unilateral 
military intervention, which he believed would make things even worse. He 
wanted UN-sponsored solution, but was deadlocked by Russian and Chinese 
vetoes on 4 February 2012.21  
Divergent priorities became even clearer during a Davutoğlu-Clinton meeting in 
Washington on 4-14 February. At the meeting, Davutoğlu constantly referred to 
‘the deadlock’ in the UN and the increased need for intervention. Clinton simply 
talked of ‘diplomatic pressure’ via ‘sanctions’, and of bringing the ‘international 
community together in condemnation of the actions of the Assad regime’. She 
said little about the Syrian opposition or military intervention.22  
Wobbles became more visible when Turkey began to push the US to recognize 
the SNC as the main representative body of the Syrian opposition.23 The US 
rejected this, for two reasons. Firstly, the SNC was not comprehensive enough to 
embrace all segments of an anti-Assad coalition, so a larger opposition front was 
needed. Secondly, the Obama administration believed that the SNC had al-Nusra 
and Al-Qaeda members, which both the US and Turkey accepted as terrorists.24  
To convince the US on the representative status of the SNC, Turkey established a 
platform called the Group of Friends of the Syrian People, which had its first 
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meeting in Tunisia on 24 March. On 31 March and 1 April, a larger meeting of the 
platform was held in Istanbul, attended by 83 Countries. 25 The meetings did not 
convince the US to replace of the Assad regime with the SNC.26  
On 16 May 2013, Erdoğan visited Obama, this time to convince him of the 
necessity for humanitarian intervention. Erdoğan cited Assad’s use of chemical 
weapons on civilians. Obama asked for ‘more specific information’ and refused a 
unilateral American intervention. He promised only to ‘strengthen the opposition 
politically’ and increase its ground fighting ability ‘to protect [it] from the Assad 
regime’.27 The differences in priorities grew. 
On 30 June 2012 the Geneva Agreement was signed. The parties to the 
agreement, including the permanent members of the Security Council, proposed 
‘a plan for establishing a transitional unity government’ to lead ‘the country into 
writing of [sic.] a new constitution and elections’. At the meeting, Davutoğlu 
once again emphasized the necessity of more ‘decisive steps’, not simply a plan 
to avert the Assad’s regime’s threat to the region.28 Clinton repeated the US 
concern that ‘further militarizing the conflict’ would ‘simply add fuel to the fire’.29  
Turkey’s attempts to use multilateral platforms to change the US view did not 
work. Therefore Erdoğan tried the bilateral route again. He called Obama on 30 
July to highlight the worsening of situation in Syria. Obama’s rhetoric and 
priorities did not change. He was concerned ‘about the Syrian regime’s ruthless 
attacks against its own people’ and ‘acknowledged’ Turkey’s generosity ‘in 
hosting’ a great number of Syrian refugees. Yet he said nothing about US 
military intervention in Syria.30 Erdoğan acknowledged that Turkey did not have 
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the ability to remove Assad31, but his acknowledgment did not change US 
priorities.  
The US Presidential candidate Mitt Romney exposed the divergent priorities of 
the Erdoğan and Obama administrations. On 10 October 2002 Romney said, 
‘Obama has failed to lead in Syria … [the] rebels needed more powerful weapons 
to battle’ Assad’s troops. The US ‘should try harder to … encourage Turkey, 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar to give [Syrian rebels] more arms’.32 
At the end of the year, the priorities further diverged with Obama’s efforts to 
build up a more comprehensive opposition in Syria. On 15 November the 
National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NCSROF) was 
established in Doha, Qatar. The NCSROF sidelined the Turkey-supported SNC by 
giving the Kurds and Nusayris a larger representation.33 
Since it could not organize a rival opposition platform, Turkey was more 
acknowledged the imbalance at a meeting with the head of NCSROF. At the 
meeting Davutoğlu ‘wholeheartedly’ welcomed the NCSROF structure while 
repeating the importance of the SNC for Turkey.34 
Another imbalance in bilateral relations was economic. By 2012, the number of 
refugees in Turkey reached 100,000.35 Turkey needed American economic and 
humanitarian support to cover its hosting costs. The Erdoğan government asked 
for help. On 11 August, during Clinton’s visit to Turkey, Davutoğlu stated that 
‘refugees fleeing to Turkey had surged to 3,000-a-day’ and that Turkey needed 
help. Clinton promised only ‘$5.5 million of new aid, for the refugees’, which was 
not enough. 36 Once more, accepting the imbalance did not change US priorities 
but prevented a new wobble. 
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In 2013, the imbalance in Turkish-American relations continued. This time, 
Turkey needed the Obama administration’s help to carry out two new policies: a 
humanitarian corridor and a no-fly-zone in Syria, and arming the Syrian 
opposition. Although Defence Secretary Leon Panetta and Clinton agreed to 
support Turkey, Obama vetoed it.37 The US Congress also supported Turkey’s 
proposal to strengthen ‘the Opposition and to change the balance on the ground 
to help give the Opposition the leverage they need to negotiate and to change’ 
Assad’s ‘calculations’. Any ‘humanitarian aid through the U.N. that ends up going 
through the regime at all, because it indirectly helps Assad, and therefore, 
presumably prolongs the conflict, and prolongs the human suffering’. According 
the Congress, if Assad was ‘gone’, ‘Iran would lose a key ally, one critical to its 
terrorist operations, including against Israel. and that’s why Iran and Hezbollah 
are massively stepping up their support of the Assad regime, providing a lifeline 
of weapons, providing fighters on the ground’. This is strengthening the Jihadist 
groups in Syria’. Obama vetoed again, since he believed that ‘[i]f Assad loses, it 
will be the Middle East version of Black Friday with door-busting sales on all the 
latest weapons, batteries included. If he wins, the door remains closed’.38 
Obama’s rejection of a unilateral American action directly conflicted with Turkey’s 
requests.  
In the first quarter of 2013, the Obama administration also tried to change 
Turkey’s priorities. For this, Secretary of State John Kerry visited Turkey twice. 
On 1 March, Kerry highlighted the differences in tactics between Turkey and the 
US. He stated: 
the first priority is to try to have a political solution. We would like to 
save lives, not see them caught up in a continued war. But we are clear 
about who we support in the effort to restore freedom and unity to the 
people of Syria. And in that effort, we have worked together, not just 
Turkey and the United States, but a whole group of countries, all of 
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whom have been doing different things according to their laws and 
according to their abilities. 39 
On 6-7 April, in his second visit for the Friends of Syrian People meeting, Kerry 
underlined his administration’s priority for a diplomatic solution in Syria. 40  
Kerry did not change Turkey’s priorities, even though ironically, Erdoğan was still 
in need of US help to carry them out. On 16-21 May he visited Obama, and 
urged that Turkey and the US should put more effort into ‘prevent[ing] Syria 
from becoming an area for terrorist organizations’, that the use of ‘chemical 
weapons’ should be stopped, and that the rights of all minorities ‘should be 
secured’. He invited the US and the UN to take necessary measures for this. 
Obama’s did not budge. He said that the Syrian opposition should be 
strengthened ‘politically so that it is inclusive and representative of all the people 
inside … Syria’. He added:  
We continue to try to mobilize the entire international community to put 
more and more pressure on Assad so that he recognizes that he is no 
longer legitimate and that he needs to go. … the crisis was an 
international problem [and bringing peace to Syria] was not something 
that the United States does by itself. And I don’t think anybody in the 
region, including the Prime Minister, would think that U.S. unilateral 
actions in and of themselves would bring about a better outcome inside 
… Syria. 41 
Assad’s chemical attack on 21 August partially changed Obama’s mind regarding 
a military intervention. He announced:  
the United States should take military action against Syrian regime 
targets. This would not be an open-ended intervention. We would not 
put boots on the ground. Instead, our action would be designed to be 
limited in duration and scope. 42 
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Obama’s announcement of limited military involvement did not satisfy Turkey. 
Erdoğan ‘openly declared’ that Turkey wanted ‘the Assad regime toppled as soon 
as possible’ and a limited intervention would not bring a regime change but only 
deter Assad ‘from using his chemical weapons again’. He added, ‘[i]t is doubtful 
even whether Obama still wants Assad to go’.43  
Chinese and Russian vetoes at the Security Council limited Obama’s intervention 
even more. Putin said that US military intervention ‘could ignite Islamic unrest 
around the region’, which was also among Obama’s concerns. China backed 
Putin.44 Obama had to postpone the attack.45 
Turkey was once again disappointed and tried to use the UN to reverse Obama’s 
decision. In the UN on 23 September-4 October, Gül openly expressed Turkey’s 
displeasure. He claimed: 
a lack of action from the UN Security Council (UNSC) only emboldens 
aggressive regimes. We need a UN capable of forcing the perpetrators 
of brutal actions to submit to justice and the rule of law. Decisive action 
is the only way that the UN system will remain relevant and credible.46  
Obama ‘did not believe that military action — by those within Syria, or by 
external Powers — could achieve a lasting peace’.47 At the end of 2013, the 
divergence in Turkish and American priorities and tactics was turning into a 
deadlock.  
Davutoğlu tried to break the deadlock. In the US on 16-19 November, he told 
Kerry of the inadequacy of international community, particularly US, efforts in 
Syria. Kerry responded that the US was after a ‘political solution to the conflict’.48  
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At the end of 2013, another and much more significant divergence in priorities 
emerged regarding the Kurdish establishments in northern Syria. Until then 
divergence was managed via high level visits, and did not particularly affect 
policies, so they did not induce wobbles on the arm. The Kurdish issue was 
different. For Turkey, the expansion of the Democratic Union Party’s (PYD/YPG) 
influence along the Turkish-Syrian border was a national security threat. Turkey 
saw the PYD/YPG as an extension of the PKK.49 In November, the PYD/YPG’s 
announcement of its autonomy in northern Syria outraged Turkey.50 On the other 
hand, for the US the PYD/YPG was becoming ‘a reliable ally’ due to its 
‘willingness to take on ISIS’, which was the US’ foremost priority.51  
The Kurdish wobble was exacerbated by the increased financial burden of the 
Syrian refugees in Turkey, for which the US was refusing Turkey’s requests for 
financial support. At the end of 2013, according to the Turkish Disaster and 
Emergency Management Authority (AFAD), there were 210,358 Syrian refugees 
living in camps and another 450,000 outside them.52 
In 2014, the differences in Turkish and American priorities and tactics regarding 
Syria induced more wobbles. High level visits at the beginning of the year 
warmed relations but did not prevent wobbles since these visits did not focus on 
the differences in priorities. The Turkish arm sustained its tendency.  
In the first quarter of 2014 there were an unusual number of high-level visits 
between Turkey and the US. During these, representatives talked about common 
concerns rather than differences. Therefore they could not reconcile their 
differences. On 4 January, Davutoğlu called Kerry. Both agreed on the worsening 
of the ‘human crisis in Syria’ and that ‘all efforts are needed to make sure that 
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Geneva II talks will take place in most suitable conditions’.53 On 12 January Kerry 
and Davutoğlu met in Paris for the Friends of Syria group meeting, but neither 
party formulated a policy for a more proactive and interventionist US action.54 On 
22 January, Kerry and Davutoğlu met again for Geneva II talks. Both admitted 
that Assad and ‘his close associates … have lost their legitimacy and capability to 
exercise authority in the country’. They also agreed on ‘negotiating a transition 
government born by mutual consent’ which ‘Assad will not be part of’.55 On 18 
February Obama called Erdoğan, and both spoke of the deterioration of the 
situation in Syria. Although the conversation did not focus on differences of 
priorities, it was the first call from the US Presidency in six months.56 Another 
high level communication was from the US Deputy Secretary of State, William 
Burns, during his İstanbul visit on 24 February. Once again, nothing substantial 
was discussed about a US intervention. Press reports claimed that Obama’s call 
and Burns’ visit were the signs of ‘warming relations’ between Turkey and the 
US.57 To maintain it, on 6-7 March Obama’s assistant for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism, Lisa Monaco, visited Turkey. Monaco and Turkish officials 
discussed particularly ‘the growing terrorist presence in Syria’.58  
This closeness in relations was temporary. On 20 March, following a series of 
tweets questioning the Turkish government, Erdoğan banned Turkish access to 
social media. A week later, the US Senate condemned this.59  
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More wobbles emerged due to worsening security situation on the Turkish-Syrian 
border. On 23 March the Turkish military shot down a Syrian fighter jet after an 
alleged violation of Turkish airspace.60 On 24-25 March, Gül talked to Obama at 
the Third Nuclear Security Summit in the Hague. Gül argued that ‘Turkey acted 
within its right to self-defence’ and underlined the threat ‘the Syrian regime’ was 
posing to Turkey. Again, Obama did not comment on a US military intervention 
in Syria.61  
In May, the infiltration of foreign fighters into Syria induced another wobble. The 
US asked Turkey to restrain this inflow by increasing security of its Syrian 
border,62 but the nature of the border, 822 kms long, and the lack of intelligence 
support restrained Turkey’s efforts. With a continuing inflow, ISIS was becoming 
the most serious threat to the region.63  
Turkish and American priorities also diverged on the rise of foreign fighters in 
ISIS. For Turkey, Assad’s increased pressure was the main reason for the rise of 
radicalism in Syria and the moderate opposition, the Turkey-supported SNC, 
should be strengthened to reduce this radical influence. Otherwise the radicals 
would bring more recruits from overseas.64 Turkey’s emphasis was to establish a 
national unity government with the help of the SNC.65 The US also accepted that 
the radicals and foreign fighters were the main threat in Syria, but the main aim 
should be dealing with them directly, not organizing a new Syrian 
establishment.66  
With the increased number of recruits, ISIS attacked Kobani in September.67 
After ISIS’ attack, 180,000 Kobani settlers fled to Turkey. The burden on Turkey 
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grew.68 The Kobani attack induced a very significant wobble because the Obama 
administration considered that Turkey did not put enough effort in fighting 
against ISIS or stopping the recruitment of foreign fighters. Senator Lindsey 
Graham stated: 
Well, I’m very disappointed in Turkey. But here’s the problem. Syria is a 
disaster. Complete disaster. Here is what Turkey understands. If Assad 
stays in power, then Syria will continue to it be a failed state. There is 
no way the Syrian people will accept a Syria where Assad controls part 
of it. Turkey is reluctant to get involved with the ISIL problem until they 
see a clear commitment from us to give the Syrians a fresh start by 
removing Assad.69 
The US administration also thought, correctly, that Turkey saw the PYD/YPG as 
an extension of the PKK, which was also ISIS’ enemy, and that, Turkey was 
letting the ISIS grow stronger to fight more effectively against the PYD/YPG.70 
On 2 October 2014, US Vice-President Joe Biden claimed that Erdogan ‘had told 
him that Turkey was wrong to let foreign fighters [get through] the Turkish 
border into Syria’, in a way blaming Turkey for the rise of the ISIS. Erdoğan 
responded ‘with a furious outburst, calling his relationship with Biden “history”, 
demanding an apology and denying that he had either made the comment to 
Biden or that Turkey had allowed foreign fighters to cross its borders’. On 4 
October Biden called Erdoğan and apologized, but now Ankara was no longer 
sure about the effectiveness of cooperation with the US.71 Officially, the Obama 
administration did not push Turkey any further regarding ISIS, but the American 
media did.72  
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Turkey accepted ISIS as a national security threat, but preferred to target the 
PYD/YPG first.73 Erdoğan acknowledged the imbalance in bilateral relations since 
he was in need of US help to deal with these two threats on the Syrian border. 
Yet Kobani clearly showed that acknowledging this imbalance did not bring 
priorities closer, since the US wanted to eradicate ISIS first. The wobbles 
sustained the arms’ tendency.  
The wobbles were detrimental to both parties. Turkey needed US military and 
intelligence support to consolidate the SNC’s position in Syria and to bolster its 
border security. On the other hand, the US did not want to sacrifice Turkey’s 
military support in fighting ISIS. To ease wobbles and clarify Turkey’s position on 
ISIS, Erdoğan called Obama on 18 October. They ‘pledged to work closely 
together to strengthen cooperation against’ ISIS. Erdoğan made clear that 
Turkey would not work with the PYD/YPG, but with the Free Syrian Army (the 
armed component of SNC).74 On 15 November, Prime Minister Davutoğlu75, 
outlined divergence in priorities and Turkey’s enthusiasm to ease them by 
changing some of its priorities. At the end of his talk with Obama, Davutoğlu 
claimed that ‘we have no difference of opinion’. We both insist that both Assad 
and ISIS ‘should go’. There were differences only ‘in synchronization or timing’. 
He added that ‘after all, different countries have different concerns and face 
different risks. Because Turkey is affected by this crisis most closely, it wants the 
problem to be solved as soon as possible’.76  
Davutoğlu tried to recalibrate Turkish and American focus on fighting ISIS. The 
US Congress supported Davutoğlu.77 Biden’s Turkey visit on 21 November re-
affirmed Davutoğlu’s claims and stated that Turkish-American cooperation on 
fighting ISIS strengthen in 2015.78  
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The new focus on ISIS eased wobbles at the beginning of 2015. Yet, later in the 
year many more wobbles emerged, which maintained the Turkish arm’s 
tendency. 
In the first three months of 2015, the Turkish and American administrations 
cooperatively concentrated on fighting the ISIS. In January they successfully 
ended ISIS’ siege of Kobani.79 This helped Turkey ‘to shake off its image of being 
[ISIS]’s bashful ally’ and it received official US appreciation.80 Cooperation on 
ISIS seemingly worked well.  
Yet with the enlargement of cooperation, wobbles re-emerged. On 19 February 
Turkey and the US concluded an agreement on a train-and-equip program for 
local recruits sent to Syria. The Pentagon stated that the US had identified 1,200 
moderate opposition members to be vetted for the training program.81 The 
program was initially going to begin in March. The Turkish Foreign Ministry Under 
Secretary Feridun Sinirlioğlu, and the US Ambassador to Turkey, John Bass, both 
declared that the agreement was expected to strengthen the partnership.82 
Seemingly, both sides thought that the agreement would reduce tactical 
differences.  
The expectation was not realistic. Firstly, the program did not start in March 
since Turkey aimed to use the recruits to overthrow the Assad regime but the US 
was ‘placing its priority on fighting’ ISIS.83 In May, Turkish and American 
authorities re-started the program. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mevlüt 
Çavuşoğlu, announced that the ‘programme started in Turkey [with] 300 Syrian 
rebels’ on 9 May.84 Ambassador Bass claimed that, the program was delayed 
because of logistics not tactical differences.85  
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These high-level statements did not reflect reality. The divergence in priorities 
prevented tactical convergence, and this was the main reason for the delay. 
Turkish and American officials could not agree on the militia to be trained. The 
US ‘reportedly turned down about 20[%] of the people that the Turkish National 
Intelligence Organization … assembled to train as fighters due to suspicions that 
they belong[ed] to [the] al-Nusra front’, which the US saw as a part of Al-
Qaeda.86 The Turkish and American disagreement on Syrian opposition was long 
standing. Since 2012, the US administration believed Turkey-supported coalition 
members have links with Al-Qaeda. 
The efficiency of the program was hampered when 60 militia trained and sent to 
Syria were caught by radical groups. Turkish and American authorities quickly 
understood the operational ineffectiveness of the program and shut it down.87 
Different priorities wrecked one of the most important Turkish-American 
cooperative tools in Syria.  
Another significant wobble emerged with the US administration’s change of mind 
regarding the Assad regime. In March, Kerry said that ‘he still believed it was 
important to achieve a diplomatic solution for the conflict in Syria and that the 
negotiations should involve President Bashar al-Assad’.88 Turkey hastily reacted. 
Çavuşoğlu said, ‘[w]hat you are [i.e. are your] going to negotiate with Assad? 
What will you negotiate with a regime that killed more than 200,000 people and 
has used chemical weapons? What has come out of the negotiations that have 
been held up until now?’89 Although the US administration backtracked in May, 
Turkey’s concerns continued.90  
Another wobble emerged during the train-and-equip program when Turkey 
pushed for establishing a safe zone in Syria. In April, Çavuşoğlu stated that for 
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the program’s success on the ground a ‘safe-zone in Syria is a must’.91 At first, 
the US Congress was inclined to support Turkey’s claim,92 but that in June, US 
officials stated that Turkey’s plans were ‘hypothetical’ and there was not ‘any 
ground truth [in] any of these plans’. The State Department also observed that 
‘no-fly zones, safe havens, just are not happening’.93 
More wobbles emerged with increasing US support to the PYD/YPG. For the US, 
the PYD/YPG was a significant ally against ISIS.94 For Turkey it was not only an 
extension of the PKK, but also was fighting the Turkish-backed opposition, the 
Free Syrian Army and the Turkmans.95 Çavuşoğlu declared that Turkey’s “red 
line” would be violated if the PYD/YPG crossed to west of the Euphrates.96 The US 
agreed to keep Syrian Kurds out of this red line. Yet the PYD/YPG did not release 
any statement to relieve Turkey’s concerns.97  
In July Turkey’s concerns about the PYD/YPG heightened with PKK attacks in 
Turkey. Turkish officials claimed that the PKK improved its capability in parallel 
with the PYD/YPG.98 The US tried to ease Turkey’s concerns by admitting the PKK 
as a terrorist organization,99 but this did not stop the US sending military 
consultants to Syria and keeping in touch with the PYD/YPG. The US Department 
of State Spokesperson, John Kirby stated:  
We don’t consider the YPG a terrorist organization, and they have 
proven successful against ISIL inside Syria. And as I said, we’re going to 
continue to work with counter-ISIL fighters who are and can be 
successful against this group, and they’re not all Kurds. They are not all 
Kurds. We understand that the Turkish Government has concerns about 
the YPG. We continue to talk to them and engage them. We continue to 
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be appreciative of the support that Turkey is making to the coalition and 
to direct kinetic activity against ISIL.100 
Turkey was disappointed again.101  
Turkey’s concerns continued to grow in 2016. The most significant reason was 
the deepening of US-PYD cooperation. Turkey’s concerns about PYD/YPG’s 
influence in Syria climaxed when with US support the PYD/YPG began to merge 
Kurdish cantons in western and eastern Syria.102 Tel Abyad was the crucial town 
for merging these cantons. Therefore, particularly in Tel Abyad, the PYD/YPG, 
forced the locals to move, which was severely criticized by Amnesty 
International.103 The Tel Abyad operation not only threatened the ethno-religious 
fabric of northern Syria but also fuelled instability due to the increased migration 
of Arab, Turkomans.104 
Turkey’s concerns climaxed with the PKK’s intensified attacks in Ankara and 
Istanbul.105 As at July 2015, Turkish officials and public opinion/media stressed 
the link between the PYD/YPG and the PKK in bolstering a surge in the PKK’s 
attack capabilities.106 Erdoğan once again stressed that the PKK, and the 
PYD/YPG ‘have no difference from each other’.107 
Erdoğan acknowledged the imbalance in relations whereby without cutting US 
support, Turkey could not eliminate the PYD/YPG. He tried to change US 
priorities again. In April 2016, he visited Obama. Although, as in previous 
communications, both stressed the importance of Turkish-American cooperation 
in fighting ISIS, no resolution was achieved regarding the PYD/YPG108 since the 
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US was still supporting the PYD/YPG. On 23 March, US State Department Deputy 
Spokesperson Mark Toner stated:  
we still adhere to what our policy’s been for the past many months, 
which is that we view the PKK as a foreign terrorist organization. We 
condemn its - the violence that it carries out against Turkish civilians 
and citizens. And separately, we have been working with the YPD - or 
YPG, rather, in parts of Syria as part of a number of groups we’re 
working with who are actively fighting and dislodging Daesh or ISIL 
from territory it controls.109 
Before Toner’s words, the US Special Envoy on Fighting ISIS Brett McGurk 
posted twitter feeds from his Kobani visit which infuriated Turkey. McGurk shared 
a photo of ‘a cemetery where he said he “paid respects to over 1,000 Kurdish 
martyrs” from the battle of Kobani waged by’ the PYD/YPG. Once again US 
‘support for the PYD’ had ‘proven to be one of the most contentious issues 
dividing the U.S. and Turkey’.110 Turkey’s anger increased ‘after images emerged 
of U.S. ground forces wearing the insignia of [PYD/YPG] during operations 
against’ ISIS. Cavuşoğlu said ‘it was unacceptable that U.S. special forces would 
be wearing [PYD/YPG] shoulder patches’.111 This again showed that 
acknowledging the imbalance did not reconcile priorities.  
The PYD/YPG wobble was expanded when its militia tried to cross Turkey’s “red 
line” of the Euphrates. In May/June, ‘despite all Turkey’s objections US-
sponsored PKK/PYD elements have crossed over to the west of the Euphrates’ 
and continued ‘to advance’.112 Deputy Prime Minister, Numan Kurtulmuş stated 
that ‘we have told’ the Americans ‘that if the PYD or ISIL crosses’ to the west of 
Euphrates ‘it would threaten Turkey’s security. Unfortunately, this sensitivity of 
ours has not been seriously addressed’.113 Çavuşoğlu was clearer. He said that ‘it 
is a different matter if the YPG wants to provide logistics support [against ISIS] 
in the east of the Euphrates, but once the operations are over, we do not want a 
single one of them in the west’. He added ‘it is unacceptable for a country that 
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claims to always be at the forefront of the fight against terrorism to cooperate 
with [the] YPG/PYD which keeps sending terrorists to Turkey and is behind the 
attacks in Ankara’. Turkey-PYD/YPG hostility almost turned into an armed conflict 
in Manbij.114  
The US tried to ease the situation by organizing a new opposition front called the 
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) which was promised to have more members 
from local Arab groups.115 Yet McGurk’s social media and the discussions in the 
US Senate116 showed that the SDF was heavily composed of PYD/YPG militia.  
In August, the situation in Manbij escalated in August further. After the 
occupation of the town, the SDF refused to leave. PYD elements in the SDF 
announced that they intended to set up a corridor between Manbij and Afrin, 
which would considerably expand their influence in the region. That was also ‘the 
dream of the Kurds … to unite their lands across northern Syria, from Hassakeh 
in the northeast to Afrin in the northwest, erasing the shame of the Ba’ath 
Party’s Arabization policies which disenfranchised Kurds and diluted their 
language and culture’.117 This was an ultimate crossing of Turkey’s “red line”.  
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The Erdoğan government’s next move was harsher. ISIS cross-border attacks 
and the 15 July coup attempt118 aggravated the pressure on him.119 To push the 
PYD/YPG and ISIS away from the Turkish border, on 24 August he decided to 
carry out a cross-border operation into northern Syria, called Euphrates Shield. 
The Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army operated with Turkish armed forces. The 
operation started a few hours before US Vice-President Joe Biden’s arrival in 
Turkey,120 to send a strong signal to the US about Turkey’s “red line”.  
Biden did not react against Euphrates Shield since he came to ease the PYD/YPG-
Turkey conflict. He said continuing US support for Turkey and said that ‘we have 
made it absolutely clear … that [pro-Kurdish forces] must go back across the 
river. They cannot, will not and under no circumstances get American support if 
they do not keep that commitment’.121 In the press conference, he thanked 
Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım ‘for how quickly Turkey resumed its 
counter-ISIL operations after the attempted coup’ and said that Turkey and the 
US would ‘continue working toward a permanent political solution to the conflict 
in Syria’. Yıldırım re-iterated Turkey’s priority that a more 
comprehensive/international collaboration was necessary for a solution in Syria. 
Yıldırım stated that Turkey was sensitive about Syria’s territorial integrity and 
would not give ‘any advantages to any ethnic groups’ and not allow ‘the 
circumstances that would lead to that to … happen’. He added, ‘Turkey will never 
accept a new Kurdish formation along its borders’.122  
Biden’s assuring words did not change the situation in the field. The PYD/YPG 
had not left Manbij. Under Euphrates Shield the Turkish military was coming 
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closer to the town. Cavuşoglu ‘reminded the U.S. [of] its pledge to push the YPG 
to the east of [the] Euphrates, noting that more than 200 members of the armed 
wing of the terrorist PYD/PKK group remain in Manbij’.123 Erdoğan was more 
straightforward. He stated that ‘we have … encircled and besieged al-Bab from 
the west. This is not enough. From there we will also head to Manbij’.124  
With the election of Donald Trump in November 2016, Turkey began to hope that 
the wobbles of the Obama administration could be eased.125 Yet, in a short while, 
Turkey understood that wobbles were inevitable.  
Turkey’s initial expectations of easing wobbles were not completely baseless. 
Immediately after the elections, Vice President Mike Pence stated the importance 
of Turkish-American relations and added that the US administration should have 
listened to Turkey about Syria.126 Turkey’s expectations were bolstered by an 
Erdoğan-Trump telephone conversation, during which Erdoğan ‘expressed [his] 
hope for a new start in relations that were strained considerably under’ Obama’s 
presidency. Both leaders ‘expressed their commitment to strengthening bilateral 
relations and continue cooperation on … the fight against terrorism’.127  
In the first quarter of 2017, there were a number of high-level bilateral 
exchanges, and Erdoğan-Trump telephone diplomacy continued. As in previous 
years, the exchanges had the potential to ease wobbles. On 7 February Erdoğan 
called Trump. Each repeated the same assurances on fighting terrorism.128 On 8 
February CIA Director Mike Pompeo met Yıldırım in Ankara. Turkey was Pompeo’s 
first visit after his appointment. Pompeo’s aim was to find a compromise over the 
PYD/YPG for a possible operation to retake Raqqa. Yıldırım’s emphasis was 
Fethullah Gülen’s extradition.129 On 9 February, Yıldırım and Pence had a 
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telephone conversation again on increasing bilateral cooperation on counter-
terrorism. On 18 February, they met at the Munich Security Conference, where 
their divergent priorities appeared again. Yıldırım constantly emphasized Gülen’s 
extradition but Pence focused on accelerating joint efforts to defeat ISIS.130 
The 15 July coup distracted Turkey. The Erdoğan government’s priority shifted 
from the PKK and ISIS to Gülen’s extradition, while the US priority of eliminating 
ISIS did not change with Trump. Moreover, many US officials, who had strained 
bilateral relations during Obama’s term were still in their positions, including 
Brett McGurk, and the CENTCOM Commander, and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.131 
Good-willed high-level communications did not converge priorities. 
In May, PYD/YPG operations at Raqqa wobbled the arm again.132 This time, 
Turkey attacked PYD/YPG targets in northern Syria without asking the US.133 
Conflicting priorities were clearer in the field.  
After Raqqa, conflicting priorities began to affect high-level talks as well. On 16 
May, Erdoğan met Trump in Washington. Erdoğan asked for Gülen’s extradition, 
while Trump emphasized a deeper cooperation with Turkey to eliminate ISIS.134 
On 30 June, Erdoğan called Trump, asking for his help to stop the PYD/YPG’s 
continuing influence in Afrin, and to stop its funding by the US. Trump did not 
promise anything.135 
Divergent priorities on the PYD/YPG continued throughout the year regardless of 
US officials’ appeasing statements. The US Deputy Department of State, 
Jonathan Cohen stressed that US support for the PYD/YPG was ‘temporary, 
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transitional and tactical’.136 The US Defense Secretary, Jim Mattis, reassured 
Turkey that ‘the US military would recover some logistical gear [and weapons 
from the PYD/YPG] after the anti-[ISIS] fight’.137 Again US promises were not 
confirmed in the field. The US continued to work with the PYD/YPG in securing 
Arab population dominated areas of northern Syria, such as Deir ez-Zor and 
Raqqa.138 In Raqqa, particularly PYD/YPG members’ PKK propaganda infuriated 
Turkey again.139  
Turkey’s anger now emerged in high-level conversations. Erdoğan called Trump 
on 24 November. Trump ‘informed’ ‘of pending adjustments to the military 
support provided to [US] partners on the ground in Syria’.140 Turkish Deputy 
Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ stated, ‘[t]he conversation of the two presidents is a 
turning point in our relations. If the [US] does not keep its promise to cease 
military assistance to the YPG, then the [US] would deceive the whole world. 
Turkey will be observing that as well as the return of previously given weapons 
by the YPG’.141 While Turkey was expecting Trump to keep his promise,142 the 
Pentagon expressed its ‘astonishment’ by Trump’s decision and made a 
statement on ‘the possible continuation of cooperation between Washington’ and 
the PYD/YPG.143 
2018 was an even more turbulent year in bilateral relations. In addition to the 
Syrian crisis, several political and economic issues aggravated relations and the 
arm continued its tendency of moving Turkey away from the US.  
US-YPG cooperation continued to induce wobbles throughout 2018. At the 
beginning of the year, Pentagon officials stated that the US administration was 
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planning to establish a border security force in northern Syria with PYD/YPG 
elements.144 Turkey not only opposed the proposal but began another cross-
border operation on 20 January, Olive Branch against PYD/YPG elements/camps 
in Afrin. The aim was to push the PYD/YPG out of Afrin.145 US CENTCOM did not 
support Turkey’s operation on the grounds that the US-led coalition against ISIS 
did not recognize Afrin as an operation area, so was not paying particular 
attention to that area with its military resources.146 
Olive Branch got the Trump administration’s attention, since the White House did 
not want Turks to operate unilaterally in Syria.147 To discuss areas of cooperation 
in Syria, on 23 January a US delegation headed by Deputy Assistant Secretary, 
Jonathan Cohen visited Ankara. The delegation met a Turkish delegation headed 
by the Deputy Undersecretary of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Muhtar Gün. 
The US delegation did not give a time frame but again promised to take back 
heavy weapons supplied to the PYD/YPG. 148  
Yet, this did not mean that US-PYD/YPG cooperation would stop in Syria. A senior 
administration official of the White House said, the White House made a 
‘distinction between allies — a term he said had legal connotations — and 
partners in a combat mission, like the Kurds. America’s actions on the ground in 
Syria, he said, would be driven by a calculation of its interests’. The Trump 
administration ‘appeared to be a significant attempt to reassure Turkey’s 
president’, Erdoğan, who considered ‘the Kurds a threat to his country’s internal 
stability’. Yet ‘the Pentagon issued its own statement … standing by its decision 
to create the Kurdish-led force. And a senior American commander praised the 
partnership with the Kurds, whose help was critical in a major American airstrike 
on’ ISIS. The commander of Special Operations forces in Iraq and Syria, General 
James Jarrard, said, ‘[o]ur S.D.F. partners are still making daily progress and 
sacrifices, and together we are still finding, targeting and killing ISIS terrorists 
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intent on keeping their extremist hold on the region’. Senior Pentagon officials 
said that ‘the Syrian Kurds will most likely serve as the backbone of the allied 
forces on the ground in Syria for months to come’.149 
After the meeting with Cohen, the Turkish delegation thought that the US ‘would 
stop supplying [PYD/YPG] with weapons [because ISIS] would soon be 
defeated’.150  
The US tried to bolster the Turkish delegation’s optimism. On 15 February 
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and National Security Advisor Herbert McMaster 
came to Turkey. The announced aim of the meeting was to develop ‘mechanisms 
that will achieve results [and] will meet the expectations of both sides’. Tillerson 
said that the US and Turkey ‘are not going to work alone any longer. … We’re 
going to lock arms, we’re going to work through the issues that are causing 
difficulties for us’. At the end of the visit several working groups were established 
composed of both countries’ top diplomats and national security personnel.151 The 
working groups were important in the sense that, for the first time in a long 
while, a comprehensive number of bureaucrats came together with an aim to put 
high-level goodwill into practice.  
On 8 March, the joint working groups met first in Washington,152 then on 25 May 
in Ankara. They worked specifically on Manbij. At the end of the Ankara meeting, 
Çavuşoğlu stated that ‘[t]he road map for Manbij’ was ‘tied to the calendar’. It 
was decided that the ‘YPG will leave. Turkey, along with the US, will decide who 
will take part in the leadership instead of [the] YPG, and who will participate in 
the security forces, perhaps on a parity basis’.153 Yet, the US thought differently. 
State Department spokeswoman, Heather Nauert stated:  
We don’t have any agreements yet with the Government of Turkey. We 
announced previously that the United States and the Turkish working 
group met … in Ankara on Friday of last week. We’re continuing to have 
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ongoing conversations regarding Syria and other issues of mutual 
concern. The two sides then had outlined the contours of a roadmap for 
further cooperation, and that includes on Manbij. I know that the 
Secretary looks forward to hosting Foreign Minister Cavusoglu on June 
4th here in Washington for those conversations to continue.154 
In June, working groups managed to hammer out a more specific solution on the 
PYD/YPG’s influence in Manbij. The plan was to form a new administration in the 
town, whose security would be maintained by Turkish and American patrols.155  
On 4 June, Çavuşoğlu and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met in Washington to 
discuss the working groups’ road map. Although after the meeting the State 
Department did not give any details about this map, Çavuşoğlu announced that 
there was ‘a clear schedule for the plan [and] we are talking about a couple of 
months, not six months’. Turkish government spokesman Bekir Bozdağ 
confirmed this.156 On 12-13 June, Turkish and US military representatives met at 
the headquarters of the US European Command in Stuttgart, where they stated 
that both sides agreed on a plan. The US European Command ‘announced the 
agreement on its Twitter account’ that the ‘US and Turkish military officials who 
participated in the discussions agreed on a proposed Manbij implementation plan 
that will be recommended to senior US and Turkish leadership for further 
discussions’.157 
While the Turkish and American bureaucracies were getting ready to put a 
compromise agreement into practice, at the high-level of politics co-operation hit 
the wall. The Pastor Brunson issue created one of the most serious crises in 
relations. On 18 July, from Twitter addressing Erdoğan, Trump said that it was 
‘[a] total disgrace that Turkey will not release a respected U.S. Pastor, Andrew 
Brunson, from prison. He has been held hostage far too long’.158 On 26 July, Mike 
Pence demanded that Turkey release Brunson. Trump and Pence also threatened 
Turkey with sanctions if it failed to release Brunson. Trump said that the US ‘will 
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impose large sanctions on Turkey for their long time detainment of Pastor 
Andrew Brunson’. Pence said that the US ‘will impose significant sanctions on 
Turkey if Brunson is not freed’. The Turkish Foreign Ministry called US demands 
‘unacceptable’ and added that ‘no-one can give orders to Turkey and threaten 
our country’.159  
The crisis escalated in August. On 1 August, the US Department of the Treasury’s 
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) ‘took action’, ‘targeting’ Turkey’s Minister 
of Justice Abdulhamit Gül and Minister of Interior Süleyman Soylu, by accusing 
both of them for playing ‘leading roles in the organizations responsible for the 
arrest and detention of Pastor Andrew Brunson’.160 On 10 August, from Twitter, 
Trump announced that he ‘authorized a doubling of tariffs on Steel and 
Aluminium with respect to Turkey as their currency, the Turkish Lira, slides 
rapidly downward against our very strong Dollar! Aluminium will now be [%]20 
and Steel [%]50. Our relations with Turkey are not good at this time!’.161 With 
US sanctions the Turkish Lira ‘hit a low of 5.11 to the dollar, and inflation 
reached [%]24.5’.162 Brunson was released on 12 October. Erdoğan replied to 
Trump from Twitter (in Turkish). He tweeted, ‘I always pointed out, the Turkish 
judiciary reached its decision independently. I hope that the United States and 
Turkey will continue their cooperation as the allies that they are, and fight 
together against terrorist groups’.163 In 2019, Turkey has still not recovered from 
its deepening economic crisis.  
The Brunson affair put a lot pressure on bilateral relations, especially regarding 
Syria. Although both sides’ working groups were enthusiastic to forge a 
resolution for cooperation in northern Syria, Pastor Brunson’s court case 
deadlocked it.164  
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On 19 December 2018, via Twitter, Trump announced that the US would 
withdraw its troops from Syria,165 but the US military circles and Trump still had 
no strategy or roadmap on how and when to carry this out. At the beginning of 
2019 Turkish and American officials were trying to resume talks to coordinate the 
US withdrawal. 166 
Turkish-American relations regarding the Syrian crisis proved that the Turkish 
arm of the wobbly cross has an inexorable trend, which pushes Turkey away 
from the US. From the beginning of the crisis, high-level representatives of both 
sides tried to develop cooperation, but their different priorities prevented it. The 
two nations differed on several issues: removing Assad, supporting different 
elements of the Syrian opposition, and the Kurdish militias’ role in defeating 
ISIS. Erdoğan acknowledged the imbalance in bilateral relations: that Turkey 
could not remove Assad or bolster the anti-Assad coalition or defeat ISIS and the 
PYD/YPG without US support. For the US, Turkey’s support was important but 
not vital, while the Turkish administration’s complaints about the PYD/YPG were 
not acceptable because of their militias’ usefulness in the field. The high-level 
visits repeated themselves regarding the importance of Turkish-American 
cooperation but did not affect policy or practice, or facilitated Turkish and 
American bureaucratic collaboration. In other words, high-level goodwill did not 
translate into practice. Several times the US administration tried to ease Turkey’s 
concerns via plans, working groups and promises but their diverging priorities 
blocked these being realized, which constantly created wobbles. The trend of the 
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b. Australia: paying a premium 
Australia’s relations with the US regarding the Syrian crisis clearly demonstrate 
the reasons for the stability of the Australian arm. During the crisis, Australia did 
not try to change US priorities. As a middle power in need of US strategic 
support for the stability of its region, Australia adapted its priorities and policies 
to the US. Both in the UN and in bilateral exchanges, Australia followed American 
policies in Syria. Paying a premium on US security insurance for the Indo-Pacific 
was habitual by now. For the US insurance, Australia also made it clear that 
increasing cooperation with China did not mean that the US was becoming 
secondary. The US appreciated Australia’s staunch posture and small wobbles in 
this era did not change the Australian arm’s trend towards the US.  
************************* 
When the Syrian crisis erupted, on 15 March 2011 Australia-US relations were 
very close. Prime Minister Julia Gillard visited the US on 5-13 March for the 60th 
Anniversary of ANZUS. On 7 March Gillard met Obama. After the meeting, 
Obama’s words precisely summarized this closeness: ‘[w]e have no stronger ally 
than Australia’, adding ‘I understand that you’ll be speaking to a joint session of 
Congress, which is a high honor that is reserved for only our closest friends. And 
I think it’s a measure of the degree to which Australians are held in such high 
esteem by Americans, partly because we share so much’.1 Gillard expressed the 
closeness in the Congress. She said, ‘you have a true friend down under’ both ‘in 
war and peace’.2 According to available records, the leaders did not specifically 
talk about the escalation in Syria, but both shared ‘a very firm conviction that 
the violence that’s been taking place and perpetrated’ by autocratic Middle 
Eastern governments were ‘unacceptable’.3  
 
1 “Remarks Following a Meeting with Prime Minister Julia E. Gillard of Australia and an Exchange 
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Congressional Record, Vol.157, No. 35, 9 March 2011, H1624. 
3 “Remarks Following a Meeting with Prime Minister Julia E. Gillard of Australia and an Exchange 
with Reporters”, Compilation of Presidential Documents, Office of the Federal Register, National 
Archives and Records Administration, 7 March 2011. 
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Australia’s first significant reaction to the Syrian crisis was in May 2011. The 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kevin Rudd, announced that Australia ‘strongly 
condemns the recent actions of the Syrian regime against its people’ and ‘is 
ramping up targeted financial sanctions against key regime figures responsible 
for human rights abuses and lethal suppression of peaceful protests in Syria, and 
is also imposing an embargo on arms and other equipment used for internal 
repression’.4 Australia’s sanctions were ‘the first by an Asia-Pacific country on 
Syria’. The Reserve Bank of Australia ‘placed 25 Syrian entities on its list ranging 
from individuals including intelligence and security heads to property 
companies’.5 As in previous crises (for example Korea, Gulf, Iraq) Australia was 
quick to join the US.  
From the beginning of the crisis, Australia’s priorities, policies and tactics in Syria 
almost overlapped with the those of the US: a political solution via extended 
diplomatic consultation. In September, the joint communiqué of the annual 
Australia-US ministerial meeting (AUSMIN), the main device for managing the 
ANZUS alliance, stated that the US and Australian governments had decided to 
‘reiterate’ their ‘call for Syrian president Assad to step aside and allow for a 
democratic transition to take place in Syria’.6 At a meeting to facilitate 
cooperation between defence elements, both sides discussed the possibility of 
‘establishing a bilateral working group to develop options that would align [their] 
respective force postures’.7 
In mid-November, Obama visited Australia, and both parties’ repeated their 
closeness not only in policy but also in synchronising a defence outlook. Obama 
said firstly that the US ‘has no stronger ally than Australia’, then declared his real 
aim of deepening cooperation between defence forces.8 Australia was ready. The 
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parties agreed on ‘joint initiatives to enhance’ the ANZUS alliance by expanding 
the ‘collaboration’ between the ADF, the US Marine Corps and the US Air Force. 
Accordingly, Australia would ‘welcome deployments of a company-sized rotation 
of 200 to 250 marines in the Northern Territory for around 6 months at a time’. 
The aim of joint and combined training9 was to develop a posture ‘to better 
respond together’. Increased synchronisation of defence forces would make 
Australia more valuable for joint operations. During his speech in parliament, 
Obama stressed the significance of Australian troops in Afghanistan: ‘I salute 
Australia: outside of NATO, the largest contributor of troops’ to Afghanistan.10 
In the first quarter of 2012, Australia’s focus on Syria grew. In parliament on 7 
February, Rudd condemned the massive killings of civilians in Homs, and 
stressed the government’s profound disappointment at the UN Security Council’s 
vetoes (by China and Russia), of an international call for military action or a 
regime change or an arms embargo or sanctions. He said that President Assad 
‘has lost all legitimacy and has shown a complete disregard for the rights and 
welfare of the Syrian people. Assad should step down and he should step down 
now’. He added, ‘I therefore welcome calls by both our United States and EU 
partners to work with Arab partners to establish an international support group 
of like-minded countries to work in concert to support [a] peaceful transition in 
Syria and the earliest end to the bloodshed’.11 Rudd was repeating the 
statements of the US Congress and Obama on Assad: that Assad should ‘step 
down from power’.12  
As did Obama, Australia followed a diplomatic course against Syria. On 9 
February Rudd talked to the Syrian charge d’affaires, Jawdat Ali, since Syria had 
no ambassador in Canberra. Rudd said that Assad ‘must find an exit strategy and 
had lost legitimacy by deploying arms against his own people’, and that the 
violence, ‘including in Homs’ was ‘indisputable’.13 
 
9 Apart from joint NATO practices and the management of US bases, Turkey had had no such 
specific synchronisation with the US military. 
10 “Remarks to the Parliament in Canberra, Australia”, Compilation of Presidential Documents, 
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11 Hansard, House of Representatives, 7 February 2012, 53-54.  
12 “Calling for democratic change in Syria”, US Congressional Bills, 112th Congress, Y 1.6: Y 1.4/2, 
9 February 2012.  
13 Age, 9 February 2012.  
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In February and March, the Syrian crisis began to pre-occupy parliament. In 
February, Senator Bob Brown announced the Australian Senate’s condemnation 
of ‘the appalling human rights abuses and escalating violence in Syria’ and called 
on ‘President Assad to step down’.14 In March, the Liberal Party’s Joe Hockey said 
that Australia ‘should stand up and say that’ it ‘will not put up with the actions of 
Assad’.15  
In May, Australia began to take more serious steps. Foreign Minister Bob Carr 
expelled the Syrian charge d’affaires after more than 100 people were massacred 
in the village of Houla. Carr said, ‘this is the most effective way we’ve got of 
sending a message of revulsion to the Syrian government’.16 That month Obama 
told Erdoğan that military action, which the US could not carry out by itself, 
would complicate things in Syria. The US would continue to put pressure on 
Assad via sanctions.17 Carr and Gillard echoed Obama’s stance. Carr claimed that 
Australia would consider military intervention in Syria but ‘Syria’s military might 
make such action extremely difficult’. Gillard said that ‘Australia and other 
nations would continue with sanctions against Syria’.18 This closeness, even in 
political rhetoric, shows that, Australian priorities and policies aligned with the 
US. There were no visible wobbles on the Australian arm regarding Syria.  
In June, following the US, Australia ramped up sanctions on Syria. Australia 
already had an arms embargo and travel and financial restrictions on Syrian 
nationals. Now Australia blocked ‘trade and investment in oil, petroleum, 
financial services, telecommunications and precious metals’,19 ramped up its 
diplomatic and humanitarian efforts. In July, at a Friends of Syria meeting in 
Paris, Carr stated that ‘Australia has taken a lead in calling for a unified 
international response to end the bloodshed’, and announced that Australia 
would give $5 million in humanitarian aid to Syria to refugees and their host 
communities, which brought Australia’s total contribution to $16 million.20 In 
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September, Australia took another significant step in humanitarian aid and 
announced that it would accept extra 1,000 refugees from Syria.21  
In the Senate in October, it was stated that Australia did not have ‘extensive 
interests or assets’ in Syria and there was ‘very little, if any, Australian economic 
or commercial involvement on the ground in Syria’. Australia considered Syria a 
humanitarian crisis, ‘impacting not only Syria but also its neighbouring states’. 22 
At the end of the year, Australian authorities began to discuss the long-term 
consequences of the Syrian conflict, particularly regarding the return home of 
‘Australian home-grown jihadists’. ‘The Australian Federal Police’s deputy 
commissioner in charge of national security, Peter Drennan, confirmed [that] the 
Syrian conflict had resulted in a spike in the number of Australians travelling 
overseas to fight’. He added that ‘these individuals then return with training in 
the use of weapons and explosives and experience fighting in armed conflict’ and 
‘could well use these skills and knowledge for terrorism in Australia’.23 The Syrian 
crisis was becoming more important for Australia than was previously 
considered.  
In January 2013, as a non-permanent member the UN Security Council, Australia 
repeated the need for humanitarian action in Syria. On 18 January, Australia 
outlined a plan to protect medical workers and maintain access to hospitals for 
families caught in Syria. The US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, supported 
this.24  
On 18 March, Foreign Minister Carr met Secretary of State John Kerry in 
Washington. Their statements proved the continuing stability of the Australian 
arm. Kerry declared, ‘I don’t think there’s a relationship that we have that is 
more united, collaborative, and strong than our friendship with Australia’, and 
‘our relationship, I think, is stronger than ever’. Carr was more direct regarding 
Australia’s position. He stated that Australia would ‘welcome American leadership 
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the leadership of the President and the leadership of the Secretary of State, on 
the Middle East’.25 It was clear that Australia would align its priorities with the 
US.  
Australia’s backing of Obama’s 21 August decision to take limited military action 
against Syria after Assad’s chemical attack26 proved this. Carr stated that ‘I think 
America is entitled … to receive [support] from a country like Australia that has 
elevated a concern with chemical weapons’. Carr justified this by claiming that 
‘we could suffer retaliation because we’re an ally, because we’ve got a security 
treaty with the United States, because of what we’ve said at any time during this 
wretched, appalling civil war in Syria’.27 On 6 September Australia and the US 
together with Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, 
Spain, Turkey, and the UK condemned Assad’s use of chemical weapons. They 
noted that the UN Security Council was paralysed and could not stop the 
increased suffering in Syria, or the regional instability.28 Foreign Affairs Minister 
Julie Bishop29 stated that, as president of the UN Security Council, Australia was 
‘taking the lead in finding a resolution … for the conflict in Syria’. She also 
implied that Australia had been collaborating with the US throughout this effort 
against chemical weapons.30 
In November, Australia-American collaboration on Syria was a priority during 
AUSMIN consultations. The US delegation appreciated Australia’s lead during its 
Security Council presidency against Syria’s chemical weapons. Both parties 
underlined their efforts towards a ‘political transition in Syria and urged 
opposition groups to work together to build a post-Assad Syria’. Kerry also stated 
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that both parties’ ‘shared efforts’ were for ‘reaching a political solution’ in Syria.31 
The arm was still stable and sustaining its trend since Australia did not have 
Turkey’s problem of supporting Syrian coalition elements disliked by the US or 
pushing for a quick military solution that the US found problematic or unlikely.  
Developments in 2014 continued to maintain the Australian arm’s tendency. The 
year started with Bishop’s Washington visit on 22 January 2014. Bishop met Vice 
President Joe Biden. Again each underscored the strength of US-Australia 
alliance.32 Bishop said, ’63 years on [from ANZUS], the US alliance remains the 
cornerstone of our national security’.33 On US priorities in Syria she said 
‘obviously, the US leads the global effort’ and ‘Australia is a vigorous supporter of 
international counter-terrorism co-operation, as well as playing our part in 
specific regional action’.34 
In February 2014, Australia’s focus on the ISIS threat in Syria and its long-term 
repercussions was intensified, especially on Australians fighting in ISIS and their 
potential to pose a national security threat when/if they return home. Australia’s 
counter-terrorism ambassador, Bill Fisher, stated that ‘al-Qaeda has made a 
comeback that few foresaw. On at least one important metric, it has never been 
stronger’. He added, ‘[t]wo groups linked to al-Qaeda, [ISIS] and Jabhat al-
Nusra now lead the military resistance against Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’. 
On Australia’s national security he said, ‘several dozen’ Australians were believed 
to be fighting in Syria. Attorney General George Brandis clarified the threat 
perception by warning that ‘those who actively participate in combat or assist in 
the planning and facilitation of such activity can become radicalised and obtain 
new skills - including the ability to conduct an attack on Australian soil [and] 
radicalise others’.35 Australian media reports repeated that ‘Australians fighting in 
Syria now occupy senior leadership positions with al-Qa’ida-linked groups, with 
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new figures showing the number of passports cancelled on security grounds has 
soared to record levels’.36 Both Australia and the US saw ISIS as the primary 
threat and Assad as secondary. 
On 22 February, Australia approved the UN Security Council resolution 2139 
aiming to extend humanitarian aid to Syria. Australia co-authored the resolution. 
Australia’s UN Ambassador Gary Quinlan stated that ‘[t]he other resolutions were 
aimed at achieving a political solution [to the war] or imposing sanctions; this 
one is about humanitarian assistance’. Australia was continuing ‘its humanitarian 
diplomacy efforts’.37  
In March 2014, there was a significant example of Australia’s acknowledgement 
of the imbalance in its relations with the US. To alleviate US discomfort over 
Australia’s developing economic relations with China, the Australian government 
clarified its choice between these two great powers. On 6 March at the Sydney 
Institute, Bishop stated that ‘while Australia continues to cement and modernise 
our close ties with the nations of our region, it’s not been at the expense of our 
alliance partner, the United States’. She added that ‘we agreed to work together 
to support the US policy of rebalance to the region and to work together on the 
full implementation of the force posture initiatives in Australia’.38 The Australian 
government needed a deeper defence cooperation with the US for Australia’s 
security in the Indo-Pacific. Acknowledging this imbalance made it very clear that 
Australia was trying to adapt its priorities to the US not only in Syria. 
US-Australia defence cooperation deepened. On 23 April, a joint media release of 
the Prime Minister and the Minister for Defence announced that the government 
‘approved the acquisition of an additional 58 F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter 
aircraft’, which would ‘reinforce the ADF’s ability to operate seamlessly with US 
forces and Australia’s capacity to continue supporting … shared strategic 
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interests under the US alliance’.39 While Turkish-American tactical collaboration 
was shrinking, Australian-American collaboration was expanding.  
The US appreciated Australia’s efforts in adapting its priorities. In June Prime 
Minister Tony Abbott visited Obama, who once again underlined the closeness in 
bilateral relations: ‘we don't have a better friend in the world, as well as the 
Asia-Pacific region, than Australia’. Obama also expressed his pleasure at the 
Australian stance on China: ‘[o]bviously, both the United States and Australia 
have enormous trade relationships with China, and we both agree that it’s 
important to continue to see China prosper and rise. But what’s also important is 
that as China emerges as this great world power that it also is helping to 
reinforce and abide by basic international law and norms’. Obama also noted the 
similarity of threat perceptions regarding Syria: ‘both our countries are 
potentially threatened by jihadists and freedom fighters, as they call them, that 
are going into Syria, getting trained in terrorist tactics, and then potentially 
coming back to our countries and could end up being a significant threat to our 
homeland as well’. Abbott indicated that Australia would follow the US in the 
Middle East: He said ‘there are a whole range of security issues which the United 
States is leading on and where Australia is doing our part to secure the freedom 
and the safety of the world and its citizens’. At a press conference Obama 
repeated, ‘there are a handful of countries in the world that we always know we 
can count on, not just because they share our values, but we know we can count 
on them because they’ve got real capacity. Australia is one of those countries’.40 
After the meeting Obama and Abbott ‘announced the conclusion of the US-
Australian Force Posture Agreement’, which would give US forces ‘more 
opportunities to work with Australian forces both bilaterally and in trilateral and 
regional activities’. The Agreement facilitated continuing bilateral cooperation on 
Syria.41 Australia’s defence priorities were becoming institutionalized.  
 
39 “Prime Minister and Minister for Defence - Joint Media Release - F-35 Joint Strike Fighters to 
transform Australia’s air combat capability”, https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/david-
johnston/media-releases/prime-minister-and-minister-defence-joint-media-release-f-35,(Accessed 
5.3.2019) 
40 “Remarks Following a Meeting with Prime Minister Anthony J. Abbott of Australia and an 
Exchange with Reporters”, Compilation of Presidential Documents, Office of the Federal Register, 
National Archives and Records Administration, 12 June 2014. 
41 “FACT SHEET: The United States and Australia: An Alliance for the Future”, White House Press 
Releases, Fact Sheets and Briefings/FIND, 12 June 2014. 
159 
In June, ISIS’ capture of Mosul raised concern in both Australia and the US. 
Bishop was ‘deeply concerned by media reports that the al-Qaeda-linked militant 
group’, ISIS, ‘has seized control … of Mosul’.42 ISIS’ further penetration in Syria 
and Iraq accelerated Australia’s humanitarian diplomacy efforts. In July, with 
Luxembourg and Jordan, Australia co-sponsored another significant Security 
Council resolution, 2165, which aimed to mandate humanitarian aid access to 
Syria.43  
In August, ISIS expansion in Syria was discussed at the 29th AUSMIN 
consultations, which reinforced the parallel priorities of Australia and the US. 
Kerry stated, ‘[a] considerable focus of our discussion was on counterterrorism 
and, more specifically, on the issue of foreign fighters’. They are ‘leaving their 
countries, going to Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere and becoming radicalized and 
taking part in extremist terrorist activities [. This] is, in fact, an international 
problem’, and ‘a concern for Australia’ and the US. He added, ‘we’re cooperating 
to get the chemical weapons out of Syria’. The two nations signed the Force 
Posture Initiatives, which was ‘the formal, legally binding document about a 
presence of U.S. Marines in the north of [Australia]’.44 A joint communiqué of 
AUSMIN noted, ‘both countries are continuing to work closely to tackle serious 
challenges … including the ongoing conflict and humanitarian crisis in Syria, 
protection of civilians in conflict zones, effective implementation of sanctions, 
countering the international terrorist threat and regional weapons proliferation’. 
The communiqué also stated that both countries condemned Syria’s use of 
chemical weapons and were seeking a political solution, not a military one.45  
Australia echoed Obama’s decision in August to use limited air strikes and special 
forces against ISIS. This ‘provided the Abbott government with an ideal 
opportunity to show its support for the ANZUS alliance’.46 After withdrawing 
troops from Iraq in 2008, Australia maintained an operational hub at Al Minhad 
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air base in the United Arab Emirates.47 This asset helped Australia provide 
humanitarian aid and military supplies to US-backed Kurdish military elements in 
Erbil.48 Abbott stated that this would be an open-ended deployment, which could 
last ‘many, many months’.49 
Australia’s concerns about ISIS were realized towards the end of 2014. Abbott 
rightly stated that the ISIS ‘is a terrorist group that is reaching out to Australia. 
This is not just an international security situation, but it’s a domestic security 
situation’. 50 ISIS became a domestic threat with “lone wolf” attacks in Melbourne 
51 and Sydney.52  
The attacks increased the Syrian conflict’s prominence in the Australian national 
security agenda. During parliamentary discussions on the Counter-Terrorism 
Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2014, several MPs stated that ISIS had 
become ‘one of the government’s highest national security priorities.’53 The 
attacks raised Australia’s threat level from medium to high.54 In January 2015, 
Abbott and the Premier of New South Wales Mike Baird gave an account of the 
Sydney attack, which underlined that ‘the decision to raise the threat level [was] 
related to … the increasing numbers of Australians connected with, or inspired by 
… ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, and al-Qa’ida, which have desire to attack Western 
countries, including Australia’. The account repeatedly declared Australia’s 
vulnerability to “home grown” terrorist attacks.55 On 23 February Abbott noted 
the rising terrorist threat ‘at home and abroad’, and stated his government’s 
underlying concern: ‘[w]e have seen our fellow Australians – people born and 
bred to live and let live – succumb to the lure of this death cult’. He added, ‘[b]y 
any measure, the threat to Australia is worsening’, and pointed to coming 
counter-terror measures: ‘The government will develop amendments to the 
Australian Citizenship Act so that we can revoke or suspend Australian citizenship 
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in the case of dual nationals. It has long been the case that people who fight 
against Australia forfeit their citizenship’.56 Abbott thought make this counter-
terror measure a law, enabling the Immigration Department to strip dual citizens 
of Australian citizenship,57 but was opposed within Cabinet.58  
Introducing domestic counter-terrorism measures did not lessen Australia’s 
enthusiasm for US policies and tactics in Syria. In January 2015 after ISIS siege 
of Kobani, the US intensified its efforts to fight ISIS via supporting the PYD/YPG. 
In March, Abbott announced that Australia would send 300 troops to Iraq, in 
addition to the forces already deployed: ‘[t]his follows requests from the Iraqi 
and from the United States governments’.59 Although Australian military 
elements were sent to Iraq, they were meant to train Iraqi peshmerga forces 
fighting ISIS in Syria.60 Australia’s increased support was an indirect, but an 
important, help to American efforts in Syria.  
The US praised Australia’s contribution. State Department Deputy Spokesperson 
Marie Harf said that ‘Australia has contributed significantly to the coalition efforts 
by providing personnel and aircraft to air combat and support missions, and 
advising and assisting Iraqi security forces. Australia has been a strong partner 
in the counter [ISIS] coalition.’61 
In May, Defence Minister Kevin Andrews stated that if there was tension between 
the US and China, both of which were ‘particularly important’ in ‘shaping the’ 
Indo-Pacific region, Australia’s alliance with the US would ‘continue to be a 
central feature of Australia’s defence and security arrangements’. Australia 
‘continue[s] to strongly support the United States’ presence in the Indo-Pacific, 
and to ‘welcome its renewed focus on the region’.62 There was an important link 
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between Australia’s efficient following of US priorities in Syria and its need for US 
strategic support in Indo-Pacific. Helping the US in Syria was like paying a 
premium on US insurance for Australian security in this region. 
In June Abbott highlighted similarities between Australian and American outlook 
towards ISIS in Syria. Firstly, he noted ISIS’ global reach. He said that ISIS ‘is 
not terrorism for a local grievance; this is terrorism with global ambitions’. He 
added that ISIS’ ‘senior members are routinely calling on sympathisers to kill un-
believers wherever they find them, sometimes specifying Australians’. He 
specified the significance of the US effort in fighting ISIS, and said that 
‘American leadership is indispensable here as in all the worlds trouble spots’.63 In 
another speech two weeks later Abbott observed that Australia and the US ‘are 
natural partners because America's values … are Australia’s values, too’, and that 
‘[o]ur destinies are intertwined today, particularly as we meet the scourge of 
ISIL. … Australia, like America, seeks to defend our interests, our citizens, our 
values and our friends’. He concluded that ‘America will never have a more 
dependable friend than Australia’.64 Abbott very clearly summarized a major 
reason for the continuing trend of the Australian arm. 
In the first two weeks of August, Australian and US defence officials were ‘in 
informal discussions … about Australia joining the air campaign in northern 
Syria’.65 Parliament did not yet support Abbott’s “informal” decision to extend 
airstrikes from Iraq into Syria. The ALP in particular questioned the legality of 
airstrikes.66 On 27 August, Abbott tried to justify his “informal” decision by 
announcing the US request: ‘the President … raised with me the Syrian situation 
and said that he would be very glad if Australia would do more, including 
airstrikes’, adding that after bilateral official talks, ‘a formal request has now 
come from the Pentagon’. The US Ambassador, John Berry, re-iterated Obama’s 
request in an appreciative tone: Australia ‘[is] essential to many of the successes 
[the US] have had’ and ‘we would like to see it go into the eastern portions of 
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Syria so that ISIL does not have any safe haven or any place to hide’.67 The 
request came from the US but Australian media speculated that the government 
had prompted for it.68 Abbott also stated that ‘[w]hile the legality is different 
whether these airstrikes are taking place in Syria or Iraq, the morality is the 
same’.69 
The Greens were not satisfied. They thought Abbott’s decision illegal and 
continued their call for a political solution.70 Kevin Andrews defended the 
government by noting the lack of a physical border between Iraq and Syria. He 
said that Australia ‘[is] in Iraq at the invitation of the government of Iraq – we’re 
defending Iraq’, and that ‘[i]t makes sense to be able to go over the border [into 
Syria] because it’s a bit like the border between New South Wales and the ACT’.71 
The Abbott government was adapting Australia’s priorities to the US following the 
latter’s additional requests.  
The escalation of the humanitarian crisis in Syria helped the government’s 
justifications. In September tragic footages of the refugee crisis ‘provoked global 
outrage at the failure of the international community to act, and became 
symbolic of the challenge facing European countries in what had become the 
region’s worst refugee crisis since the Second World War’.72 The Australian public 
showed great sympathy for Syrian asylum-seekers.73 Accordingly, the Abbott 
government prepared to offer 12,000 Syrian asylum-seekers permanent places 
in Australia’s humanitarian program.74 The ALP accepted this, which led the 
government get public support for aerial bombings in Syria. In mid-September, 
Australian airstrikes on ISIS targets began.75  
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On 15 September 2015 Malcolm Turnbull replaced Tony Abbott as prime 
minister. On 13 October the Minister for Foreign Affairs Julie Bishop, the Minister 
for Defence Marise Payne, the Secretary of State John Kerry and the Secretary of 
Defense Ashton Carter met for AUSMIN in Boston. On Syria, the meeting agreed 
on ‘their strong commitment’ to degrade and defeat ISIS in Syria via military 
intervention, but that the ‘the conflict will ultimately require a political solution’.76 
Turnbull maintained Abbott’s policy. 
The significance of Australia’s increasing commitment to Syria was implied in the 
2016 Defence White Paper. This paper reflected a clear change in Australia’s 
defence mindset.77 Previously Australia had focused on a continental defence as 
set out in Paul Dibb’s review. Dibb did not ignore helping the US but underlined 
that this help ‘should be seen essentially as a gesture of support, not as a 
contribution that could materially affect the outcome’.78 The 2016 Paper argued 
that Australia’s defence force structure should address tasks in the Indo-Pacific 
and in other parts of the globe. It specified that the ‘[g]overnment is committed 
to making practical and effective military contributions to global security 
operations’.79 Australia’s alliance with the US should be strengthened ‘to meet 
shared security challenges such as the pervasive threat of terrorism’.80 Regarding 
Syria, the ‘government will also continue to work closely with’ the US ‘to address 
common global security challenges such as in’ Syria.81 The paper showed how 
fully the Australian government had managed to adapt its priorities to the US.  
On 19 January 2016, Turnbull made his first visit to the White House since 
becoming prime minister, and met Obama. Obama noted the closeness in 
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relations by appreciating Australia’s efforts in Syria: ‘in our fight against ISIL, 
Australia is the second largest contributor of troops on the ground after’ the US. 
Turnbull stressed that Australia’s contribution to the US efforts in fighting ISIS 
was not because of ‘national self-interest, not just [of] economics or kinship, but 
[of] shared values’, and that Australia’s aims in fighting ISIS matched those of 
the US. He said that ‘[w]e have to constantly lift our game in the way we engage 
with and tackle these extremists, particularly’ ISIS.82 Turnbull clearly 
demonstrated a convergence of priorities.  
Bishop also visited Washington at the end of January. She met Biden and 
relevant high-level security officials such as the head of the CIA, John Brennan, 
the Director of National Intelligence, General Jim Clapper, and the National 
Security Adviser, Susan Rice. The ‘civil war in Syria and the fight against’ ISIS 
‘dominated’ their ‘discussions’. Bishop promised continuing close coordination 
with the US: ‘it has been acknowledged by the United States from the outset that 
Australia is a major contributor to the [Syrian] effort … I know the United States 
is urging other countries to do as Australia has done and put forward a greater 
contribution to ensure that we can bring peace to Syria’.83 Australia was a 
distinctive example of a US ally which so closely aligned its priorities with the US. 
On 2 February Bishop met Kerry in Rome. Kerry stated that the US and its allies 
‘have to [go] ahead with their strategy and do so relentlessly’ to counter ISIS 
expansion. Bishop implied that Australia’s contribution to the coalition’s efforts in 
Syria was its individual decision: ‘there was absolutely no pressure from the US 
or other countries for Australia to do more in Iraq and Syria’.84 
Bishop’s visit and her statements had results. The Commander of US Pacific Air 
Force, General Lori Robinson, stated, ‘high-level discussions are underway to 
have American B-1 bombers and aerial tankers temporarily stationed in the 
Northern Territory … it gives us the opportunity to strengthen the ties we already 
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have with the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and it gives the opportunity to 
train our pilots to understand the theatre and how important it is to strengthen 
our ties with our great allies, the RAAF’.85  
The arm continued its trend. Australia was not only following US policies very 
closely, but also allowing the enlargement of a US presence on its soil. ‘The 
expansion of [the] US presence in Australia is seen as a way both of boosting the 
US position in the region — enabling US aircraft and Marines to operate 
regionally — as well as deepening US commitments to Australian security’.86 
Australia’s efforts in supporting the US in Syria were being recognised.  
Yet in 2016 a wobble re-emerged following growing China-Australia cooperation. 
The wobble appeared after the US State Department ‘secretly polled nationwide 
opinion of the Northern Territory’s deal to lease [the] Darwin port to Chinese firm 
Landbridge, predicting it would likely force Australians to rethink their choices of 
when to put national security ahead of economic gain’. That ‘the US carried out 
such polling reflected some American doubt about Australia’s strategic 
intentions’.87 The US was not happy with deepening China-Australia relations.88  
Biden’s visit to Sydney at the end of July showed that the US wanted to eliminate 
the wobble by recalibrating US’ significance to Australia in the Indo-Pacific. Biden 
declared, ‘I’m here because that partnership is a living connection between our 
two countries, as vital in our current era of change and uncertainty … we’ve 
shown our commitment to lead in the region over and over again. Anyone who 
questions America’s dedication and staying power in the Asia Pacific simply is not 
paying attention’.89 The US was not comfortable with ‘Beijing's behaviour across 
the Indo-Pacific’ especially regarding increasing tensions in the East and South 
China seas, ‘fuelled by Chinese land reclamation and militarisation’. Biden’s visit 
demonstrated that ‘even the closest relationships require tending. ANZUS should 
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not be taken for granted, and it is not a wholly trouble-free zone’. In Southeast 
Asia, Australia’s interests might cross ‘American ambitions’.90 
The disagreement reflected a significant parallel between Turkish-American and 
Australian-American relations. For trouble spots in the Middle East where 
Australia had little national interest, it was easy for Australian governments to 
follow American priorities. Yet, as with Turkey, neighbourhoods where Canberra 
always had key national priorities, such as developing relations with China, it was 
possible to conflict with US priorities.  
On 18 September 2016 Australian airstrikes targeting what was believed to be 
ISIS elements near Dayr az Zawr turned out to be attacking Syrian government 
affiliated troops.91 Turnbull said that ‘Australian forces, Coalition forces in that 
particular operation, believed they were targeting Daesh units, Daesh fighters, 
units of ISIL’.92 The Minister for Defence, Marise Payne, stated that the 
government ‘regret[s] the loss of life and have extended our deep sympathies to 
the families of those, of members of the Syrian defence force involved’. Payne 
added that ‘Australia will never intentionally, knowingly target a known Syrian 
military unit or in any way, shape or form actively support Daesh. Our mission is 
in fact to remove the threat of Daesh, not support it in any way’.93 In the 
Australian Senate, in October, Acting Chief of the Defence Force Vice Admiral Ray 
Griggs gave an opening statement. He repeated that the Australian Defence 
Forces ‘have been patently clear that Australia would never intentionally target a 
known Syrian government military unit or actively support Daesh’.94 The 
statements showed how much Australian and American priorities coincided on 
Syria. Unlike Turkey, both wanted to defeat ISIS not primarily remove Assad.  
While the convergence of priorities keeping the Australian arm stable, the 
American discomfort regarding Australia-China relations still induced wobbles. 
After Donald Trump’s presidential victory, AUSMIN was cancelled for 2016. The 
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Australian media commented, ‘[i]t’s not a promising sign about the alliance's 
vitality’, and that Washington was shocked ‘late in 2015, at not being told that 
the Port of Darwin - including facilities used by the US Marines - was about to be 
leased for 99 years to a Chinese company with Communist Party links’.95  
In addition to this wobble, 2017 started with the “Trump effect”. 96 The Trump 
administration’s repeated statements of its preference to break the traditions of 
US foreign policy raised questions in Australia ‘about the durability of the 
alliance’.97  
Before the “Trump effect” started to influence bilateral relations, in Washington 
on 26 January, Bishop stated that ‘Australia entered into free trade negotiations 
with the United States and ten other partners because we believed the Trans 
Pacific Partnership [TPP] had the potential to deliver mutual benefits to every 
nation involved’, and that even if ‘the Trump administration has withdrawn its 
support for the TPP’, ‘Australia remains supportive of the principles that 
underpinned the TPP’.98 This was an early signal that in the Indo-Pacific, the 
Turnbull and Trump administrations’ relations began to wobble.  
Turnbull’s first telephone conversation with Trump on 28 January demonstrated 
this. ‘Trump badgered, bragged and abruptly ended [the] phone call with’ 
Turnbull over a refugee agreement.99 Trump’s tone showed that the relations 
would not be as comfortable as before, at least at leaders’ level. 
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Both parties still agreed on Syria. Turnbull stated that ‘[w]e will be engaged and 
we are already engaged, obviously, with the new administration in Washington’, 
and that ‘we have a very intimate, engaged collaboration, alliance, with the 
United States, so we’re working very closely together’.100 After ‘having had very 
detailed meetings’ with Vice President Mike Pence, Secretary of State Rex 
Tillerson, National Security Advisor General Herbert Raymond McMaster, Bishop 
stated that ‘it is clear that a military solution will not resolve the instability, the 
civil war in Syria; there must be a political solution’.101 At a press conference for 
the arrival of an F-35A, Turnbull announced the legal arrangement for increasing 
the efficiency of Australian defence force engagements against ISIS: 
Australian law, as it stood, had the consequence that our defence forces 
in that particularly Syria-Iraq theatre could only target terrorists when 
they were actively engaged in combat. We weren’t able to target them 
when they were in support roles, in logistics, in planning, in financing, 
for example. I changed the law … so that our Australian Defence Force, 
our Air Force, is able to kill terrorists in the Middle East whether they 
have a gun in their hand, a bomb in their hand or whether they are in 
the back office planning an attack or raising money or engaged in 
logistics. [Trump] was very, very impressed to hear about the [defence] 
investment [Australia has] made.102 
Yet close cooperation on Syria still did not ease the wobble regarding China-
Australia relations. ‘Australia’s diplomatic juggling act in wooing Chinese 
investment while strengthening its military alliance with the US’ was not 
appreciated in Washington. The Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, Peter Varghese, stated that ‘Australia ultimately wouldn’t be able to 
avoid facing up to China’s ambition to displace the U.S. as the predominant 
power in Asia [and] judging [this] to be an ambition at the heart of Australia’s 
alliance with the U.S.’103 
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On Syria, on 22 March Bishop attended the Global Coalition Summit to 
emphasize Australia’s efforts in fighting ISIS.104 After the summit Bishop said that 
Australia would ‘continue to pressure ISIS militarily in Iraq and Syria’, and that 
Australia was ‘already one of the largest contributors to the effort to defeat ISIS 
in Syria and Iraq and we will continue to work within the Coalition’. She said that 
Australian and American priorities overlapped on ‘on defeating ISIS in Syria’ and 
retaking ‘the territory that has been claimed by ISIS’.105 Next day, in another 
interview in Washington, Bishop left the door open for providing more troops in 
Syria if the US asked for it. She said ‘[o]f course we will continue to play our part 
and it may well be that we are asked to provide more and we would of course 
consider any specific request at that time’.106 
In April, regardless of the “Trump effect” in Asia, Australian and American 
priorities on Syria were still aligned. The US position was to take unilateral action 
to stop Assad using chemical weapons if the UN failed to provide collective 
action. Bishop stated that ‘[i]f indeed it is the Assad regime as many have 
claimed, that is responsible for [the chemical] attacks, then the first step would 
be … to prevent the Assad regime from continuing’, and that both the US and 
Australia believed that ‘Assad has to be part of the transition to a political 
solution’.107 Turnbull stated, ‘[y]ou know where we stand, we have condemned 
[Assad’s chemical attacks] utterly, it cries out for a strong response and we are 
in close, very close touch as we always are, constant, close and constant 
communication with our allies and in particular the United States’.108 
In May, Turnbull visited Trump. Although both leaders showed warmth,109 
Australian concerns about the closeness of relations concerning the Indo-Pacific 
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were growing110 even while cooperation on Syria was deepening. At the 16th IISS 
Asia Security Summit in June, Turnbull noted the efficiency of the international 
coalition against ISIS. Regarding Australia’s concerns about the US-China rivalry 
in the Indo-Pacific he stated:  
Now some commentators argue that Australia has to choose between 
Beijing and Washington. It is an utterly false choice - we have a good 
friend and partner in Beijing and a steadfast friend and ally in 
Washington. Nothing constrains us in our dealings with the other, 
neither constrains us in our dealings with the other - our foreign policy 
is determined in Australia’s national interest and Australia’s alone. We 
know that our security and our prosperity depends on the continued 
stability and peace of this region, a condition which can only be 
achieved if all nations can pursue their own destinies free of coercion or 
interference. Our Alliance with the United States reflects a deep 
alignment of interests and values but it has never been a straightjacket 
for Australian policy-making. 111 
On 5 June, both sides met for 2017 AUSMIN consultations. The resultant joint 
statement stressed the ‘strength and vitality’ of the alliance, and claimed 
efficiency in US-Australia cooperation on fighting ISIS. Australia’s main concern 
was Indo-Pacific security. ‘Australia and the United States underlined their 
shared, deepening commitment to the security, stability and prosperity of the 
Indo-Pacific region, and to strong regional organisations, especially the East Asia 
Summit, APEC, and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus’.112 Tillerson 
particularly emphasized US appreciation for Australia’s contribution in Syria. ‘We 
are certainly grateful for Australia’s commitment to defeating ISIS in Iraq and 
Syria, [or] wherever else they may show their face - and certainly their face is 
appearing in the region. Countering violent extremism, stemming the flow of 
foreign terrorist fighters, and shutting down propaganda arms online remains a 
shared goal for both the United States and Australia’.113 The wobble on the arm 
did not change its now traditional trend.  
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At the launch of a Foreign Policy White Paper in November, Turnbull stated, 
‘[o]ur alliance with the United States reflects a deep alignment of interests and 
values, while never being a straitjacket for Australian policymaking’. He added: 
Now there is no more important bilateral relationship in the world than 
that of China and the United States. I have seen firsthand that 
Presidents Trump and Xi respect and understand each other, both on 
the issues on which they agree and those on which they differ. 114 
At the end of the year Bishop repeated the significance of the Australia-US 
alliance at the “G’Day USA 2018” launch. She said Australia and the US ‘are 
natural partners’ and that the US ‘is also [Australia’s] most important strategic 
partner in defence, intelligence and security terms’. She added that ‘today US 
and Australian servicemen and women are working together to counter terrorism 
in Syria’.115  
In 2018, the arm was still stable and trending upwards regarding Syria, even if 
ISIS began to lose some weight in the security agendas of both countries.  The 
ISIS problem in Syria was now becoming a concern about foreign terrorist 
fighters returning to Australia. For this continuing threat Australia was still 
working very closely with the US.116 In February Bishop met Tillerson in Kuwait 
for Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS meeting. There both parties declared the 
significance of their collaborative efforts in defeating ISIS elements in Syria and 
Iraq. Yet Bishop added Australia’s concern that ISIS ‘may no longer hold Iraqi 
territory, but most certainly, some of its members are seeking to hide among the 
general population and return to the tactics of insurgency’.117 Although this would 
not affect Australia’s relations with the US: ‘[w]e have a very close relationship 
with the United States and we will continue to work with them on common 
challenges in our region and globally and specifically on issues we already have 
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underway, for example, our work in the coalition to defeat terrorism, in Iraq, 
Syria’.118 
In Washington at the end of February, Turnbull reiterated Bishop’s concerns. He 
said, ‘[now that] the so-called caliphate has been rolled up in Syria, you’re 
seeing foreign fighters coming back to the region. It’s very, very important that 
we work seamlessly, as closely as possible with our partners in the region to 
ensure that we do not get a sort of revival of ISIL in this region’.119 Trump shared 
Australia’s concerns and ‘thanked … Australia's leadership on counterterrorism 
issues in Southeast Asia and its substantial contributions to the Global Coalition 
to Defeat ISIS. They discussed further cooperation as terrorist fighters depart 
Iraq and Syria’.120 Both leaders emphasized their coordinated efforts for a 
political settlement in Syria and to fight ISIS.121 Turnbull underlined the main 
reason for the success of Australia-US cooperation. ‘Australia and the United 
States, we define our national identities, not by race or religion or ethnicity but 
rather by commitment to shared political values of freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law, mutual respect’.122 
Cooperation continued without wobbles when Assad used chemical weapons in 
Douma. Australia waited for the US before reacting. Bishop then said that 
‘President Trump has indicated that the United States will decide [on] a response 
shortly. Australia will obviously take into account any request from the United 
States and our allies in relation to this matter’.123 In practice, ‘[i]n relation to the 
recent chemical weapons attack in Syria, overnight Australia has co-sponsored a 
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United States UN Security resolution calling for the establishment of a new UN 
investigative mechanism to assess this chemical weapons attack’.124  
Turnbull repeated Australia’s support for US airstrikes. ‘Today, the United States, 
United Kingdom and France responded forcefully to the Syrian regime’s illegal 
use of chemical weapons on 7 April in Douma. Australia supports these strikes, 
which demonstrate a calibrated, proportionate and targeted response’.125 
At AUSMIN consultations in July, the Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo gave ‘a 
firm commitment that the US will not pull back on its engagement in the Indo-
Pacific region’.126 Pompeo confirmed, ‘our cooperation and our efforts and our 
alliance is rock solid’. Not only in Syria but also for Indo-Pacific security and a 
de-nuclearised North Korea ‘[t]he United States and Australia speak with one 
voice’.127 ‘The Secretaries and Ministers underscored their shared commitment to 
ISIS’s lasting defeat in Iraq and Syria’.128 
In October Foreign Minister Marise Payne visited Washington, but discussed ISIS 
in Syria very little. Both parties’ focus shifted to the return of foreign fighters to 
Southeast Asia, and Indo-Pacific security.129 In November, Australia foreign and 
defence policy increased its attention on balancing China and the US in Indo-
Pacific. Payne stated:  
the stability of our region depends on relations between two of our most 
important partners. They are the United States and China. They are 
economically interdependent and their own relationships are 
sophisticated. They’re multifaceted. So we want to continue to ensure 
the strength and vitality of our own relationship with the United States. 
It’s fundamental to our security. But we can also be strengthening our 
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relations with China … particularly through advancing our 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. 130 
At the end of the year, Syria became a hot topic in Australia once more with 
Trump’s decision to pull US troops out of Syria. On 19 December Trump ‘ordered 
the withdrawal of 2,000 American troops from Syria, bringing a sudden end to a 
military campaign that largely vanquished the Islamic State’.131 After the decision 
US Defence Secretary James Mattis resigned, which kept Australian Defence 
personnel wondering about what would be Trump’s next move in the Middle 
East.132 
The Wobbly Cross: 
Turkish and Australian relations with the US regarding the Syrian crisis highlight 
the reasons for the wobbly cross. Both middle powers were in need of US support 
but for different levels of urgency. Turkey acknowledged the imbalance in its 
relations with the US since it needed US help in removing President Assad, 
alleviating the financial pressure of Syrian refugees, eliminating the PYD/YPG 
threat, and resolving additional national security issues such as the extradition of 
Fethullah Gülen. On almost none of these Turkish priorities, Turkey and the US 
agreed. Turkey tried to punch above its weight by urging the US to adapt its 
priorities to Turkey. Throughout the crisis it became clear that Turkey never had 
that capability. The US priority was shifted from removing Assad to eliminating 
Islamic extremists, particularly ISIS, with the PYD/YPG’s militia support. Almost 
every high-level correspondence between Turkish and American officials stated 
the importance of Turkish-American cooperation but only for the US priority of 
fighting ISIS. In other words, the US tailored Turkey’s priority. Divergence of 
priorities, policies and tactics induced incurable wobbles and sustained the 
downward sloping tendency of the Turkish arm.  
Australia did not have close national security priorities in Syria, since the crisis 
did not pose a direct threat until the “lone wolf” attacks in Melbourne and 
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Sydney. Therefore it was easier for Australia to adapt its priorities to the US in 
Syria. Australia followed the changes in US priorities from removing Assad to 
humanitarian intervention, from extended airstrikes to eliminating ISIS. As in the 
Gulf and Iraq wars, Australia very closely followed US policies and tactics. The 
ANZUS tradition and a common language aided Australia in following the US 
lead. 
The Syrian crisis highlighted another aspect of the wobbly cross. The severity of 
national priorities makes it difficult for the middle power to adapt to the great 
power. When these priorities conflicted, sometimes acknowledging the imbalance 
in bilateral relations did not help. The great power expected the middle power to 
adapt to it. The US wanted Australia to diminish its cooperation with China and 
focus on ANZUS collaboration. Similarly the US ignored Turkey’s concerns 
regarding the PYD/PYD and asked for support in fighting ISIS. Both middle 
powers had to comply because of their continuing need or desire for US support, 





Conclusion: Testing the “Wobbly Cross” 
This thesis compares Turkish-American and Australian-American relations from 
c.1975 and to the end of 2018. It aims to test and extend the argument put 
forward in my doctoral thesis that the diagonally opposite courses of these 
relations between the early 1940s and the mid 1970s continued until today. The 
case studies selected demonstrate that the arms of the cross not only sustained 
their opposite courses, but still wobble as US relations oscillate. The “wobbles” 
are the result of middle power leaders’ national security concerns set against 
their seeking self-reliance and national autonomy. The diagonal shape of the 
wobbly cross is caused by divergence in middle power with local and national 
priorities from a great power with global priorities.  
Although Turkey and Australia are so dissimilar in their political culture, customs 
and institutions, the “wobbly cross” highlights the consequences of inherent 
factors in the situation of middle powers. These factors mainly relate to two 
conceptual aspects: an imbalance in relations and a divergence in priorities. 
These aspects constantly interact in structuring the “wobbly cross”.  
A middle power’s relations with a great power are imbalanced. Even if they 
operate within an alliance framework, for example NATO or ANZUS, a middle 
power’s need for the great power is much greater and more diverse than the 
reverse. Both Turkey and Australia illustrate this. Because of its permanently 
fragile economy, Turkey has always needed foreign financial aid. Either via 
bilateral agreements or via the IMF, the US has provided most of this, which has 
generated an accumulating dependence, or an imbalance. In the 1990s and 
2000s, Turkey tried to turn this imbalance into an interdependency by seeking to 
increase bilateral trade. The US constantly rejected this. Turkey’s continuing 
financial dependence on the US thus pushed Turkish leaders to acknowledge the 
imbalance and to try to act as a loyal US ally.  
US military aid to support Turkey’s defence budget and its armed forces 
intensified this imbalance, because at the same time Turkey needed US 
diplomatic and political support for their attempts to join the EU. A similar need 
for US politico-diplomatic and military support to strengthen Turkey’s position in 
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the Middle East occurred with the Gulf War and intensified with the Arab Spring. 
The US then needed Turkey, but only in the military and security realms. Turkey 
has always been both a useful barrier to block Russian influence in the eastern 
Mediterranean and the Middle East, and a significant logistic line for US 
operations in the region. Turkey has strategic NATO bases, for example İncirlik, 
critical to US deployments and airstrikes. The US administration’s ultimate aim 
has been to use these bases without much Turkish interference.  
Australia too has an imbalanced relationship with the US, but some differences 
put Canberra in a stronger position vis-à-vis Ankara. First, Australia’s economy is 
not fragile nor reliant on US aid. The American and Australian economies in the 
finance, education, and service sectors interact near-seamlessly. This lets both 
countries deepen cooperation in trade and investment. Second, geographically 
Australia is far from the trouble spots of the Middle East, where the US has given 
most of its strategic attention in recent decades. Third, Australia has not needed 
US diplomatic or political support to strengthen its position in an international 
organization. The major imbalance in Australia-US relations is strategic. Australia 
seeks US support for high-tech military and intelligence equipment and data. 
More importantly, Australia needs a US strategic/military presence in the Indo-
Pacific to feel secure. In other words, Australia’s need for US support was for 
perceived threats, Turkey’s was for acute and actual threats. Had the crises been 
in the Indo-Pacific, and not in the Middle East, the trend of the “wobbly cross” 
might have reversed. 
The case studies show that the imbalance in Australia-US relations was not as 
vulnerable as in Turkish-US relations. For decades, even after the end of the Cold 
War, the US alliance was accepted as indispensable to Australian defence and 
foreign affairs. Almost always, Australia worked for “alliance solidarity”, 
expecting that via this solidarity, the US would be anchored in Asia. The US 
alliance was seen as an insurance policy, and fighting for the US was its premium 
payment.  
While imbalance directly affected Turkish-US and Australian-US relations, conflict 
in priorities were more significant for the trend of the arms.  
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This thesis uses national “priorities” rather than national “interests” in order to 
distinguish general from context-oriented national aims. National priorities were 
used to elaborate the latter. Since the 1970s, Turkey and the US have had 
similar national interests: stability in the eastern Mediterranean, strengthening 
NATO’s south-eastern wing, developing Turkey’s defence posture. Yet the case 
studies show that their national priorities were different. Turkey wanted to 
reduce its financial dependence on the US, and to be a rule maker in the Middle 
East by extending its influence in Iraq and Syria strategically and economically. 
Turkey also wanted to eliminate the PKK threat. In high level talks, US officials 
noted the importance of Turkey’s priorities but in practice did not wholeheartedly 
support any of them. Instead they expected Turkey to adapt its priorities to the 
US. Özal and Erdoğan tried this, but could not suppress anti-American feeling in 
the Opposition or in public opinion. Whenever priorities converged, for example 
fighting ISIS or opening the İncirlik base, wobbles eased and relations 
strengthened. But such convergence happened only a few times. Divergent 
priorities sustained the Turkish arm’s tendency. 
The US also expected Australia to adjust its priorities to the US. Australia was 
more successful in this, for several reasons. First, since 1952 Australia and the 
US had a common threat perception, maintained and developed within the 
ANZUS alliance. Second, this perception produced a common understanding or 
culture, facilitating each other’s expectations. Third, following US policies became 
a habit particularly for Australian conservatives. Fourth, the crises of the period 
did not directly affect Australian priorities, which were mainly focused on the 
Indo-Pacific. As a result Australia’s success in adapting its priorities to the US 
sustained the Australian arms trend and kept Australia close to the US.  
The Australian and the Turkish leadership and opposition were important factors 
in adjusting priorities. For Turkey, Özal and Erdoğan were both eager to develop 
relations with the US. Both tried to use the crises in the Middle East to increase 
Turkey’s role in US strategic calculations. Yet by doing so they alienated the 
Opposition in parliament, the bureaucracy, and the public. Erdoğan was more 
successful in suppressing such opposition but he developed his own anti-
Americanism, particularly during the Syrian crisis. 
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Under the influence of the Guam Doctrine, Whitlam attempted an active and self-
reliant foreign policy, creating tensions with Nixon. This was easily resolved by 
Fraser. Hawke also took small steps towards self-reliance but his government’s 
pro-American statements and actions prevented any significant wobble. Howard 
had close personal relations with Bush, which sustained his pro-American outlook 
and policies. Gillard, Rudd, Abbott, and Turnbull all followed US policies within 
the ANZUS spirit. None of these leaders seriously struggled against an anti-
American opposition in parliament, as in Turkey.  
Another important difference between Turkey and Australia is their relative 
cultural affinity with the US. Although Turkey has been a NATO member since 
1952, with several strategic NATO bases on its soil, and has developed a wide-
variety of interactions with the US, the two countries find it hard to cultivate a 
common language of understanding. On several regional and global issues since 
1975 they have had common interests but could not transform these into joint 
priorities. On many issues communications were like the “dialogue of the deaf”.  
Since ANZUS Australia and the US have developed a culture of understanding 
and mutual support. They support each other on regional and global platforms. 
Although ANZUS is not a security organization as developed and effective as 
NATO, it helps the two countries keep up efficient communication. After the US 
minimized relations with New Zealand within ANZUS, Australia became the sole 
pivot of the organization, which increased its value as an ally for US strategic 
plans.  
The developments in Turkish-American and Australian-American relations during 
the Syrian crisis highlighted three significant aspects related to the “wobbly 
cross”. These aspects were also valid in previous cases but more clearly 
observed during the Syrian crisis. First, middle powers cannot change a great 
power’s key priorities. Erdoğan tried to align US priorities with Turkey on 
removing Assad, on the perceived threat posed by the PYD/YPG’s increasing 
influence in northern Iraq and Syria, and on Fettulah Gülen’s extradition. None of 
his attempts worked. Australian governments did the opposite. They adapted 
Australian priorities to the US on humanitarian aid to Syria, keeping Assad in 
power, and fighting ISIS. Second, a middle power and a great power could 
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effectively cooperate and strengthen their alliance only on the great power’s 
priorities. Both Australia and Turkey cooperated most effectively with the US on 
fighting ISIS, which was the US’ central priority. Third, a middle power can most 
successfully align its priorities to a great power in realms where the middle 
power’s priorities are not acute or significant. In Syria, where the Assad regime, 
the increasing number of refugees, and the PYD/YPG posed threats to Turkey, 
Erdoğan could not tailor Turkey’s priorities to the US.  
Ironically, in the Indo-Pacific Australia’s priorities might assume an importance 
similar to Turkey’s priorities in Syria and Iraq. The Indo-Pacific is not only 
significant for Australia, but is also a theatre of China-US rivalry. Australia’s 
efforts to balance its relations with these two great powers at the same time 
does not make the US particularly happy. During the Syrian crisis, Australia and 
the US did manage to ease Indo-Pacific wobbles via the ANZUS psyche, but 
Australia-China cooperation could induce future wobbles on the Australian arm, 
as Canberra may not so easily align its priorities with the US. It is not impossible 
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